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Tata Motors Limited And Another vs State Of West Bengal And Others on 28 September, 2011

PARTING OBSERVATION When the Tatas had stated in their letter dated 28th September, 2010, mentioned in the statement of objects and reasons for the impugned Act, that they had withdrawn from the project and that they were considering permanent withdrawal from the site if compensation was provided, I do not think that acquisition of this land by the State for the public purpose disclosed in the impugned Act, can be called arbitrary legislation. More so, when it was stated in the letter that the Tatas had no activity in contemplation to be undertaken at the site. Furthermore, for this reason it cannot be said that this legislation was targeted at a particular person or corporate body to victimise it. A single person legislation is not unknown in our country. It is permitted if there is sufficient basis. ( see Charanjit Lal Chowdhury - vs - The Union of India, reported in AIR (38) 1951 SC 41 and Dharam Dutt and others - vs - Union of India and 50 others, reported in (2004)1 SCC 712). Exercise of the power of eminent domain, in such a situation cannot be called arbitrary or illegal or without basis.
Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side) Cites 117 - Cited by 5 - I P Mukerji - Full Document

State Of Himachal Pradesh And Anr vs Kailash Chand Mahajan And Ors on 20 February, 1992

"The decision of the majority of this Court in Chiranjit Lal v. The Union of India is relied on in support of these contentions. In that case, however, the majority felt justified in upholding the legislation, though it adversely affected the rights and interest of the shareholders of a particular joint stock company, because the mismanagement of the company's affairs prejudicially affected the production of an essential commodity and caused serious unemployment amongst a section of the community. Mr. Justice Das and I took the view that legislation directed against a particular named person or corporation was 982 obviously discriminatory and could not constitutionally be justified even if such legislation resulted in some benefit to the public. In a system of Government by political parties, I was apprehensive of the danger inherent in special enactments which deprive particular named person of their liberty or property because the Legislature thinks them guilty of misconduct, and said in may dissenting opinion :
Supreme Court of India Cites 64 - Cited by 212 - S Mohan - Full Document

The State Trading Corporation Of India ... vs The Commercial Tax Officer, ... on 26 July, 1963

But the Rajasthan High Court in Maharaja Kishangarh Mills Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan (2) assumed that the question whether a corporation was a citizen for the purpose of Art. 19 was generally decided in Chairanjitlal Chowdhur's case(3) and held that a corporation was entitled to raise by a petition under Art. 226 a plea of a breach of a fundamental right under Art. 19. Authorities in the Calcutta High Court appear to be somewhat conflicting.
Supreme Court of India Cites 81 - Cited by 170 - B P Sinha - Full Document

The State Of West Bengal vs Anwar Ali Sarkar on 11 January, 1952

(4) The meaning and scope of article 14 have been elaborately explained in two earlier decisions of this Court, viz., Chiranjit Lal Chowdhury v. The Union of India and Others ([1950] S.C.R. 869) and The State of Bombay and Another v. F. N. Balsara ([1951] S.C.R. 682), and the principles laid down in those decisions have to be kept in view in deciding the present case. One of these principles is that article 14 is designed to protect all persons placed in similar circumstances against legislative discrimination, and if the legislature takes care to reasonably classify persons for legislative purposes and if it deals equally with all persons belonging to a well-defined class, it is not open to the charge of denial of equal protection on the ground that the law does not apply to other person.
Supreme Court of India Cites 47 - Cited by 600 - Full Document

M/S. Img Academies Bharat Private ... vs Govt Of Ap., Rep By Secy, Law And ... on 7 March, 2024

23. Thus, from aforesaid enunciation of law, it is evident that there could be a legislation relating to a single individual on account of some special circumstances or reasons applicable to him and not applicable to others. It is equally well settled proposition that the burden was on the person to assail the validity of the legislation that there were also other persons similarly situate and he alone was 43 discriminated against (see Chiranjit Lal Choudhuri (supra)).
Telangana High Court Cites 50 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Anandlok Welfare Association & Anr vs Kolkata Municipal Corporation & Ors on 14 March, 2024

"Even where an association is permitted by law to bring a legal proceeding it can bring an application under Article 226 only when its rights as a collective body as distinguished from the aggregate rights of its members are affected by the act challenged in the proceedings (Chiranjit Lal v. Union of India. AIR 1951 SC 41; Govt Press Employees' Assocn.
Calcutta High Court Cites 29 - Cited by 0 - A Banerjee - Full Document

