Search Results Page

Search Results

1 - 3 of 3 (2.11 seconds)

V.N. Narayanan Nair And Ors. vs State Of Kerala And Ors. on 14 August, 1970

In Chintamoni Prathihari v. State of Orissa, AIR 1958 Orissa 18 the court said that a village granted for the maintenance of the deity of Shri Jagannath Mahaprabhu could be acquired under the provisions of the Estates Abolition Act, that that would not interfere with the fundamental right under Article 26 of the Constitution, and that the question was concluded by the decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 1952 SC 252 while dealing with the decision of the Allahabad High Court in AIR 1951 All 674. But the question here is, can a State acquire the property of a religious denomination in pursuance of a law which does not provide for compensation at all or provides only for illusory compensation, if the law is protected by Article 31-A? The question, in other words, is whether Clause (c) of Article 26 is subject to a law other than a law relating to public order, morality or health? The right of a religious denomination to administer its property is expressly made "subject to other laws. Can we say that the right to own and acquire property is also subject to the other relevant laws despite the fact that it is not expressly made subject to those laws? The Bombay High Court in AIR 1970 Bom 23 considered the question whether Sections 32 to 32-R and the proviso to Section 88-B (1) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 67 of 1948, violated the fundamental right of religious institutions under Article 26 (c). The court said that if the property of a religious denomination is held subject only to laws relating to public order, morality or health, it would lead to several anomalies. The court observed:
Kerala High Court Cites 174 - Cited by 57 - K K Mathew - Full Document

Namdhari Gurudwara vs Nakbinoo And Ors. on 27 September, 1968

(3) ARTIC. 26, Cl. (c) provides that Subect to public order, morality and health, every religious denomination or any section thereof shall have the right to own and acquire movable and immovable property and the argument is that as such institutions have been thereby guaranteed the right to own property, any acquisition of their property is a contravention of the provisions of the Art. Art. 19(1)(f) is distinguished from Art. 26, Cl. (c) on the ground that ownership of property is guaranteed under the latter but nto under the former. This argument we think to be wholly fallacious. Art. 26, Cl. (c), confers on every religious denomination the right to own and acquire property but it does no more than this, and we can see no ground for holding that it prevents, or was intended to prevent property belonging to a religious body being acquired by authority of law. The second decision cited on behalf of the respondents is Chintamoni Prathilri v. The State of Orissa, in which acquisition of Devadayam inam under section 3 of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act was held nto to interfere with the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 26, Lastly, my attention has been invited to the State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh, In that decision, the State Legislature's power to acquire trust properties was upheld and it was added that a charity created by a private individual is nto immune from the sovereign's power to compulsorily acquire that property for public purposes. Mahajan, J. (as he then was) continued to observe that it wa.s incorrect to say that the vesting of these properties in the State under the provisions of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act in any way affected the charity adversely because the net income that the institutions were deriving from the properties had been made the basis of compensation awarded to them.
Delhi High Court Cites 16 - Cited by 0 - I D Dua - Full Document
1