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Manekbai Nadirshaw Vachha vs Nadirshaw Jamshedji Vachha on 20 February, 1936

3. Now Act 15 of 1865 is largely based on the English Act to which I have just referred, and Section 34 is praotioally the same as Section 32 of that Act. There are slight differences of wording, but they do not appear to affect the sense materially. The construction which the English Courts have placed on this section is that it conferred no other power except to secure a gross sum or annual sums to the wife by charging the property of the husband; if he had no property, no order could be made; he could not be ordered to make periodical payments out of wages or salary. It was also held that an order of the kind contemplated by the section, viz., an order securing the payment or payments to the wife, could not be afterwards varied, as the intention of the legislature was that it should be permanent: Rawlins v. Rawlins (1865) 4 Sw and Tr 168, Hyde v. Hyde (1865) 12 L T 235 and Medley v. Medley (1882) 7 P.D 122; see also Iswarayya v. Iswarayya 1931 P.C 234.
Bombay High Court Cites 21 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Ramesh Ramanlal Saraiya vs Kusum Madgaokar on 6 April, 1948

Stone J. set out at great length the Privy Council case of Iswarayya v. Iswarayya and the observations of their Lordships therein and proceeded to apply the principles and rules of English law under Section 7 for the determination of the issue before them. In dealing with the argument that such an interpretation of Section 7 may involve importing into the Indian law grounds for divorce which are contrary to the provisions of the Indian Divorce Act the learned Judge pointed out that since adultery, cruelty or desertion had been dealt with as grounds for divorce in India on a somewhat different footing than that from which they were dealt with as grounds for divorce in England, it would be contrary to the provisions of the Indian Divorce Act to import the grounds as understood in England into the Indian Divorce Act. But his Lordship proceeded to observe at p. 529 : "Had there not been a provision to the contrary, we could have followed even that important change." It is not necessary for the purpose of the ease before us to go to that length. But that was the view which Stone J. was prepared to take. Mockett J. observed (p. 533):
Bombay High Court Cites 22 - Cited by 7 - Full Document

Manekbai Nadirshaw Vachha vs Nadirshaw Jamshedji Vachha on 20 February, 1936

5. Now Act XV of 1865 is largely based on the English Act to which I have just referred, and Section 34 is practically the same as Section 32 of that Act. There are slight differences of wording, but they do not appear to affect the sense materially. The construction which the English Courts have placed on this section is that it conferred no other power except to secure a gross sum or annual sums to the wife by charging the property of the husband; if he had no property, no order could be made; he could not be ordered to make periodical payments out of wages or salary. It was also held that an order of the kind contemplated by the section, viz., an order securing the payment or payments to the wife, could not be afterwards varied, as the intention of the Legislature was that it should be permanent. [Rawlins v. Rawlins (1865) 4 Sw. & Tr. 158, Hyde v. Hyde (1865) 12 L.T.N.S. 235, Medley v. Medley (1882) 7 P.D. 122 see also Iswarayya v. Iswarayya (1931) L.R. 58 I.A. 350 : S.C. 33 Bom. L.R. 1402, 1406.]
Bombay High Court Cites 19 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Grace Isabel Stuedman vs Anneley Eliardo Beresford De Courey ... on 27 May, 1943

The learned Judge read the observations of the Judicial Committee in D. Iswarayya v. S. Iswarayya as supporting his views. As I have already explained the last mentioned case does not support the very broad general proposition assumed by Stone J. The provisions of the Letters Patent of 1865 or of Section 45, Indian Divorce Act or the Code of Civil Procedure or the considerations and difficulties I have discussed above do not appear to have been adverted to by his Lordship. Mockett J. also toot the same view of Section 7. With the utmost respect I cannot agree with those learned Judges. I respectfully agree with the conclusion arrived at by Wadsworth J. for reasons stated by him as also for the other reasons stated by me above. It is needless to repeat my reasons.
Calcutta High Court Cites 36 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Amarthala Hemalatha vs Dasari Balu Rajendra Varaprasad on 5 March, 1990

18. A Full Bench of the Madras High^ Court in Sumathi Ammal v. D. Paul, AIR 1936 Madras 324 consisting of Stone and Mockett, JJ. (Wadsworth, J. dissenting) reviewed the whole history of legislation and also considered the judgment of the Privy Council in Iswarayya v. Swarnam Iswarayya, AIR 1931 PC 234 and held that the effect of Sec. 7 was that not only principles and rules of law but also statutory provisions and statutory rules in force and in obligation (Sic) in the Courts for divorce or Matrimonial Causes in England, are to be applied while granting relief under the Indian law.
Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana) Cites 18 - Cited by 1 - S S Quadri - Full Document

