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Trikamlal Manilal Shah vs Musamiya Isam Haiderbux Razvi on 16 January, 1992

13. It is in the aforesaid manner that the Appellate Bench proceeded to pass decree for possession against petitioner-tenant. It is submitted that the legal position with regard to giving of time when there was a continuous dispute of standard rent and permitted increases and when annual liability to pay education cess was admitted, was not taken into consideration at all and even the ratio in the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mranalini (supra) was not properly applied while passing the decree for eviction. It would, therefore, be necessary to deal with that part of the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner-tenant.
Gujarat High Court Cites 12 - Cited by 3 - Full Document

Gopaldas Kakubhai Thakkar Decd Through ... vs Jamnabai Tekchand Mangalani Decd ... on 13 October, 2022

A copy of the order dated June 4, 1976 has not been placed before us. We, therefore, cannot say that the court had condoned the delay in depositing the amount of arrears in accordance with the earlier order or that it has condoned the consecutive defaults committed every month since April 1975 in depositing the monthly amount. Merely because it is stated that the court had permitted the tenant to deposit the said amount, it cannot be construed that the court had condoned the delay in depositing the same. We are not holding that the court does possess such a power. On this question, we do not wish to express any opinion though it has been held in Mranalini B. Shah v. Bapalal Mohanlal Page 14 of 17 Downloaded on : Sun Dec 25 03:54:33 IST 2022 C/CRA/425/2002 JUDGMENT DATED: 13/10/2022 Shah (19) G. L. R. 1090) that the court has no such power. Assuming that the court has the power to condone the delay in depositing not only the arrears but also the consecutive defaults in depositing the monthly amount over a period of more than one year, the fact remains that no order condoning the delay is proved to have been made. Not only this - even for the period subsequent to June 1976, the tenant has been highly irregular in depositing the amount as would be evident from a reading of the order of the High Court. The learned Judge has pointed out that after June 1976 the tenant made the next deposit of Rs. 143. 70 p. on November 15,1976. The next deposit in a sum of Rs. 71.85 p. was made on January 7, 1977. Rs.23.94 p. was deposited on February 9,1977 and different amounts on June 1, 1977, August 1, 1977 and November 3,1977. Though it is stated that these deposits were also made with the permission of the court, it is not shown us that the court had condoned the delays in depositing these various amounts. In the absence of the orders of the court being placed before us, we cannot say that the court had condoned the same either expressly or by necessary implication again assuming (but without so holding) that the court does possess such a power ."
Gujarat High Court Cites 15 - Cited by 0 - A S Supehia - Full Document

Malganbhai Rasulbhai vs Pushpavadan Manilal Desai (Since ... on 29 July, 1985

Similarly the decision of this High Court in the case of Pravinchandra (supra) held the field till it was implied overruled by the Supreme Court in the case of Mranalini (supra). On account of the decision of the Bombay High Court and the decision of this High Court, the Legislature did not think it necessary to amend the law. The Legislature was quite content with the position of law exposed by the two High Courts. However, after the decision of the Supreme Court and particularly when the Supreme Court said that the Court had no jurisdiction to refuse decree of eviction and the court was compelled to pass decree, in case the conditions laid down in Section 12(3)(b) were not complied with, the Legislature stepped in. The statement of objects and reasons for Amendment Act No. 7 of 1985 states that:
Gujarat High Court Cites 22 - Cited by 3 - Full Document

Bachiben Tulsidas vs Jayantilal Chunilal on 18 March, 2005

I have also considered the judgments SHAH DHANSUKHLAL CHHAGANLAL v. DALICHAND VIRCHAND SHROFF (supra) as well as GANPAT LADHA v. SASHIKANT VISHNU (supra), MRANALINI B. SHAH AND ANR. v. BAPALAL MOHANLAL SHAH (supra), JOSHI BHURARAM DATTARAM v. JIVIBAI D. MULCHAND (MRS.), JOSHI RATANSHI GOPALJI v. NAROTTAM NARANJI MEHTA ORS. (supra) and other submissions made by the learned counsel. It is no doubt true that originally the case was fallen under Section 12(3)(a) of the Act. The trial Court held that the tenant failed and neglected to fulfill the conditions of Section 12(3)(a) of the Act. The appellant Court has considered the alternative case and held that the tenant is not qualified for protection under Section 12(3)(b) of the Rent Act. In view of the dispute of the standard rent which has been only determined by the judgment of the trial Court and there was a dispute of education cess, in my view the learned appellate judge was right in considering the alternative claim under Section 12(3)(b) of the Act.
Gujarat High Court Cites 27 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Girish Gangadhar Agrawal vs Jagdishchandra Amrutlal Wakhariya on 21 August, 2009

