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Documents citing Ramchandra Anant Joshi And Ors. vs Janardan Tulshiram Ghuge And Ors. on 24 August, 1962

Jivanbhai Khushalbhai And Ors. vs Gulam Mohmed Farookh Gulam Mohinddin ... on 27 November, 1978

20. But the application under Section 29 read with Section 14 was not maintainable, as it was filed after April 1, 1957. On this point, we adopt the reasoning and conclusion of the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Ramchindra Anant v. Janardan 74 Bom. L.R. (sic). We agree with the following observations of Chainan, C.J. in the aforesaid case: "It has been contended that as there is no provision in the Act that an application on the grounds mentioned in Section 14 cannot be made after April 1, 1957, such an application is-maintainable, for since the Legislature has preserved the right to make such an application, it could not have intended that it should not be availed of in any case. There is undoubtedly force in this argument, but it seems to us that the intention of the legislature in enacting Section 32 clearly was to transfer the ownership of the lands to the tenants on April 1, 1957, except in cases where applications for possession had been made by the landlords before April 1, 1957. Where such an application had been made, the right of purchase given to the tenant is postponed until that application is rejected. It is clear from this section that the Legislature did not intend that the right given to a tenant by this section should be destroyed or affected by any application made after April 1, 1957. If an application for possession made under Section 29 read with Section 14 after April 1, 1957 is decided in favour of the landlord before the application made by him prior to April 1, 1957 is disposed of, it will affect the right of the tenant to become the owner of the land on the postponed date. It seems to us that this was not intended by the Legislature. The fact that the Legislature has provided that only an application made prior to April 1, 1957, should affect the right of the tenant to become the purchaser of the land on April 1, 1957 clearly indicates that the Legislature contemplated that no such application should be made after April 1, 1957.
Gujarat High Court Cites 10 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Bapu Dnyanu Patil vs Sadashiv Ramchandra Joshi on 8 October, 1968

It applies them to cases falling under Section 32F only after the requisite notice is given. The provisions of Sections 32 to 32E are to be applied so far as they are applicable. Inasmuch as Section 32F of the Act gives an option to a tenant of a landlord under disability and a tenant under disability and requires the tenant in each case to exercise the option in the particular manner and further lays down the consequences of the option not having been exercised in that manner, it is impossible to apply the provisions of Section 32 to such a case and destroy the very provisions which limit the right given Under Section 32F of the Act. Really speaking this contention is not even open to be argued inasmuch as a Full Bench of this Court in Ramchandra Anant v. Janardan (1902) 64 Bom. L.R. 635 has held that neither Section 32 nor its proviso is applicable to cases governed by Section 32F of the Act of 1948, In each of these applications, therefore, the option ought to have been exercised in accordance with the provisions of Section 32F of the Act of 1948.
Bombay High Court Cites 45 - Cited by 5 - Full Document

Namdeo Vishnu Joshi And Anr. vs Raghunath Ganu Kadam And Ors. on 16 January, 1974

He is required to apply under sub-section (2) of S. 29 in a prescribed form and obtain the order of possession from the Mamlatdar. Section 29 (2) provides that save as otherwise provided in sub-section (3A), no landlord shall obtain possession of any land or dwelling house held by a tenant except under an order of the Mamlatdar. Unless, therefore, the Mamlatdar passes an order, the right of possession does not materialize and the possession of the tenant in this interregnum period does not become unlawful. it has been so held by the Full Bench of this Court in Ramchandra Anant Joshi v. Janardan Tulsiram Ghuge, (FB). The question before the Full Bench was slightly different. The landlord had already given a notice under Section 31 and made an application under Section 29 of the Tenancy Act. This had the effect of postponing the compulsory transfer of title in favour of the tenant. In the meanwhile, for another good reason falling under Section 14, the landlord served a second notice under Section 14 of the Tenancy Act and filed another applicant under Section 29 (2). The question that arose before the Full bench was whether this second notice was lawful. it was, therefore, necessary for them to find out the nature of the possession of the tenant after the termination of his tenancy by the first notice and while the proceedings under Section 31 read with Section 29 were still pending. It may be noted that the proceedings were then pending before the Appellate Court. While pointing out that the second notice is quite valid as it gave another cause of action to the landlord against the tenant, the learned Judges made the following observations, which are subsequently approved by the Supreme Court. At page 641 (of Bom LR) = (at. p. 81 of AIR) of the report, they observed:
Bombay High Court Cites 19 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Yadav Yeshwant Mali vs Pundlik Pandurang Patil on 4 December, 1970

