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Documents citing K. Chinnathambi Gounder And Anr. vs The Government Of Tamil Nadu, ... on 22 June, 1979

P. Devendran vs The State Of Tamil Nadu And Anr. on 17 July, 1992

8. The reliance of the decision of a Full Bench of this Court in Chinnathambi Gounder v. Government of Tamil Nadu , in my view, is wholly unsustainable. That was a case which arose before the Central Act 68 of 1984 came into force. After coming into force of Act 68 of 1984, I do not think the principle laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in the above mentioned case will not hold good. The Full Bench of this Court, in the decision cited supra, applied the maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit and took note of the fact that there was no stay in that case in favour of the petitioner and observed at page 278 as follows:
Madras High Court Cites 9 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

M.G.Ramachandran vs State Represented By on 14 December, 2011

11. The Division Bench of our High Court in paragraph 10 of the judgment reported in 2009 (3) Crimes 232 (Mad.) (Sulian alias Chinnathambi and another ..vs.. State of Tamil Nadu), applied the same law. As found in the above case of the Division Bench of our High Court, here also all the eye witnesses examined on the prosecution side are closely related to each other and the accused are also injured, some of the accused sustained simple injuries and other accused sustained both simple and grievous injuries and considering the place at which the injuries sustained, our High Court is of the view that the injuries are not minor or superficial and irrespective of the nature of injuries, by reason of non-explanation of the injuries sustained by the accused and failure of the prosecution to place all the records pertaining to the counter case, the Court is compelled to draw an inference that the prosecution has not presented the true version and the origin of the occurrence is not established and the eye witnesses have also deliberately suppressed the part of the transaction in which the accused are injured and it is very unsafe to convict the accused placing reliance on the evidence of such eye witnesses. As rightly argued by the learned counsel for appellants in both the cases, the examination of only interested witnesses and non-examination of independent witnesses, when admittedly available in the present case, assumes greater importance and prejudice the credibility of the evidence of the prosecution witnesses.
Madras High Court Cites 12 - Cited by 0 - K B Vasuki - Full Document

C. Kamatchi Ammal vs Kattabomman Transport Corporation ... on 16 April, 1986

is set aside or quashed beyond the period of three years from the first notification, under S. 4(1) of the Act, no fresh declaration under S. 6(1) can ever be issued, because in such circumstances, it will be impossible to comply with the requirements of the proviso. It is not possible to take the view that the first proviso will be attracted in a case where a declaration was originally issued within the period of three years, that declaration has been struck down and the second declaration comes to be issued beyond the period of three years. Indeed in almost every case where a declaration under S. 6 of the Act is challenged, the possibility normally will be that such dispute will be decided only after a period of three years having regard to the pendency of matters in courts. This is the view which has been taken by the Full Bench in Chinnathambi Gounder v. Govt. of Tamil Nadu (1980) 2 Mad LJ 269: (AIR 1980 Mad 251) cited supra. It has been held by the Full Bench that where a declaration under S. 6(1), Land Acquisition Act, was factually made well within three years from the date when the notification under S. 4(1) was made, it cannot be contended that merely by reason of a second declaration having been made beyond a period of three years on account of the first declaration under S. 6(1) having been quashed by an order of court, the first declaration had become non est and the second declaration should also be made within a period of three years from the date of the notification, because though the first declaration had been quashed, the factum of declaration cannot be disputed or effected. The Full Bench pointed out that the effect of the quashing order passed by the court will be only to remove the validity and legal force of the declaration which had been quashed. This decision of the Full Bench is binding on us. Accordingly, we must reject the argument that the declaration dt. 3-12-1983, published on 4-12-1983, is void on the ground that it was issued beyond the period prescribed by the proviso to S. 6(1) of the Act.
Madras High Court Cites 8 - Cited by 17 - Full Document

