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Nitte Education Trust And Another vs Union Of India And Another on 18 March, 1996

In Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka, , their Lordships of the Supreme Court condemned the charging of capitation fee as a consideration for admission and held it to be illegal. It further held, the action of permitting the capitation fee to be charged by State-recognised educational institutions to be ultra vires as it enables the rich to take admissions where the poor have to withdraw due to financial inability.
Karnataka High Court Cites 30 - Cited by 2 - Full Document

M/S Kammavari Sangha, vs Department Of Income Tax on 17 June, 2016

Therefore, we are of the view that the receipts of the assessee from the parents of students is nothing but capitation fees and once capitation fee is charged for admission of the students by the educational institution, the educational institution can be held that it is not engaged in charitable activities, but selling the education in the light of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ms. Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka & Ors. (1992) 3 SCC 666 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that capitation fees was nothing but price of selling education and such "teaching shops" were contrary to the Constitutional scheme and abhorrent to our Indian culture.
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal - Bangalore Cites 20 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Vignana Educational Foundation vs Ntr University Of Health Sciences And ... on 7 February, 2003

35. Appeals were filed before the Supreme Court with special leave against the decision of the Full Bench. These appeals were heard along with connected matters filed by various managements running engineering colleges in the States of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu contending that the law laid down in Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka (supra) is not correct. Hon'ble Sri Justice Jeevan Reddy who delivered majority Judgment in Unni Krishnan considered three questions. On the first question whether Constitution of India guarantees fundamental right to education to citizens, it was held that the fundamental right to free education is available to children until they complete the age of fourteen years and thereafter it is the obligation of the State to provide education subject to limits of its economic capacity and development. Second point related to the question as to whether a citizen has a fundamental right to establish and run educational institutions under Article 19(1)(g). In Unni Krishnan, it was held that imparting education cannot be treated as trade or business though it may fall under category of "occupation", provided no recognition is sought from the State or the affiliation from the University is asked for on the basis that it is a fundamental right. Dealing with the third question as to whether it is permissible for the University to impose obligations upon educational institutions to act fairly in the matter of admission of students, it was held that private educational institutions merely supplement the efforts of the State in educating the people and therefore what applies to the main activity applies equally to" the supplemental activity and as the State cannot claim immunity from the obligations of Articles 14 and 15, a private educational institution cannot also claim such immunity and no such immunity can be conferred by the State.
Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana) Cites 55 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Janhit Abhiyan vs Union Of India on 7 November, 2022

Mohini Jain [Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka, (1992) 3 SCC 666] seems to say, yes. With respect, we cannot agree with such a broad proposition. The right to education which is implicit in the right to life and personal liberty guaranteed by Article 21 must be construed in the light of the directive principles in Part IV of the Constitution. So far as the right to education is concerned, there are several articles in Part IV which expressly speak of it. Article 41 says that the "State shall, within the limits of its economic capacity and development, make effective provision for securing the right to work, to education and to public assistance in cases of unemployment, old age, sickness and disablement, and in other cases of undeserved want". Article 45 says that "the State shall endeavour to provide, within a period of ten years from the commencement of this Constitution, for free and compulsory education for all children until they complete the age of fourteen years". Article 46 commands that "the State shall promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people, and, in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, and shall protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation”. Education means knowledge ─ and "knowledge itself is power”. As rightly observed by John Adams, "the preservation of means of knowledge among the lowest ranks is of more importance to the public than all the property of all the rich men in the country". (Dissertation on Canon and Feudal Law, 1765) It is this concern which seems to underlie Article 46. It is the tyrants and bad rulers who are afraid of spread of education and knowledge among the deprived classes. Witness Hitler railing against universal education. He said: "Universal education is the 29 most corroding and disintegrating poison that liberalism has ever invented for its own destruction." (Rauschning, The Voice of Destruction: Hitler speaks.) A true democracy is one where education is universal, where people understand what is good for them and the nation and know how to govern themselves. The three Articles 45, 46 and 41 are designed to achieve the said goal among others. It is in the light of these Articles that the content and parameters of the right to education have to be determined. Right to education, understood in the context of Articles 45 and 41, means:
Supreme Court of India Cites 281 - Cited by 5 - D Maheshwari - Full Document

A Citizen Of India vs State Of Karnataka And Ors. on 20 September, 1996

2. The experience of the working of the 1956 Act had brought to light certain inadequacies. The Central Government had introduced a comprehensive Bill to amend the 1956 Act in Rajya Sabha on the 26th August 1987 and the Joint committee submitted its report in 1989 recommending further amendments to the Bill. The matter could not be processed further due to dissolution of the Lok Sabha and change in government. However, by early 1992 it became necessary to reconsider some of the recommendations contained in the Joint Committee's report keeping in view the current requirements of medical education. While the matter was in an advanced stage of consideration, the Supreme Court of India in the Judgment in MOHINI JAIN v. GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA on 30th July, 1992, held that educational institutions cannot charge capitation fee and that education, including higher education, is a fundamental right. A number of private institutions have challenged the above mentioned judgment and sought a review by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court of India have since pronounced the judgment on 4th February 1993. The implications of the judgment will have to be studied. In the circumstances, Government, has, therefore, considered it advisable not to proceed with 1987 Bill as many of the matters covered by the Bill wilt become subject of review by the Supreme Court.
Karnataka High Court Cites 46 - Cited by 9 - Full Document

Dr. Jaya Thakur vs Government Of India on 30 January, 2026

“20. The right to education is a fundamental right under Article 21-A inserted by the Eighty-sixth Amendment of the Constitution. Even before the said amendment, this Court has treated the right to education as a fundamental right. (Vide Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka [(1992) 3 SCC 666 : AIR 1992 SC 1858] ; Unni Krishnan, J.P. v. State of A.P. [(1993) 1 SCC 645 : AIR 1993 SC 2178] and T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka [(2002) 8 SCC 481].)
Supreme Court of India Cites 109 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Kranth Sangram Parishath, Represented ... vs Sri N. Janardhan Reddy, Chief Minister, ... on 18 September, 1992

32. In opposition to the arguments of the learned Counsel for the petitioners, it is contended by Sri T. Ananta Babu, learned Advocate-General that the impugned legislation makes a valid classification. It is wrong to assume that Section 3-A classifies students on the basis of capacity to pay capitation fee; it only classifies institutions. All colleges are divided into-(i) those administered with State funds; and (ii) those administered without the aid of State funds. The difference between the two classes is clearly discernible and the classification has a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved, viz., development of medical and technical education. Registered societies have a fundamental right to establish and administer educational institutions under Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India. The doctrine of 'repugnancy' has no application as Section 3-A, in fact, is not in conflict with any of the existing provisions of any Union legislation now in operation. The decision of the Supreme Court in Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka (1 supra), being contrary to the law laid down by the earlier larger Bench of the Supreme Court, cannot be treated as. a binding precedent.
Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana) Cites 115 - Cited by 14 - Full Document
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