Sheoshankar vs State Govt. Of Madhya Pradesh And Ors. on 18 April, 1951

147. It would be evident that the only matter in which the petitoiner is personally interested, is his right to drink country liquor, with or without permit, &, as a necessary pre-requisite for the exercise of that right, to have that kind of liquor made available to him. He has characterised as discriminatory the provisions of one of the rules which preclude a person from obtaining a permit to consume intoxicating liquor unless he had a certain social & economic status & unless he pays Rs. 100/-as fees & then too restricting the permit-holder to the consumption of foreign liquor. No doubt, the petitioner belongs to a large class of persons who are as much affected by this provision as he himself is but as he asserts that by reason of the discrimination he feels injured he has a right to maintain the petition. But then his right to challenge the law is limited to such of its provisions (& of the rules etc. made thereunder) as affect him personally. The decision in 'Charanjit Lal v. Union of India" , to which we have already referred, supports this view.
Bombay High Court Cites 75 - Cited by 31 - Full Document

The State Of West Bengal vs Anwar All Sarkarhabib Mohamed,The ... on 11 January, 1952

Article 14 of our Constitution, it is well known, corre- sponds to the last portion of section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the American Constitution except that our article 14 has also adopted the English doctrine of rule of law by the addition of the words "equality before the law." It has not, however, been urged before us that the addition of these extra words has made any substantial difference in its practical application. The meaning, scope and effect of 334 article 14 of our Constitution have been discussed and laid down by this Court in the case of Chiranjit Lal Chowdhury v. The Union of India and Others (1). Although Sastri J., as he then was, and myself differed from the actual deci- sion of the majority of the Court, there was no disagree- ment between us and the majority as to the principles underlying the provisions of article 14. The difference of opinion in that case was not so much on the principles to be applied as to the effect of the application of such principles. Those principles were again considered and summarised by this Court in The State of Bombay v.F.N. Balsara (2). It is now well established that while arti- cle 14 is designed to prevent a person or class of persons from being singled out from others similarly situated for the purpose of being specially subjected to discriminating and hostile legislation, it does not insist on an "abstract symmetry" in the sense that every piece of legislation must have universal application. All persons are not, by nature, attainment or circumstances, equal and the varying needs of different classes of persons often require separate treatment and, therefore, the protecting clause has been construed as a guarantee against discrimi- nation amongst equals only and not as taking away from the State the power to classify persons for the purpose of legislation. This classification may be on different bases. It may be geographical or according to objects or occupa- tions or the like. Mere classification, however, is not enough to get over the inhibition of the Article. 'The classification must not be arbitrary but must be rational, that is to say, it must not only be based on some quali- ties or characteristics which are to be found in all the persons grouped together and not in others who are left out but those qualities or characteristics must have a reasonable relation to the object of the legislation. In order to pass the test, two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (1) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes those that are grouped together from others (1) [1950] S.C.R. 869. (2) [1951] S.C.R. 682.
Supreme Court of India Cites 50 - Cited by 106 - M P Sastri - Full Document

Anwar Ali Sarkar vs The State Of West Bengal on 28 August, 1951

Where the classification made rests on no such basis, the special law made for the so called class will be invalid. These propositions are based on principles laid down in American decisions on 'the Fourteenth Amendment which have been accepted by the Supreme Court in the case of 'Charanjit Lal v. The Union of India', (1950) SCR 869, and Prohibition case from Bombay (not yet reported) as applicable to Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
Calcutta High Court Cites 42 - Cited by 6 - Full Document

Government Of Andhra Pradesh & Ors vs Smt. P. Laxmi Devi on 25 February, 2008

"Another principle which has to be borne in mind in examining the constitutionality of a statute is that it must be assumed that the legislature understands and appreciates the need of the people, that the laws it enacts are directed to problems which are made manifest by experience, and that the elected representatives assembled in a legislature enact laws which they consider to be reasonable for the purpose for which they are enacted. Presumption is, therefore, in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment. Charanjit Lal vs. Union of India, 1950 SCR 869: (AIR 1951 SC 41); State of Bombay vs. F.N. Baulsara, 1951 SCR 682 at p.708; (AIR 1951 SC 318 at p. 326); AIR 1959 SC 942."
Supreme Court of India Cites 37 - Cited by 725 - M Katju - Full Document
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