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Annada Charan Sil And Anr. vs Hargobinda Sil And Ors. on 13 July, 1922

There can be little doubt that the view taken by the Madras High Court in Adityam Iyer v. Ramakrishna Iyer 21 Ind. Cas. 458 : 38 M. 514 : (1913) M.W.N. 847 : 14 M.L.T. 382 : 25 M.L.J. 602 is well-founded on principle. To take an illsutration, suppose a mortgage-bond had been executed for Rs. 1,000. Would it be competent to the mortgagee who instituted a suit to enforce the security for Rs. 1,000 to prove by oral evidence that the real consideration was not Rs. 1,000 as stated in the bond but Rs. 5,000. If such a course were permissible, the protection intended by the Legislature to be afforded by the adoption of the rule embodied in Section 92 of the Evidence Act would be completely nullified.
Calcutta High Court Cites 9 - Cited by 6 - Full Document

Somepalli Mutyalu vs Chittineni Veerayya And Ors. on 5 February, 1946

Adityam Iyer v. Ramakrishna Iyer (1913) 25 M.L.J. 602 :I.L.R. 38 Mad. 514, is a case of a sale where the price is a term of the contract itself and it was therefore held that no evidence could be adduced to vary it. The other case is again one where it was held that, though it was open to a party to prove want of consideration or failure of consideration, or a difference in the kind of consideration, it was not open to him to prove a variation in the amount of consideration.
Madras High Court Cites 5 - Cited by 3 - N C Aiyar - Full Document

Chuni Bibi vs Basanti Bibi And Anr. on 4 June, 1914

13. The respondents rely upon the decision of the Madras High Court in Adityam Iyer v. Ramakrishna Iyer 21 Ind. Cas. 458 : (1913) M.W.N. 847 : 14 M.L.T. 382 : 25 M.L.J. 602., which will be referred to later. As regards the cases relied upon by the appellant they urge that the first of them merely lays down one of the rules subsequently embodied in Section 92 of the Evidence Act and that the passage quoted has no application to the facts of the case, inasmuch as the respondents are not seeking to remove the blind which hides the real transaction but wish merely to contradict a statement of fact contained in the deed : that the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th and 7th cases are not authorities for the proposition that a party may prove by oral evidence that the consideration for a sale is leas than or different from that stated in the deed bat are only instances of parties to deeds being allowed to show that the consideration passed in a form other than that state in the deed : and that if the fifth case goes further than that it was wrongly decided. As regards the 8th case the respondents contend that it was a case of facts being proved which would invalidate a document within the meaning of the first proviso to Section 92 of the Evidence Act.
Allahabad High Court Cites 6 - Cited by 7 - Full Document

Mohammad Taki Khan vs Jang Singh on 12 March, 1935

In the case of Adityam Iyer v. Rama Krishna Iyer 1915 Mad 868, it was laid, down that the amount of the price-agreed to be paid is an essential term, of a contract of sale and that no evidence of an oral agreement at variance with the provisions of the deed is admissible. Accordingly the vendor in that case was not allowed to show that, the true sale consideration instead of the ostensible amount of Rs. 35,00O was really Rs. 36,000, the extra sum. of Rs. 1,000 having been agreed to be written off after delivery of possession.
Allahabad High Court Cites 8 - Cited by 14 - Full Document

Gondu Ramasubba Iyer vs Muthiah Kone And Ors. on 8 October, 1924

3. The defendant's case is that the plaintiff was aware of that encumbrance, that he agreed to discharge it and that, it should not be mentioned in the document. The argument of Mr. Venkatachariar is that the evidence to the effect that the plaintiff was aware of the existence of an encumbrance is opposed to the clear recital in the document and such evidence should not have been admitted as it was inadmissible under Section 92 of the Evidence Act. His argument is that the declaration that there was no other encumbrance on the property than the one mentioned in it is an important term of the sale-deed and any agreement to vary the terms of the sale-deed could not be proved under Section 92. Section 92 says : 'When the terms of any such contract, grant, or other disposition of property or any matter required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, have been proved, no evidence of any oral agreement or statement shall be admitted as between the parties to any such instrument or their representatives-in-interest for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to, or subtracting from its term." The defendant's plea that there was an oral agreement whereby the plaintiff undertook to discharge the debt in favour of Karuppan Ambalam cannot be proved by parol evidence. Mr. Venkatachariar addressed an elaborate argument on the point. He mainly relied upon Adityam Iyer v. Ramakrishna Iyer (1913) 38 Mad. 514. In that case it was held that if the consideration for sale is recited as Rs. 35,000 it could not be proved that the real consideration was Bs. 36,000. The facts in that case were that there were two sale-deeds for Rs. 35,000. The vendor wanted to prove : that the real amount of consideration was Rs. 36,000 and Rs. 1,000 went in discharge of a debt. It was held that parol evidence to prove that the amount of consideration was Rs. 36,000 and not Rs. 35,000 was inadmissible as the amount of the consideration was an important term of the contract and it could not be varied by an oral agreement. In that case the learned Judges held if a certain amount is mentioned in a document as the consideration it was not open to the parties to show that the amount of consideration was something different from that which is mentioned in the document. That does not prevent a vendor from showing that the vendee was aware of an encumbrance which he did not want to be mentioned in the sale-deed. The existence of an encumbrance undisclosed to the vendee which he could not have discovered by the exercise of reasonable care would no doubt make the sale voidable. Under Section 55 of the Transfer of Property Act, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, the seller is bound to disclose to the buyer any material defect in the property of which the seller is, and the buyer is not aware, and which the buyer could not with ordinary care discover. It has been held that the material defect in the property would also include a defect of title and encumbrance in the property. Mr. Justice Shephard and Mr. Brown in their Commentary on the Transfer of Property Act, 6th Edition, page 202 make the following observation : "It is apprehended, however, that the terra "any material defect" in the property is not to be so restricted and that omission to disclose flaws in the title or encumbrance which the purchaser has no apparent means of discovering may equally be fraudulent under the section."
Madras High Court Cites 5 - Cited by 3 - Full Document

