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Hasimara Industries Ltd. And Anr. vs The Company Law Board And Ors. on 25 June, 1975

16. We have now to examine whether an investigation under the Code is a "proceeding under this Code" in terms of Clause (3) of Section 96(1). This point has been dealt with by a Division Bench of the Mysore High Court in the case of Kaverappa v. Sankanayya AIR 1965 Mys 214 =(1965 (2) Cr LJ 225) We quote below paragraphs 32 and 33 at pages 218 and 219 of the judgment of Mr. Justice Somnath Iyer who delivered the judgment of the Division Bench of the Mysore High Court, The paragraphs run thus :
Calcutta High Court Cites 27 - Cited by 2 - Full Document

Harshad S. Mehta vs Central Bureau Of Investigation on 1 October, 1992

In this regard, he has placed reliance on the decision of Mysore High Court in the case of M.P. Kevarappa Vs. D. Sankannayya Setty 1965(2) Crl.L.J. 225. in that case the Court was dealing with the provisions of Section 94 and 96 of the Old Code. The facts of that case were that the word Circle Inspector of Police at ÍMercara acquired information that two persons had printed and circulated a pamphlet containing matters falling witn the purview of of Section 124A and Section 153A of the Penal Code. The Circle. Inspector wanted to collect the evidence so that the prosecution could be commenced in respect of those offences. He applied to the First Class Magistrate Mercara for sanction to investigate those offences since those offences were non-cognizable offences, hence permission was necessary. The Magistrate accorded the permission to investigate the offences which he presumably did under the provisions of Section 155(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and thereafter a case was registered. The police wanted to search the houses of the accused and asked for the general search warrants. The general search warrants were issued by the Magistrate authorising the police to search the premises of the complainant. The complainant filed a suit for damages against the Magistrate for issuing search warrants illegally. The District Magistrate upheld the contention of the complainant and awarded damages against the magistrate. Against that order the matter went up in appeal. The point raised before the High Court was whether the Magistrate had the power to issue the general search warrant when there was no matter pending before him either in which he had to make an inquiry or trial, and that the magistrate did not consider that for the purposes of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding before the Court to which there is a reference in para 3 of Sub Section 96 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it was necessary that a general search should be made. Para 3 of Sub Section (1) of Section did not authorise the Magistrate to issue search warrant for the purposes of investigation. The Court considered the provision of Section 94(1) of the Old Code as well as of Section 96 of the Old Code which are corresponding to Section 91 and 93 of the present Code, and came to the conclusion that it does not appear reasonable to say that a general search warrant which may be made under the third paragraph of Section 96(1) for an inquiry which is made by a Magistrate to determine prima facie the truth and falsity of certain facts in order to take further action thereon, cannot be made during an investigation whose purpose is in substance similar. Relying on the various other judgments the High Court came to the conclusion that although the word Investigation' occurring in Section 94(1) does not occur in para 3 of Section 96(1) of the Code. So long as that paragraph employs the comprehensive words 'or other proceeding under this Code' and the definition of an 'investigation' contained in S. 4(1)(1) of the Code makes it clear that an investigation like the one in the present case, is a proceeding under the Code, it would not be, right for the Court to depend upon the inexistence of the word 'investigation' in para 3 of Section 96(1) for founding the conclusion that an investigation is not a proceeding under the Code or that a general search to aid an investigation is not within para 3 of Section 96(1) of the Code. Therefore, relying on these observations, Mr. Saxena contended that inexistence of the word 'investigation' in Section 267 will not make any difference. The word 'other proceedings' is comprehensive enough to include investigation. The scope of the word 'other proceeding' should not be restricted only to the inquiry or trial pending in the Court because if that had been the import of the legislature it would have manifestly made it clear in its language as was done under Section 491(1)(C) of the Old Code. In fact in order to enlarge the scope of this Section the word 'other proceeding' has been used.
Delhi High Court Cites 37 - Cited by 23 - Full Document
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