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Kheya Abasan Samabay Samity Ltd vs State Of West Bengal & Ors on 11 July, 2017

In the present case the allotment of land was cancelled after deposit of total amount of premium on the basis of land policy of the Government adopted subsequent to the date of allotment of land and as such the facts of the present case are distinguishable from the facts of "Corporation of Calcutta V. Dhirendra Nath Sen". As a result, the ratio of the Division Bench decision cannot be made applicable 6 in the facts of the present case.
Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side) Cites 2 - Cited by 11 - R K Bag - Full Document

In Re: Ranjit Kuamr Sarkar vs The Asansol Durgapur Development on 7 September, 2011

So far as prayer for interim order is concerned, since it prima facie appears that the agreement dated 10th January, 1979 still subsists and the petitioner has not raised any construction and since it appears from the judgment in Calcutta Municipal Corporation vs. Dhirendra Nath (supra) that therein the resumption had taken place and as in the instant case, resumption is to take place on 12th September, 2011, let status quo as regards possession be maintained till 14th December, 2011. It is made clear that parties shall not raise any construction within the said period.
Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side) Cites 1 - Cited by 0 - S Pal - Full Document

Smt. Susmita Basu & Anr vs Kolkata Municipal Corporation & Ors on 17 December, 2013

The authorities having due regard to the earlier orders of the Hon'ble Court again called the writ petitioners to appear at the hearing in connection with the grant of certificate of enlistment. Mr. Ghosh referred the provisions under Section 199, 239, 419, 425, 435, 301 and 307 of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 in support of his argument, that the land in question belonged to Kolkata Municipal Corporation and there is no iota of document to show or establish any right, title and interest whatsoever of the writ petitioners in the said land. Under Such circumstances Municipal authorities cannot allow the writ petitioenrs being the unauthorised occupants of the land to do the business and to response their prayer for issuance of certificate of enlistment. Mr. Ghosh also referred one decision of Hon'ble High Court at Calcutta reported in AIR 1973 Calcutta 506 (The Corporation of Calcutta & Ors. Vs. Dhirendra Nath Sen & Ors.) and 2011 AIR SCW 990 (Jaipal Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Punjab & Ors. ). The present writ application as it appears from the record has a chequered history.
Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side) Cites 10 - Cited by 2 - A K Mondal - Full Document

Dr. G. Srihari vs The Madras Dock Labour Board By Its ... on 6 September, 1979

14. For the respondents it was pointed out that Clause 6 of the scheme had been subsequently amended and, as per the amendment, it was only in respect of posts carrying a maximum salary of Rs. 1,000 that prior approval of the Central Government had to be obtained, and in view of such amendment, the post of Assistant Surgeon was not one for the appointment to, or termination of which the prior approval of the Central Government had to be obtained. The argument, therefore, is that even assuming that as per old Clause 6 of the scheme, the prior approval of the Government was required for terminating the services of the appellant, after the amendment of the clause the necessity ceased to exist and therefore, the Board was competent to terminate the services of the appellant. Countering this argument, the appellant's counsel would say that the appellant's rights will have to be determined in accordance with the conditions which prevailed when he was appointed and, therefore, the terms of Clause 6 as they originally stood would have to be applied, and if so applied, the order of termination can be validly passed only after obtaining the prior approval of the Central Government. As authority for this proposition, Mr. Ramachandran relied upon Delhi Transport Union v. B.B.L. Haflaey (1973) 1 L.L.J. 76 Mr. Dolia appearing for the first respondent refuted this contention and placed reliance upon Corporation of Calcutta v. A.K. Sen (1978-79) 83 Cat. W.N. 43 where it was held that the expression "appointing authority" would not mean the authority which had actually appointed the employee, but would mean the authority which would be competent to do so at the time the order of termination was made. Even this argument we are unable to accept, because the argument of the appellant's counsel proceeds on the footing that the appellant was employed on a permanent basis on statutory terms and, as such, certain rights become inhered and consequently, no order of termination can be passed inderogation of those rights.
Madras High Court Cites 16 - Cited by 3 - S Natarajan - Full Document
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