C. Kamatchi Ammal vs Kattabomman Transport Corporation ... on 14 February, 1985

7. It is necessary in this connection to refer to the decision in K. Chinnathambi Gounder v. Govt. Tamil Nadu (1980) 2 Mad LJ 269: (AIR 1980 Mad 25 1) (FB) relied upon by the learned counsel for the first respondent. In that case, the notification under S. 4(1) of the Act was made on 25-6-1969 and this was followed by an enquiry under S. 5-A of the Act on 10-2-1970. A declaration under S, 6(1) of the Act was made on 27-5-1970. Thereupon, the owners of the land filed on 16-8-1970 a writ petition before this court challenging the validity of the declaration and on 3-11-1971, the writ petition was allowed holding that the enquiry proceedings as well as the declaration under S. 6(1) of the Act have to be quashed. 'Thereupon, after service of notice, a fresh enquiry under S. 5-A was held on 2-6-1972 and a declaration was made under S. 6(1) on 26-9-1972, which was published in the Gazette on 11-10-1972. The award enquiry concluded on 16-7-1974. It was thereafter that the owner of the land filed a writ petition contending that as the declaration under Sec. 6(1) had been made beyond- a period of three years, the declaration was out of time. In repelling this contention, the Full Bench pointed out that factually a declaration under S. 6(1) of the Act was made within three years from the date of the notification under S. 4(1) of the Act, and that it is not the requirement that if a declaration is quashed, the subsequent declaration too should be made within three years. Referring to the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in Director, Income tax v. Pooran, the Fuji Bench stated that even if the period of three years, under S. 6(1) of the Act is made mandatory, that had been complied with by the publication of the notification which was first made on 27-5-1970 and that though the first declaration had been quashed, the facturn of declaration cannot be disputed or affected. In that view, the Full Bench concluded that the making of the first declaration within time cannot be eschewed , and the second declaration alone be treated as the one made for the first time by the Government, as if nothing had happened. Applying this principle to this case, it is seen that on 8-2-1978 the notification under S. 6(1) of the Act had been made and that, as pointed out by the Full Bench, would be sufficient to satisfy the facture of declaration and the subsequent events cannot be considered to have in any manner nullified or effaced the factor of declaration. It is not, as pointed out by the Full Bench, the requirement that the subsequent declaration too should be made within three years. Though the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the decision of the Full Bench was rendered prior to the introduction of the explanation to See. 6(1) of the Act, by Tamil Nadu Act 42 of 1980, yet, in my view, that would not make any difference to the applicability of the principle laid down In the Full Bench decision. Having regard to these considerations, the first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted.
Madras High Court Cites 9 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Balak Ram Gupta vs Union Of India (Uoi) on 27 May, 1987

14. This argument is untenable. So far as the first step in the argument is concerned, though it is correct to say that the provisions of Section 15, Limitation Act are not attracted to an interpretation of the proviso, there is a reported decision of a Full Bench of the Madras High Court based on the language of the pre-1984 proviso where, applying the principle of the maxim "actus curiae neminem gravabit" and applying the decision in Director of Inspection of Income Tax v. Pooran Mall , the Court excluded the period of operation of a stay order in computing the period for a declaration under Section 6 (Chinnathambi Counder v. Government, AIR 1980 Mad 251, and followed in C. Kamatchi Ammal v. Kattabomman Transport Corporation Ltd. . This decision goes against the petitioner's contention (though it was in a case in which the very petitioner who obtained the stay order that sought to take advantage of the time-limit set by the proviso). Counsel, relying on certain earlier decisions of the same High Court, contended that the Full Bench decision needs reconsideration. It is argued that the principle, "actus curiae nannies gravabit" ("an act of the Court shall prejudice no man"), can be taken advantage of only by or against a party to the suit or proceeding in which the order is passed and not by or against a third party. Reference is made to a passage from Broom's Legal Maxims (10th Edn. page 73) and Mulla Code of Civil Procedure (14th Edn. Vol. 1 p. 785). We do not think we are called upon to go into this question. The respondent's case is based not on an equitable principle of general law but on the specific provision of the statute which has to be interpreted in the background, context and setting in which it was inserted.
Delhi High Court Cites 43 - Cited by 118 - S Ranganathan - Full Document

