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Suvadip Mukherjee vs The State Of West Bengal & Anr on 16 May, 2008

14. I have given my anxious and thoughtful consideration to the submissions made by Mr. Basu. However, I am unable to accept the contention of Mr. Basu I find both the decisions are on two different and distinct issue and there was no conflict. While in the case of Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra (supra) the Apex Court laid down the role to be played by a Court while considering the question of framing charge and held that Court must not frame charge automatically, simply because the prosecution proposed on the materials collected during investigation it would be proper for framing charge but it shall fully advert to the materials placed before it by the prosecution and shall satisfy itself whether such materials prima facie make out the offence against the accused justifying framing of charge i.e. the Court must not blindly follow the decision of the prosecuting agency.
Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side) Cites 23 - Cited by 1 - A K Roy - Full Document

V. C. Shukla vs State Through C.B.I on 7 December, 1979

Although this Court said that the Code does not define an interlocutory order, it does not include an intermediate order made during the preliminary stages, of an inquiry or trial. This Court laid greater stress on the fact that an order which was directed against a person who was not a party to the inquiry or trial and had, therefore, no opportunity to place his point of view could not be bound by any order passed against him. This appears to be the ratio of that case. Reliance was also placed on a decision of this Court in the case of Century Spinning & Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. The State of Maharashtra in order to urge that the stag, of framing of charges is a matter of moment and an order framing a charge could not be termed as an interlocutory order. In the first place, the judgment of the aforesaid case was rendered before the Code of 1973 was passed and, therefore, the interpretation of interlocutory order as contained in s. 397 (2) of the Code could not have arisen for consideration. Secondly, the decision was given on the scope and ambit of s. 251A of the Code of 1898 AS amended by the Act of 1958. Dealing with the scope of sub- sections (2) and (3) of s. 251A of the Code of 1898, this Court observed as follows:(1) "The argument that the Court at the stage of framing the charges has not to apply its judicial mind for considering whether or not there is a ground for presuming the commission of the of offence by the accused is not supportable either on the, plain language of the section or on its judicial interpretation or on any other recognised principal of law. The order framing the charges does substantially affect the person's liberty and it is not possible to countenance the view that the Court must automatically frame the charge merely because the prosecuting authorities, by relying on the documents referred to in Section 173, consider it proper to institute the case. The responsibility of framing the charges is that of the Court and it has to judicially consider the question of doing so. Without fully adverting to the mate rial on the record it must not blindly adopt the decision of the prosecution."
Supreme Court of India Cites 70 - Cited by 603 - S M Ali - Full Document

Kanwal Prakash Singh & Anr vs The State Of West Bengal & Anr on 17 June, 2022

(1972) 3 SCC 282, It is laid down in the case that where there is no ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, then the accused must be discharged. However, it is argued that, it is not profitable for the petitioners to rely on the said decision as the Learned Trial Judge, while rejecting the application for discharge of the petitioners was of the view that from the materials on record a prima facie case alleged against the petitioner has been made out by the complainant. In my considered view the above decision does not lend support to the petitioners' case.
Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side) Cites 40 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

State Of Karnataka vs Firm 'Hotel Nagarjun' And Others on 8 October, 1991

But, Sri Mahabaleshwaragouda, learned counsel for the respondents accused in Criminal Revision Petition No. 452/1988 and whose argument was adopted by Sri Jayavittal Kolar with supplemental submissions submitted that the above mentioned decision of this Court cannot be regarded as having laid down the law properly in view of the observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of Century Spinning and Manufacturing Company Limited v. State of Maharashtra, .
Karnataka High Court Cites 15 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

State Of Karnataka vs Firm Hotel Nagarjun on 8 October, 1990

In my view, there is nothing helpful to the respondents-accused in the case of Century Spinning and Manufacturing Company Limited and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra. In the said case, the Textile Commissioner had cautioned the Century Spinning Mills against committing irregularities by violating the provisions of the notification issued under the Essential Commodities Act, but, he had felt fully satisfied that there was no cogent ground for prosecuting the mills for an alleged violation of the notification issued. Nevertheless, prosecution was launched against the management of the mills and its officers under Section 7 of the Act for the offence of criminal conspiracy under Section 120B I.P.C. read with Section 7 of the Act and also for the substantive offence under Section 7 of the Act. It was contended on behalf of the accused that since the Textile Commissioner had condoned the offence, If any, committed by the accused as per Deviation Order dated 26-6-1965 in which only a warning was given to the mills and there was no mens rea on the part of the accused, the trial Magistrate took the view that the Deviation Orders issued in favour of the mills clearly stated that it was exempted from compliance with the directions contained in paragraph-8A read with Schedule II-A of the Notification, dated 22-9-1949, with the result that it must be held that as far as the mill is concerned those directions had not at all been issued with respect to Param Sukh dhotis of 140 Cms., and having constructional particulars in question were concerned and, therefore, the mill could not be said to have contravened the 3 Notifications imposing the statutory control, by manufacturing the disputed varieties of Param Sukh dhotis.
Karnataka High Court Cites 17 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Rajeev Sharma vs Pradeep Kumar on 28 March, 2025