But whensoever the result may be known, it is clear that once a certificate is granted to the landlord, the land becomes exempt from the operation of Sections 32 to 82R, that is to say, the land is free from the provision of Section 32 which vested the title in the tenant either on April 1, 1957 or any postponed date. So far as the land of the certificated landlord is concerned, Sections 82 to 82R may be deemed to be not there in the statute book, and if nothing in those sections affects these lands, it will be wrong to import the considerations of Section 32 in order to determine the rights of the parties. The learned President of the Tribunal seems to be of the view that an application made after April 1, 1957 was not maintainable. For that he purported to rely upon a Full Bench decision of this Court in Ramchandra Anant v. Janardan . It appears to me, that case instead of supporting him supports quite the contrary view. In that case, the question to be decided was whether an application for possession on grounds specified in Section 14 made after April 1, 1957 was maintainable in view of the fact that prior to April 1,1957 an application had been made by the landlord under Section 81 in pursuance of the provisions of Section 32(1) read with its first proviso. The contention was that by reason of the fact that an application made under Section 31 was pending, the vesting of the title in the tenant was postponed till a later date, and, therefore, in the meantime, the relationship of landlord and tenant continued with the result that the landlord was entitled to apply for possession on the grounds specified in Section 14, It was held, no such application after April 1, 1957 was maintainable, because Section 32 itself provided that the application for possession on grounds specified in Section 14 should be filed before March 31, 1957, thus, by necessary implication, barring a subsequent application.
Bombay High Court Cites 22 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Suryakant Ramchandra Mudake vs Shivlinga Vishwanath Ghongade on 12 April, 1972

4. The learned Counsel Mr. Kadam appearing on behalf of the respondent-defendant, has, however, argued that in view of the observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Patel Chunibhai v. Narayanarao, , Venkatesh Narahar v. Hajisaheb Khadirsaheb , and observations of this Court in Full Bench decisions in Ramchandra Anant v. Janardan, (FB) & Vasant Hariba v. Jagannath (1969) 71 Bom LR 12 (FB) the decision in (1966) 68 Bom LR 874 cannot be said to be good law. In this connection he has also drawn my attention to the observations of this Court in First Appeal No. 458 of 1962 decide don 18-101962 (Bom). However, it must be noticed here that the judgment in First Appeal No. 458 of 1962 is not recorded by this Court after hearing the parties on both the sides. The Division Bench of this Court which disposed of that appeal has done so summarily and the observations made by this Court in that case are in the judgment recorded while dismissing the appeal summarily. Now, before I proceed to discuss the decisions relied upon by the learned Counsel Mr. Kadam, I think it would be worthwhile to notice that the learned Judge who decided the case in (1966) 68 Bom LR 874, and took the view that the possession of a tenant becomes wrongful from the date of the order of the Mamlatdar whether the application made by the landlord under Section 31 read with Section 29 (2) of the Act is granted the Report that "having regard to the terms of Sub-sections of Section 29, it appears to me that what was intended was there should be an order of the Mamlatdar for delivery possession." Realising, however, that in cases where the Mamlatdar dismisses the application for possession made by the landlord under Section 31 read with Section 29 (2) of the Act, there would be no order of the Mamlatdar for delivery of possession, he has tried to get over the difficulty by observing that "since the terminus a quo is the Mamlatdar's order the Collector in appeal does nothing but that what the Mamlatdar ought to have done and, therefore, when the order of Mamlatdar refusing to delivery possession either on appeal or revision or a further application to the High Court is made, it must relate back to the date of the Mamaltdar's order refusing to deliver possession, and, that being so in effect, the order must be deemed to have been made when the Mamlatdar made his earliest order." With respect, apart from the observations of the Supreme Court the observations of the Supreme Court and the Full Bench decisions of this Court cited by the learned Counsel Mr. Kadam. I think it is difficult to agree with this view.
Bombay High Court Cites 27 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Ranjit Shripatrao Holkar (Since ... vs Ananda Sakharam Bhilare (Since ... on 15 June, 2004