Ballani Ranganayakulu And Others vs Mattupalli Nageswara Rao on 18 November, 1991

4. It was held in Iswarayya v. Iswarayya, AIR 1931 PC 234 that there was no need for the respondent in the appeal to prefer cross-objections, when the impugned order/decree is in his favour, though some of the findings are against him. The wife in that case, filed two petitions for alimony for herself and for maintenance of her children. One decree was passed on those two applications. Rs. 30/-per month was ordered for the eldest girl and Rs. 40/- for each of the other 3 children and thus in all Rs. 150/- was awarded for the children, an amount of Rs. 160/- per monlh was awarded for the wife. The said decree was passed, when a sum of not less than Rs. 300/-per month was prayed for the maintenance of the children and Rs.260/- per month was claimed for the alimony of the wife. When the matter had come up before the High Court in the appeal, the High Court opined that since the children had all ceased to be minors within the meaning of Divorce Act, 1869, no provision could be made for them. But upon the facts of the case, the High Court felt that the wife's alimony should be increased to Rs. 260/- per month as claimed by her. Then it was urged before the Privy Council that as the wife had not preferred any appeal or cross-objections against the decree for alimony at Rs. 160/- per month, the High Court erred in enhancing it at Rs.260/-per month. While adverting to the said contention, the Privy Council observed "that there was no reason why the wife should appeal from the order, which the District Judge had made; there was every reason why she should be satisfied therewith." It was stated that the Appellate Court could enhance the alimony of Rs. 260/-in that case in exercise of the power conferred under 0.41, R. 33, CPC, though no cross-objections were preferred by the wife.
Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana) Cites 12 - Cited by 5 - Full Document

Deoki Nandan vs Makhan Lal And Ors. on 21 March, 1960

29. The next case is a decision of the Privy Council in Iswarayya v. Swarnam Iswarayya, 1931 All LJ 808 : (AIR 1931 PC 234). A wife was granted an alimony for herself andi her children. She was satisfied with the amount and did not appeal. The husband, however, did, and his appeal was allowed to this extent that the High Court held that the children were not entitled and the provision made in their favour by the lower court was excluded. But, at the same time, they increased the wife's allowance from Rs. 120/- to Rs. 260/- a month.
Allahabad High Court Cites 11 - Cited by 2 - Full Document

Reynold Rajamani & Anr vs Union Of India & Anr on 30 July, 1982

Learned counsel of the appellants has referred us to B. Iswarayya v. Swarnam Iswarayya(3) and George Swamidoss Joseph v. Miss Harriet Sundari Edward.(4) Nothing said in those cases helps the appellants. The first case was concerned with the question whether an appellate court can increase the amount of alimony payable by the husband to the wife without an appeal by her. And the second deals with the question whether the Indian Courts can make a decree nisi for nullity absolute within a shorter period than that specifically mentioned in the Indian Divorce Act.
Supreme Court of India Cites 18 - Cited by 42 - R S Pathak - Full Document

Seetaram And Ors. vs Smt. Ramabai And Anr. on 25 February, 1958

In this sense, it cannot be gainsaid that the landlords were persons aggrieved, because they had been refused permission to serve a notice of eviction on the ground that the tenant was a habitual defaulter and also that the house needed repair and reconstruction. But the clause to which we have referred does not say that any person aggrieved may appeal to the Deputy Commissioner. It says that any person aggrieved 'by an order' of the Controller may prefer an appeal. "When the order was in favour of the landlords they were not aggrieved by the order. To borrow the language of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Iswarayya v. Iswarayya, 58 Ind App 350 at p. 361: (AIR 1931 PC 234 at p. 239) (C), there was no reason why the landlords should appeal from the order which the Rent Controller had made; there was every reason why they should be satisfied therewith.
Madhya Pradesh High Court Cites 4 - Cited by 7 - M Hidayatullah - Full Document

Smt. Sogra Khatun vs Bhagaban Das Khandelwal on 7 February, 1977

In the decision reported in AIR 1931 PC 234 (B. Iswarayya v. Swarnam Iswarayya), on the appeal preferred by the husband, the court, while dismissing the wife's claim for maintenance and expenses for the education of the children, held that the court below was justified to take the view that complete justice could not be done unless the amount ordered to be paid to the wife for alimony was increased, and it accordingly increased that amount. The wife had not preferred any cross-appeal in that case.
Orissa High Court Cites 11 - Cited by 0 - Full Document
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