Gondu Ramasubbu Iyer vs Muthiah Kone And Ors. on 8 October, 1924

3. The defendant's case is that the plaintiff was aware of that encumbrance that he agreed to discharge it and that, it should not be mentioned in the document. The argument, of Mr. Venkatacharier is that the evidence to the effect that the plaintiff was aware of the existence of an encumbrance is opposed to the clear recital in the document and such evidence should not have been admitted as it was inadmissible under Section 92 of the Evidence Act. His argument is that the declaration that there was no other encumbrance of the property than the one mentioned in it is an important term of the sale-deed and any agreement to vary the terms of the sale-deed could not be proved under Section 92. Section 92 says: "When the terms of any such contract grant or other disposition of property or any matter required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, have been proved, no evidence of any oral agreement or statement shall be admitted as between the parties to any such instrument or their representatives-in-interest, for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to, or subtracting from its terms." The defendant's plea that there was an oral agreement whereby the plaintiff undertook to discharge the debt in favour of Karuppan Ambalam cannot be proved by parol evidence, Mr. Venkatachariar addressed an elaborate argument on the point. He mainly relied upon Adityam Iyer v. Ramakrishna Iyer 21 Ind. Cas. 458 : 38 M. 514 : (1913) M.W.N. 847 : 14 M.L.T. 382 : 25 M.L.J. 602 that case it was held that if the consideration for sale is recited as Rs. 35,000 ,it could not be proved that the real consideration was Rs. 36,000. The facts in that case were that there were two sale-deeds for Rs. 35,000. The vendor wanted to prove that the real amount of consideration was Rs. 36,000 and Rs. 1,000 went in discharge of a debt. It was held that parol evidence to prove that the amount of consideration was Rs. 36,000 and not Rs. 35,000 was inadmissible as the amount of the consideration was an important term of the contract and it could not be varied by an oral agreement. In that case the learned Judges held if a certain amount is mentioned in a document as the consideration it was not open to the parties to show that the amount of consideration was something different from that which is mentioned in-the document. That does not prevent a vendor from showing that the vendee was aware of an encumbrance which he did not want to be mentioned in the sale-deed. The existence of an encumbrance undisclosed to the vendee which he could not have discovered by the exercise of reasonable care would no doubt make the sale voidable. Under Section 55 of the Transfer of Property Act, in the absence of contract to the contrary, the seller is bound to disclose to the buyer any material defect in the property of which, the seller is, and the buyer is not aware, and which the buyer could not with ordinary care discover. It has been held that the material defect in the property would also include a defect of title and encumbrance in the property. Mr. Justice Shephard and Mr. Brown in their Commentary on the Transfer of Property Act, 6th Edition, page 202 make the following observation: "It is apprehended, however, that the term any material defect" in the property is not to be so restricted and that omission to disclose flaws in the title or encumbrance which the purchaser has no apparent means of discovering may equally be fraudulent under the section."
Madras High Court Cites 4 - Cited by 5 - Full Document

Lala Singh vs Basdeo And Ors. on 19 January, 1923

Tie appellant wants to prove a separate oral agreement of Rs. 2,500. I do not know how anybody can persuade himself that Rs. 2,500 as the price of the property is not inconsistent with Rs. 3,000. The proviso No. (2) which is the one relied on by the appellant, of Section 92, permits the proof of a separate oral agreement on a matter on which the document is silent, and which is not inconsistent with its terms It is quite clear that the attempt to prove that a sale really took place for Rs. 2,500 when the deed says it took place for Rs. 3,000, is not within that proviso. The learned Judge in a very clear judgment has pointed out why this case comes within the principle laid down in the case of Adityam Iyer v. Ramakrishna Iyer 21 Ind. Cas.
Allahabad High Court Cites 2 - Cited by 2 - Full Document
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