Praveen Dress Mfg. Co. vs Seventh Income-Tax Officer. on 5 May, 1989
10. Lastly, it was argued that when two interpretations of a provision are possible, the one in favour of the assessee should be adopted as explained by the Supreme court in the case of CIT v. Vegetable products Ltd. [1973] 88 ITR 192 which has been applaud in the case of Jindal Aluminium Ltd. [IT Appeal Nos. 855 and 856/Bang/1987]. The supreme court was dealing with the language of a taxing provision which was capable of more interpretations than one. The interpretation called for [Sec. 251[1]] is not a taxing provision and the above principle does not apply. The natural meaning of the language used in section 251(1) does not admit of any interpretation restricting the power of the Appellate Asst. Commissioner when a matter comes to him as a consequence of remand unless the order of remand itself fixes the compass of enquiry. Provisions conferring powers are to be broadly construed unless restrictions are in built in the provision itself. If the section contains no express provision excluding jurisdiction, the ordinary powers generally exercisable by the authority should be presumed to be existing if as a consequence of remand the first appellate authority should get seisin of the entire appeal. The powers of the first appellate authority under section 251[1] are not reduced unless in a given case the order of remand itself specifies the scope of enquiry in the issue remanded. In the present case, the order of the Tribunal placing no such limitation, the Appellate Asst. Commissioner was well within his authority to exercise all the powers under section 251(1) (a) as the order of Appellate Asst. Commissioner has been set aside in entirely. The ground relating to jurisdiciton is, therefore, pronounced against the assessee.