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Documents citing Jeshingbhai Ishwarlal vs Emperor on 14 April, 1950

Chamba Valley Transport Ltd. vs State Of Himachal Pradesh on 11 August, 1952

For the same reason, there could also be no question of retrospective application of the provisions of Article 19 of the Constitution. The right in question became exercisable as soon as it assumed the badge of a legal right by being recognised by the State in our Constitution, irrespective of whether the act which gave cause to the exercise of the right was performed before or after the birth of the right. Or, borrowing with respect the reasoning of Chagla, C. J., in the aforesaid ruling, -- 'Jeshingbhai v. Emperor', AIR 1950 Bom. 363 (at 386, first column), what the petitioner is doing by the present petition is not so much the challenging of the act of the respondent in stopping the carrying on of the petitioner's business as the assertion of a fundamental right granted to the petitioner since 28-1-1950.
Himachal Pradesh High Court Cites 16 - Cited by 3 - Full Document

Dayabhai Poonambhai Patel vs The Regional Transport Authority And ... on 13 July, 1951

This case lends support to the view I have formed The other case in ' Jeshingbhai v. Emperor' . In this case the validity of an administrative order made by a District Magistrate under Bombay Public Security Measures Act was challenged & the question arose whether the Bombay High Court had jurisdiction under Art, 226 to issue an order against an executive officer who had issued an administrative order, in order to safeguard the fundamental rights or the citizen. Counsel for the petitioner in that case argued that what ever might have been the position prior to 26-1-1950 & whatever might have been the jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court prior to that date, after the passing of the Constitution, the jurisdiction of the High Court had been considerably enlarged. Chagla C.J., examined the provisions of Article 226 & came to the conclusion that though prior to 26-1-1950 the court's Jurisdiction to issue high prerogative writs was restricted territorially to the ordinary original civil Jurisdiction of the Court & to certain specified writs the jurisdiction is not now so limited but extends to the issue of directions, orders or writs, for the purpose of enforcement of the rights conferred by Part III & for any other purpose.
Madhya Pradesh High Court Cites 82 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Fram Nusservanji Balsara vs State Of Bombay And Anr. on 22 August, 1950

28. Before we consider the frame of the petition and the reliefs to which the petitioner is entitled, we should like to state that ordinarily we would have applied our mind first to whether the petitioner was entitled to any relief at all and then considered the provisions of the law which were germane to the particular relief to which he was entitled. The Advocate General did at the very outset raise a preliminary point that the petition was not maintainable and the petitioner was not entitled to any relief. But he did not insist on arguing that preliminary point in limine and inviting our decision on it. He stated that Government did not wish to avail itself o! any technical defence. On the other hand, Government was most anxious to know the views of this Court on the various provisions of the law so that it should be guided in the enforcement of the prohibition law and should not do anything which in the opinion of this Court was illegal. We appreciate the very fair stand taken by Government and it is because of this that we have dealt with the various provisions of the prohibition law before we come to the question of the relief to which the petitioner as entitled, To the extent that the rights of the petitioner are affected by the enforcement of any provision of the prohibition law which we have held to be void, the petitioner would be entitled to a writ or order against Government under Article 226 of the Constitution. This Court had occasion recently to point out in Jeshingbhai Ishwarlal v. Emperor , how wide are the powers of the Court under this article, and if in an appropriate case the fundamental rights of the citizen are violated or threatened, the Court would not be reluctant to exercise its jurisdiction which is confined upon it under this article. It would be open to the petitioner to ask us to issue an order upon Government calling upon them to forbear from enforcing the provision of the law with regard to the exemption of the classes enumerated in Section 39 because it violates his right of equality of law under Article 14. It would also be open to him to ask for an order calling upon Government to forbear from enforcing the Act to the extent that it applies to eau-de-cologne and lavender water because his rights to acquire, hold and dispose of those articles are affected. He would also be entitled to an order directing the Government to delete from the requirements for a permit the condition which requires the petitioner to be certified as an addict and the condition which requires the petitioner to undertake not to do anything which would have the effect of directly or indirectly defeating or frustrating the objects and purposes of the Act. The Advocate- General has argued that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because he never made a specific demand of these rights against the Government and he never gave an opportunity to Government to comply with any of his demands and, therefore, strictly there was no denial of his, rights by Government at the date the petition was filed. To maintain an application under Section 45, Specific Belief Act, a demand of justice and its denial is essential before an order can be made under that section. It is true that the orders that the petitioner is now seeking are not confined to Section 45 but fall under Article 226 of the Constitution. But even so, we have to consider whether it is open to a petitioner under Article 226, without making a specific demand of his right and without giving an opportunity to the Government to comply with that right, to file a petition.
Bombay High Court Cites 69 - Cited by 27 - V Bose - Full Document

Union Construction Co. (Private Ltd.) vs Chief Engineer, Eastern Command, ... on 14 July, 1959