Anna Shankar Walvekar vs The State Of Maharashtra And Ors. on 7 November, 1996

5. In the above factual background, we shall now examine the contentions raised before us. Mr. Jahagirdar appearing for the petitioner submitted that section 6 of the said Act as applicable at the relevant time by its proviso to sub-section (1) provided that no declaration in respect of any particular land covered by a Notification under section 4, sub-section (1), published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967 shall be made after the expiry of three years from the date of such publication. It was his submission that in the instant case section 4 Notification was dated 6th May, 1972. However, the fresh section 6 Notification after the decree in the suit filed by the petitioner was made on 7th July, 1979. Thus it was clearly beyond time. It was, therefore, his submission that in view of this, the entire acquisition proceedings stood vitiated. Mr. Kumbhakoni, the learned advocate appearing for the 4th respondent, repelled this submission by relying on a Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in the matter of K. Chinnathambi Gounder and another v. Government of Tamil Nadu and another, reported in A.I.R. 1980 Madras 251 (Full Bench). The Full Bench while dealing with identical submission raised by Mr. Jahagirdar inter alia held "that even assuming that the 1st Proviso to section 6(1) is mandatory, the same was complied with in the instant case as first declaration under section 6(1) was well within 3 years from the Notification under section 4(1). It was not therefore a case where no declaration was at all effected by Government under section 6(1) of the Act within a period of three years from the date of Gazette Notification under section 4(1). In such a case, it could not be said that a second declaration had been made beyond a period of three years and was therefore invalid, merely because the first declaration under section 6(1) had been quashed by an order of Court, the first declaration did not become non est and it was not necessary that the second declaration should also be made within a period of three years from the date of the notification. Though the first declaration had been quashed, the factum of declaration could not be disputed or effaced. The first proviso to section 6(1) refers only to a declaration under section 6 and does not say that an effective declaration should be made within three years. Nor does it say that in the event of the declaration being quashed by Court, subsequent declaration too should be made within three years." We are in full agreement with the above view of the Full Bench of Madras High Court. We, therefore, cannot accede to Mr. Jahagirdar's submission.
Bombay High Court Cites 15 - Cited by 2 - S S Nijjar - Full Document

Sukumar M. Khot And Ors. vs State Of Maharashtra And Ors. on 8 February, 2007

Relying on the judgment in K. Chinnathambi Gounder and Anr. (supra), the learned Division Bench noticed that the second declaration made beyond a period of three years, could not be held to be invalid and there was no necessity that a second declaration should be made within the period of three years from the date of the notification under Section 4. The Court held that the first proviso to Section 6(1) refers only to the declaration under Section 6 and does not say that effect to declaration shall be made within three years. Nor does the section say that in the event of the declaration being quashed by the Court, the subsequent declaration should be made within three years. From the judgment of the learned Division Bench of this Court, which followed the judgment of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court, it would appear, that in so far as the fresh declaration under Section 6, the time prescribed to make a fresh declaration, will not apply.
Bombay High Court Cites 16 - Cited by 0 - F I Rebello - Full Document

P.L. Finance And Investments Ltd. And ... vs Appropriate Authority And Others on 1 December, 1994

In K. Chinnathambi Gounder v. Government of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1980 Mad 251, a Full Bench of this court had an occasion to consider the issue pertaining to the exercise of the power by the designated authority beyond the stipulated period, in the given circumstances when it had become necessary for being exercised for the second successive time. The Full Bench decision arose under the first proviso to section 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1984. The proviso obliged the Government to issue a declaration under section 6 of the Act within three years from the date of notification under section 4 of the Act. In that case, a declaration under the Act was made within a period of three years, as stipulated in the proviso. But the acquisition proceedings were challenged by means of a writ petition and ultimately the court quashed the declaration under section 6 of the Act alone on the ground of violation of the principles of natural justice and denial of an opportunity to the person interested in the property before issuing the declaration under section 6 of the Act. When the defect noticed was rectified by giving an opportunity, a fresh notification came to be issued and the same was challenged as being made beyond the period of three years stipulated under the proviso to section 6(1) of the Act. The learned judges of the Full Bench of this court, while applying the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in the income-tax case, referred to supra, have held that for passing orders by complying with the stipulation of time envisaged under the proviso to section 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, it cannot be said that the Government did not pass any declaration within the period of three years since the first declaration under section 6(1) was well within three years. It was further observed that though the first declaration was quashed, the fact of declaration could not be disputed or effaced, since the first proviso to section 6(1) refers only to a declaration under section 6 and not an effective declaration within the period of three years; nor does it say that in the event of the declaration being quashed by the court, subsequent declaration too should be made within three years.
Madras High Court Cites 23 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

D. Nandakrishnan And Anr. vs State Of Tamil Nadu And Ors. on 17 April, 1997

17. The Full Bench pronouncement of the Supreme Court squarely applies to the facts of the present case. The Division Bench had allowed the writ petition and quashed the Section 6 Declaration by order dated 21.1.1988 and the same has been communicated to the Land Acquisition Officer and the certified copy of the said judgment was received by the Land Acquisition Officer, the second respondent on 3.2.1989. Thus either reckoned from 21.1.1988 or for that matter from 3.2.1989, till now no declaration under Section 6 of the Act has been issued by the 1st respondent. Hence the Respondents cannot issue a fresh declaration under Section 6 as number of years have rolled by now. Even assuming that a period of three years would not apply which contention is not correct, even then more than three years have elapsed since 3.2.1983. Reckoned from 3.2.1989 and till date of filing of writ petition on 19.2.1993 more than three years have elapsed.
Madras High Court Cites 11 - Cited by 1 - Full Document
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