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Dayal Krishnan vs Assessing Authority-Cum-Excise And ... on 22 March, 1966

"No doubt a petition under Section 16 is a discretionary remedy but it cannot be inferred therefrom that the revisional authority has the power to impose conditions which are not warranted by a statute. Rule 25 and especially the condition with regard to the payment of tax can be Justified under the first proviso to Section 15 of the Act which says that no appeal shall be entertained by an authority unless satisfied that the amount of tax assessed has been paid. Rules 25 and 26 have to be applied in the case of revision "mutatis mutandis" which phrase is defined in Shorter Oxford Dictionary to mean "thing being changed that have to be changed, i. e., with necessary changes". Rules 25 and 26, in other words have to be read with such changes as have to be introduced to bring it in accord with the provisions of the statute and the rules made thereunder. Though the condition of payment of tax is justified in the case of appeals, being provided in the Act itself, it cannot be read to be an essential corollary in the hearing of a revision petition. It is argued by Mr. Sharma, for the respondents, on the analogy of a Division Bench authority of this Court in Burma-Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Co. of India Ltd. v. Punjab State, 1964-15 STC 624 (Punj) that the condition with regard to payment of tax can be read in construing Rule 28. In the Division Bench authority it was held that the words "at any time" in Section 21 of the Pun-Jab General Sales Tax Act can be construed to Justify the Revising Authority placing restriction of 90 days in filing the petition for revision. In my opinion, this authority cannot be used as a support for the proposition contended for by the learned counsel for the respondent. The fetter which is now sought to be imposed on Section 16 and Rule 28 cannot be justified on the simple ground that the pre-requisite of payment of the assessed tax is not provided for in Section 16 and the rule-making power cannot travel beyond the specific terms of this lection in the Act."
Punjab-Haryana High Court Cites 29 - Cited by 1 - I D Dua - Full Document

Bahadur Chand Chaman Lal vs The Punjab State on 8 January, 1970

9. In the end we wish to make it clear that we may not be understood as laying down that in the absence of a statutory period of limitation, the Financial Commissioner under Section 21(3) cannot follow a reasonable rule of practice specifying the period within which he would normally exercise his revisional jurisdiction. In fact such a practice is both necessary and inevitable. On this point we are entirely in agreement with the views earlier expressed by the Division Bench in Kangra Valley State Company Limited v. The Punjab State and Anr. [1961]12 S.T.C. 362, and particularly the following observations of Khanna, J., in Burmah-Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Company of India Ltd. v. The Punjab State [1964]15 S.T.C. 624.:
Punjab-Haryana High Court Cites 11 - Cited by 1 - Full Document
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