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Kale Balaswamy And Ors. vs State Of Andhra Pradesh on 8 August, 1981

8. It has been held in number of cases that in the absence of prejudice there is no legal bar to the recording of a conviction under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code even when the accused was charged under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code or vice versa. However in the instant case even though seven accused are acquitted still there are three accused viz., A-1 to A-3. Even applying the ratio laid down in Maina Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1976 Cri LJ 835) (supra) all the three of them could be convicted for offences simpliciter. When there are more than one, a conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code against them also on the same reasoning can be recorded. Therefore, we see absolutely nothing illegal about the conviction recorded by the lower Court.
Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana) Cites 11 - Cited by 2 - Full Document

Vijendra Singh vs State Of U.P. on 4 January, 2017

Section 34 IPC fixing constructive liability conclusively silences such a refined plea of extrication. (See Amir Hussain v. State of U.P.12; Maina Singh v. State of Rajasthan.13) Lord 12 (1975) 4 SCC 247 13 (1976) 2 SCC 827 19 Sumner’s classic legal shorthand for constructive criminal liability, expressed in the Miltonic verse “They also serve who only stand and wait” a fortiori embraces cases of common intent instantly formed, triggering a plurality of persons into an adventure in criminality, some hitting, some missing, some splitting hostile heads, some spilling drops of blood.
Supreme Court - Daily Orders Cites 30 - Cited by 0 - D Misra - Full Document

Sri Anurag Goswami vs The State Of Assam And Anr on 4 April, 2023

63. We have noticed the series of decisions where the view held is that when a definite number of known persons were alleged to have participated in the crime and all except the appellant were acquitted, the appellant alone cannot be convicted under Section 34 I. P. C. and he would be liable only for his individual act of assault, [(Probhu Babaji Navle v. State of Bombay, AIR 1956 SC 51; Krishna Govind Patil v. State of Maharashtra, (1964) 1 SCR 678; Baul v. State of U.P., (1968) 2 SCR 450 (454); Maina Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (1976) 3 SCR 651; Karnail Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1977 SC 893 and Piara Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 401.]
Gauhati High Court Cites 32 - Cited by 0 - M Nandi - Full Document

Jayan And Ors. vs State Of Kerala on 1 December, 2006

...When a murderous assault by many hands with 'many knives has ended fataly, it is legally impermissible to dissect the serious ones from the others and seek to salvage those whose stabs have not proved fatal. When people place with knives and lives, the circumstances that one man's stab falls on a less or more vulnerable part of the person of the victim is of no consequence to fix the guilt for murder. Conjoint complicity is the inevitable inference when a gory group animated by lethal intent accomplish their fixing constructive liability conclusively silences such a refined plea of extrication. (See: Amir Hussain v. State of UP and Maina Singh v. State of Rajasthan .
Kerala High Court Cites 21 - Cited by 1 - J B Koshy - Full Document

Priya Nath Basuri And Ors. vs State Of West Bengal on 8 August, 2005

20. Last but not the least, Mr. Roy referring to the evidence of P.Ws. 3, 6 to 8 submitted that assault by accused Mrigen and Pulin to the victim with the blunt side of axe and tangi respectively indicates that they had no intention to commit murder of the victim Padmalochan and as such they could not be roped with the offence of murder with the aid of Section 149 IPC. Relying upon the cases of Maina Singh v. State of Rajasthan, reported in 1976 SCC (Cri) 332 and Amar Singh v. State of Punjab, reported in 1987 SCC (Cri) 232 Mr. Roy further contended that though all the seven convicts were charged under Section 302/149 IPC, conviction of three accused only for the offence of murder denotes acquittal of other accused persons for the said charge and so, Section 149 cannot be invoked. What has to be proved against a person who is alleged to be a member of an unlawful assembly is that he was one of the persons constituting the assembly and he entertained along with the other members of the assembly the common object as defined in Section 141. Section 142 provides that whoever, being aware of facts which render any assembly unlawful, intentionally joins that assembly, or continues in it, is said to be a member of an unlawful assembly. In other words, an assembly of five or more persons actuated by and entertaining one or more of the common objects specified by the five clauses of Section 141, is an unlawful assembly.
Calcutta High Court Cites 29 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

State Of Assam vs Ajgar Ali And Ors. on 24 July, 1986

In Maina Singh (supra) their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed ...even if, in a given case, the charge discloses only the named persons as co-accused and the prosecution witnesses confine their testimony to them, even then it would be permissible to come to the conclusion that others named or unnamed, besides those mentioned in the charge or the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, acted conjointly with one of the charged accused if there was other evidence to lead to the conclusion, but not otherwise.
Gauhati High Court Cites 12 - Cited by 4 - Full Document

Kashirao S/O Kisan Lahale (In Jail) And ... vs The State Of Maharashtra Through S.O. on 23 July, 2002

21. There cannot be any doubt regarding the said ratio laid down by the Apex Court. However, the said Judgment would not be applicable to the facts of the present case which are entirely different. In the present case, it has not been established by the prosecution by either direct or circumstantial evidence that apart from accused No. 1 the other accused were either seen by any of the witnesses examined by the prosecution assaulting the deceased and, therefore, in the absence of this crucial evidence, it will be difficult to hold the other accused guilty of the offence under Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code of sharing the common object and intention. The said submission of the learned A.P.P., therefore, cannot be accepted that all the accused are liable under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code for having committed the murder of Subhash Warankar.
Bombay High Court Cites 13 - Cited by 0 - V M Kanade - Full Document

Harshadsingh Pahelvansingh Thakore vs The State Of Gujarat on 17 September, 1976

7. Counsel Shri Goyal pressed upon us what he regarded as a sure-fire contention that if there was no specific evidence of the appellant having inflicted the fatal stab on the chest he was entitled to share the acquittal with the rest even if there was abundant proof of several persons including him having set upon the deceased and killed him using lethal weapons. In the present case more than one knife was used, more than one man was in the attacking party and more than one incised wound was inflicted. While we can make short work of the submission by holding, as we do, that there is clear testimony that the chest stab which was fatal in the ordinary course was the handiwork of the appellant, we make the legal position clear that when a murderous assault by many hands with many knives has ended fatally, it is legally impermissible to dissect the serious ones from the others and seek to salvage those whose stabs have not proved fatal. When people play with knives and lives, the circumstance that one man's stab falls on a less or more vulnerable part of the person of the victim is of no consequence to fix the guilt for murder. Conjoint complicity is the inevitable inference when a gory group animated by lethal intent accomplish their purpose cumulatively. Section 34 IPC fixing constructive liablility conclusively silences such a refined plea of extrication. (See Amir Hussain v. State of U.P. , Maina Singh v. State of Rajasthan . Lord Sumner's classic legal shorthand for constructive criminal liability, expressed in the Miltonic verse 'They also serve who only stand and wait' a fortiori embraces cases of common intent instantly formed, triggering a plurality of persons into an adventure in criminality, some hitting, some missing, some spletting hostile heads, some spilling drops of blood. Guilt goes with community of intent coupled with participatory presence or operation. No finer juristic niceties can be pressed into service to nullify or jettison the plain punitive purpose of the Penal Code.
Supreme Court of India Cites 6 - Cited by 24 - Full Document
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