44. In the end Mr. Kunzru has contended that even though it may not be possible to issue a writ of mandamus or any other prerogative writ in the circumstances of the present case Khere is nothing which prevents this Court from passing a suitable direction or order which would have the effect of doing justice between the panties. It is submitted that the powers given under Article 226 of the Constitution are not confined only to the issuing of prerogative writs but this Court has also the power to pass such orders in addition to the prerogative writs which it may in the circumstances of the particular case deem fid and proper to pass. It is true that under Article 226 of the Constitution a High Court cannot only issue prerogative writs but can also issue directions and orders. It is also true that the words "direction or order" are not synonymous with a writ. A perusal of Article 226 also shows that the directions, orders or writs that may be issued need not be ejusdem generis with the prerogative writs (see Jeshingbhai v. Emperor, AIR 1950 Bom 363 (FB)).
Allahabad High Court Cites 36 - Cited by 18 - Full Document

Joseph Antony And Anr. vs Deputy Commissioner Of Agricultural ... on 29 June, 1994

The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Jeshingbhai Ishwarlal v. Emperor AIR 1950 Bom 363 observed : "It is not for the Legislature to determine whether the restrictions are reasonable or not. It is for the court of law to consider the reasonableness of the restrictions imposed upon the rights. 'Reasonable' is ah objective expression and its objectivity is to be determined judicially by the court of law. There is no limit placed upon the power of the court to consider the nature of the restrictions. The court must look upon the restrictions from every point of view. It being the duty of the court to safeguard fundamental rights, the greater is the obligation upon the court to scrutinise the restrictions placed by the Legislature as carefully as possible".
Kerala High Court Cites 28 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Haren Kalita vs The State on 29 April, 1953

9. The learned counsel contends that the section purports to leave it entirely to the satisfaction of the Provincial Government to take action in order to restrict the rights of the petitioner. It thus takes away the jurisdiction of the Court to apply any objective test to the matter and to determine whether the satisfaction of the Provincial Government was or was not justified on the materials. It is argued that the satisfaction of the State Government may or may not be reasonable, and in any event it is a subjective matter in regard to which, upon the terms of the Act, the Courts could not apply any objective test of reasonableness. There is also nothing to show in the Act that it is left to the satisfaction of any particular individual, but it merely involves the satisfaction of some unknown individual officially purporting to represent the Government. The learned counsel has, in support, relied upon the Full Bench decisions of the Patna and Bombay High Courts in--'Brajnandan Sharma v. State of Bihar', AIR 1950 Pat 322 (B) and--'Jeshingbhai Ishwarlal v. Emperor', AIR 1950 Bom 363 (C), respectively, where it was held in respect of legislations containing in some measure analogous provisions that the legislations were void. In the former case, Meredith, C. J. refused to entertain the contention that it was not open to the Courts to consider the reasonableness or otherwise of the provisions and the Legislature itself was the sole judge of the matter. His Lordship held that if such an argument were accepted, the word 'reasonable' in Clause (5) would be rendered completely nugatory. When the Constitution provided that the restrictions must be reasonable, it intended obviously that it was for the Courts to decide whether the restrictive provisions were reasonable or not. There is undoubtedly an objective test of reasonableness and that is what the Courts have to apply,--a test which any reasonable individual of normal average intelligence would apply in the circumstances of a particular case. Such a test is essentially an objective test. It must be remembered, however, that in the case in question, the Legislature not only left it to the satisfaction of the State Government to impose restrictions upon the rights of the citizens, but the Act did not provide for any opportunity being given to the individual affected to vindicate himself or challenge the order or even to learn about the reasons of the order. The Act did not even provide for the service upon him of the grounds of the order. In those circumstances, their Lordships were justified in holding that the restrictions were not reasonable.
Gauhati High Court Cites 14 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Manjula Manjari Dei vs M.C. Pradhan, Director Of Public ... on 8 August, 1952

The Court would refuse to exercise its power under Article 226 and interfere with the action of an executive officer unless it is satisfied that that officer is under an obligation to do something or forbear to do something--See 'Jeshingbhai v. Emperor', AIR 1950 Bom 363 F.B.--though in that particular case, the Court issued a writ as the act complained of involved the infringement of a fundamental right.
Orissa High Court Cites 10 - Cited by 3 - B Jagannadhadas - Full Document

Shiv Dutt And Anr. vs State Of Himachal Pradesh And Anr. on 3 June, 1953

For the same reason, there could also be no question of retrospective application of the provisions of Article 19 of the Constitution. The right in question became exercisable as soon as it assumed the badge of a legal right by being recognised by the State in our Constitution, irrespective of whether the act which gave cause to the exercise of the right was performed before or alter the birth of the right. Or, borrowing with respect the reasoning of Chagla, C. J., in the aforesaid ruling, --'Jeshingbhai v. Emperor', AIR 1950 Bom 363 (O), (at p. 366, first column), what the petitioner is doing by the present petition is not so much the challenging of the act of the respondent in stopping the carrying on of the petitioner's business as the assertion of a fundamental right granted to the petitioner since 26-1-1950."
Himachal Pradesh High Court Cites 18 - Cited by 14 - Full Document
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