10. Mr. Rege, to support his contention, had placed reliance on the decision of Full Bench of our High Court in the case of Ramchandra Anant Joshi (supra). In that case, the landlord after giving notice to his tenant before December 31, 1956 under Section 31 of the Act, terminating tenancy for personal cultivation, subsequently before March, 1957, made an application to mamlatdar for obtaining possession of the land on the ground of personal cultivation. While the said application was pending before the court, landlord issued another notice on July 17, 1958 terminating tenancy on the ground of default, which was after the tillers day. The court considered the issue as to whether the subsequent termination notice was valid and proceedings founded on such notice could be maintained. That issue does not arise for our consideration.
Bombay High Court Cites 33 - Cited by 2 - A M Khanwilkar - Full Document

Bajirao Jaisingrao Ghadage vs Rajaram Yeshwant Chougule And Ors. on 6 June, 2005

v. Babasaheb Anandrao Desai; and in in the case of Patel Chunibhai Dajibha, etc. v. Narayanrao Khanderao Jambekar and Anr. Reliance was also placed on the decision of Full Bench of our High Court reported in 1972 Mh.L.J. (F.B.) 124 : 1971 (Vol. LXXIII) BLR 792 in the case of Vishnu Shantaram Desai v. Smt. Indira Anant Patkar and in the case of Ramchandra Anant Joshi v. Janardan Tulshiram Ghuge, 1962 NLJ 700 : (1962) LXIV BLR 635.
Bombay High Court Cites 23 - Cited by 1 - A M Khanwilkar - Full Document

Venkatesh Narahar Kattl vs Haji Saheb Khadir Saheb Mulla And ... on 13 October, 1965

In spite of the termination of the tenancy, the landlord has no right to obtain possession of the land without an order of the Mamlatdar under s. 29(2). Between the date of the termination of the tenancy and the date of the order for possession under S. 29(2), the tenant continues to be in lawful possession of the land and is liable to pay rent and not mesne profits, see Ramchandra Avant v. Janardan(2). Thus, on the termination of the tenancy, the right to obtain possession of the land, though in reality not accrued to the landlord, is, by a legal fiction, deemed to have accrued to him so that he may immediately apply under S. 29(2) for an order for possession.
Supreme Court of India Cites 13 - Cited by 3 - R S Bachawat - Full Document

Atmaram Onkar Talele vs Ananda Shrawan Kolambe on 8 August, 1969

13. It was strongly urged by Mr. Pratap and Mr. Sharad Manohar that the normal principle of requirement of deciding the rights of the litigants on the basis of the cause of action and the facts available on the date of the institution of the suit, is not applicable to the proceedings under Section 33B of the Tenancy Act. The argument advanced is that relationship of the landlord and tenant under the Tenancy Act does not come to an end on the date when the landlord terminates tenancy by issuing a notice to that effect. Such relationship comes to an end only when landlord succeeds in getting the possession of the land leased to the tenant in execution of the order passed on his application for possession after terminating the tenancy by serving notice on him. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Pull Bench of this Court reported in Ramchandra Anant v. Janardan (1962) 64 Bom. L.R. 635. Now I have not been able to appreciate how this proposition can have any bearing on the principle that the rights of the parties have got to be decided in accordance with the cause of action and the facts as were available on the date of the institution of the suit. Secondly, it is not possible to accept this proposition in its absolute and broad form in which it has been placed before me. It is not in dispute that the tenancy rights are normally put an end to by the landlord after serving a notice to that effect on the tenant. It is also true that in view of the special provisions of the Tenancy Act, designed to protect tenants from the unlawful dispossession by the landlord, the tenancy cannot be said to have been terminated till the application is made and order to that effect is passed by the Mamlatdar under Section 29 of the said Tenancy Act. This does not mean that the tenant continues to be tenant till the litigation comes to an end finally and all remedies of the tenant are exhausted and landlord gets possession in execution of any such order. The judgment of the Full Bench does not lay down any such broad proposition.
Bombay High Court Cites 6 - Cited by 4 - Full Document
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