and others, reported at 1998(1) Mh.L.J. 282, the question of irregularity in payment of rent during the pendency of the lis had been raised and after referring to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Mranalini B. Shah v. Bapalal Mohanlal Shah, reported at AIR 1980 SC 954, Mohan Laxman Hede v. Noormohamed Adam Shaikh, reported at AIR 1988 SC 1111, and Shantabai Vishnumal v. Ganpat Ladha, reported ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 14:55:53 ::: 25 at 1976 Mh.L.J. 332, the Court observed in para 4 as under :
Bombay High Court Cites 37 - Cited by 0 - R C Chavan - Full Document

Girish Gangadhar Agrawal vs // on 21 August, 2009

and others reported at 1998(1) Mh.L.J. 282, the question of irregularity in payment of rent during the pendency of the lis had been raised and after referring to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Mranalini B. Shah v. Bapalal Mohanlal Shah, reported at AIR 1980 SC 954, Mohan Laxman Hede v. Noormohamed Adam Shaikh, reported at AIR 1988 SC 1111, and Shantabai Vishnumal v. Ganpat Ladha, reported at 1976 Mh.L.J. 332, the Court observed in para 4 as under :
Bombay High Court Cites 30 - Cited by 0 - R C Chavan - Full Document

Ramdas Bhagwan Choudhary. vs Dhule Madhyawarti Sahakari Grahak ... on 19 December, 2025

22. Nonetheless, as is evident from the 'C' number register maintained by the trial Court that the default is apparent. Even under the statutory provisions, the tenant is under an obligation to pay or tender in Court regularly such rent till the suit is decided. Thus, the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Mranalini B. Shah and another V. Bapalal Mohanlal Shah (supra) that the protection available to the tenant, as contemplated under section 15(3) does not 15 WP / 2121 / 1996 confer any discretionary jurisdiction to the Court. However, it provides protection to the tenant on certain conditions and those conditions have to be strictly observed by the tenant, seeking the statutory protection.
Bombay High Court Cites 23 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Ramdas Bhagwan Choudhary Died Thr Lrs ... vs Madhyavarti Sahakari Grahak Bhandar ... on 19 December, 2025

22. Nonetheless, as is evident from the 'C' number register maintained by the trial Court that the default is apparent. Even under the statutory provisions, the tenant is under an obligation to pay or tender in Court regularly such rent till the suit is decided. Thus, the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Mranalini B. Shah and another V. Bapalal Mohanlal Shah (supra) that the protection available to the tenant, as contemplated under section 15(3) does not 15 WP / 2121 / 1996 confer any discretionary jurisdiction to the Court. However, it provides protection to the tenant on certain conditions and those conditions have to be strictly observed by the tenant, seeking the statutory protection.
Bombay High Court Cites 23 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Bai Sakarbai Devraj vs Ibrahim Abdul Ganibhai Pankhida on 6 May, 1994

The other decision referred to in the object clause is again a Supreme Court decision in Mranalini B. Shah & Am. v. Bapalal Mohanlal Shah (1978) XIX GLR 1090, which says that the expression "regularly" is mandatory and not "directory" and that the payments to be monthly must be paid 'regularly' and that the payments made at interval of 2, 3 or 4 months cannot be considered to be regularly. It is also pointed out that there is no discretion vested in the Court not to pass a decree in ejectment if the provisions of Section 12(3)(b) are not complied with. These are the two decisions which had persuaded the Legislature to intervene and to delete the expression "regularly". Heavy reliance has been placed on these two decisions by the Learned Counsels representing the cause of the landlords to urge before us that any payment which cannot be said to be 'regularly' within the expression "regularly" would not save the defendant-tenant from facing a decree of eviction.
Gujarat High Court Cites 26 - Cited by 5 - B N Kirpal - Full Document
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