Although this Court said that the Code does not define an interlocutory order, it does not include an intermediate order made during the preliminary stages, of an inquiry or trial. This Court laid greater stress on the fact that an order which was directed against a person who was not a party to the inquiry or trial and had, therefore, no opportunity to place his point of view could not be bound by any order passed against him. This appears to be the ratio of that case. Reliance was also placed on a decision of this Court in the case of Century Spinning & Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. The State of Maharashtra in order to urge that the stag, of framing of charges is a matter of moment and an order framing a charge could not be termed as an interlocutory order. In the first place, the judgment of the aforesaid case was rendered before the Code of 1973 was passed and, therefore, the interpretation of interlocutory order as contained in s. 397 (2) of the Code could not have arisen for consideration. Secondly, the decision was given on the scope and ambit of s. 251A of the Code of 1898 AS amended by the Act of 1958. Dealing with the scope of subĀ­ sections (2) and (3) of s. 251A of the Code of 1898, this Court observed as follows:(1) "The argument that the Court at the stage of framing the charges has not to apply its judicial mind for considering whether or not there is a ground for presuming the commission of the of offence by the accused is not supportable either on the, plain language of the section or on its judicial interpretation or on any 33 ( 2025:HHC:9529 ) other recognised principal of law. The order framing the charges does substantially affect the person's liberty and it is not possible to countenance the view that the Court must automatically frame the charge merely because the prosecuting authorities, by relying on the documents referred to in Section 173, consider it proper to institute the case. The responsibility of framing the charges is that of the Court and it has to judicially consider the question of doing so. Without fully adverting to the mate rial on the record it must not blindly adopt the decision of the prosecution."
Himachal Pradesh High Court Cites 45 - Cited by 0 - V Singh - Full Document

Rajeev Sharma vs Pradeep Kumar on 28 March, 2025

Although this Court said that the Code does not define an interlocutory order, it does not include an intermediate order made during the preliminary stages, of an inquiry or trial. This Court laid greater stress on the fact that an order which was directed against a person who was not a party to the inquiry or trial and had, therefore, no opportunity to place his point of view could not be bound by any order passed against him. This appears to be the ratio of that case. Reliance was also placed on a decision of this Court in the case of Century Spinning & Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. The State of Maharashtra in order to urge that the stag, of framing of charges is a matter of moment and an order framing a charge could not be termed as an interlocutory order. In the first place, the judgment of the aforesaid case was rendered before the Code of 1973 was passed and, therefore, the interpretation of interlocutory order as contained in s. 397 (2) of the Code could not have arisen for consideration. Secondly, the decision was given on the scope and ambit of s. 251A of the Code of 1898 AS amended by the Act of 1958. Dealing with the scope of subĀ­ sections (2) and (3) of s. 251A of the Code of 1898, this Court observed as follows:(1) "The argument that the Court at the stage of framing the charges has not to apply its judicial mind for considering whether or not there is a ground for presuming the commission of the of offence by the accused is not supportable either on the, plain language of the section or on its judicial interpretation or on any 33 ( 2025:HHC:9529 ) other recognised principal of law. The order framing the charges does substantially affect the person's liberty and it is not possible to countenance the view that the Court must automatically frame the charge merely because the prosecuting authorities, by relying on the documents referred to in Section 173, consider it proper to institute the case. The responsibility of framing the charges is that of the Court and it has to judicially consider the question of doing so. Without fully adverting to the mate rial on the record it must not blindly adopt the decision of the prosecution."
Himachal Pradesh High Court Cites 45 - Cited by 0 - V Singh - Full Document

Rajeev @ Rajesh Sehgal vs State Of U.P. And 3 Others on 9 July, 2025

"10. On the other hand, the decisions cited. by learned counsel for the respondents in Vadilal Panchaly. D.D. Gha- digaonkar(1) and Cen-tarS, Spinning & Manufacturing Co. v. State of Maharashtra(2) show that it is wrong to say that at the stage of flaming charges the court cannot apply. its judicial mind to the consideration whether or not there is any ground for presuming the commission of the offence by the accused. As observed in the latter case, the order framing a charge affects a person's liberty substantially and therefore it is the duty of the court to consider judi- cially whether the material warrants the framing of the charge. It cannot blindly accept the decision of the prose- cution that the accused be. asked to face a trial.
Allahabad High Court Cites 32 - Cited by 0 - R Misra - Full Document

Priya Sharan Maharaj Alias Yadavendra ... vs State Of Maharashtra on 6 February, 1995

"On the other hand, the decisions cited by learned counsel for the respondents in Vadilal Panchal v. D. D. Ghadigaonkar, and Century Spinning & Manufacturing Co. v. State of Maharashtra, show that it is wrong to say that at the stage of framing charges the Court cannot apply its judicial mind to the consideration whether or not there is any ground for presuming the commission of the offence by the accused. As observed in the latter case, the order framing a charge affects a person's liberty substaintially and therefore it is the duty of the Court to consider judicially whether the material warrants the framing of the charge. It cannot blindly accept the decision of the prosecution that the accused be asked to face a trial.
Bombay High Court Cites 62 - Cited by 7 - Full Document
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