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Documents citing Fateh Chand And Anr. vs Narsingh Das And Anr. on 16 May, 1912

T. Rangayya Reddy vs V.S. Subramanya Aiyar And Ors. on 16 January, 1917

In Fateh Chand v. Narsingh Das 16 Ind. Cas. 988 : 22 C.L.J. 383 which is perhaps the nearest to the present case, under the form of a compromise one of the defendants got a transfer for money of whatever interest the other defendant had in the property agreed to be sold. It was held that he was a subsequent transferee. The difference between that case and this is obvious; but that, I think, makes no difference in principle. The answer to the 1st question must, therefore, be in the affirmative. In the view I have taken, there is only one cause of action, namely, that for specific performance in this case, the other cause of action, viz., for partition not having accrued on the date of the suit. If there was an existing cause of action for partition on the date of the suit, the question whether the two causes of action, one for specific performance and the other for partition and possession, can be joined in one Suit, would depend not only on the provisions of Order J, Rules 3 and 5, which primarily regulate the joinder of parties but also of Order II, Rules 3 and 4, which provide for joinder of causes of action.
Madras High Court Cites 11 - Cited by 11 - Full Document

Mathura Mohan Saha And Ors. vs Ramkumar Saha And Chittagong District ... on 24 November, 1915

228 : 14 C.L.J. 159; Fateh Cand v. Narsingh Das 16 Ind. Cas. 988 : 22 C.L.J. 383. The plaintiff will, in addition, have a decree, against the District Board, for Rs. 957-11-1 together with interest thereon at 6 per cent. per annum from 4th December 1900 to the date of realisation. The plaintiff will have his costs in the Courts of the Subordinate Judge and the District Judge from the Distric. Board, and his costs in this Court from the other defendants. A self-contained decree, which will set out the various sums in detail, will be drawn up in this Court.
Calcutta High Court Cites 21 - Cited by 20 - Full Document

Tiruvambala Desikar Gnana Sambanda ... vs Chinna Pandaram Alias Manikkavachaka ... on 20 December, 1915

8. It will be convenient to consider in the first place whether the compromise decree in Original Suit No. 74 of 1901 is valid and binding. As already stated it was entered into after Sivagnana had purported to dismiss the defendant by Exhibit K and the defendant had replied by filing a complaint for defamation and a suit to declare the alleged dismissal illegal. The Subordinate Judge has found that it was brought about after protracted negotiations and on the independent advice of persons who had the interests of the institution at heart, and not by means of any pressure or oppression on the part of the defendant. If Sivagnana was not in a position to justify the charges he had made against the defendant, it was eminently proper for him to withdraw them, instead of committing the mutt to further ruinous litigation. I do not however consider it necessary to pursue the matter further because in my opinion the consent decree in Original Suit No. 74 of 1901 was binding on Sivaguana and is also binding on the present plaintiff who claims through him, and even if there had been any grounds for setting it aside by suit, such a suit became barred during the lifetime of Sivagnana. A consent decree is binding on the parties to the suit until it is set aside just as much as if it had been passed after contest: Fateh Chand v. Narsing Das (1915) 22 C.L.J. 383 citing In re South American and Mexican Company; Ex parte Bank of England (1895) 1 Ch. 87. The effect of the consent decree in Original Suit No. 74 of 1901 is to establish as against Sivagnana and those who like the present plaintiff claim through him that the defendant had been duly appointed junior Pandarasannadhi and continued to hold that office at the date of the decree. Consequently, unless he was subsequently removed, he was junior Pandarasannadhi at the death of Sivagnana and then became his legal representative and entitled to succeed to his office.
Madras High Court Cites 9 - Cited by 10 - Full Document

Thiretambala Desikar Gnana Sambanda ... vs Chinna Pandaram Alias Manikkavasaka ... on 20 December, 1915

9. It will be convenient to consider in the first place whether the compromise decree in Original Suit No. 74 of 1901 is valid and binding. As already stated, it was entered into after Sivagnana had purported to dismiss the defendant by Exhibit K and defendant had replied by filing a complaint for defamation and a suit to declare the alleged, dismissal illegal. The Subordinate Judge has found that it was brought about after protracted negotiations and on the independent advice of persons who had the interests of the institution at heart, and not by means of any pressure or oppression on the part of the defendant. If Sivagnana was not in a position to justify the charges he had made against the defendant, it was eminently proper for him to withdraw them, instead of committing the Mutt to further ruinous litigation. I do not, however, consider it necessary to pursue the matter further, because, in my opinion, the consent decree in Original Suit No. 74 of 1901 was binding on Sivagnana and is also binding on the present plaintiff who claims through him and even if there had been any grounds for setting it aside by suit, such a suit became barred during the lifetime of Sivagnana. A consent decree is binding on the parties to the suit until it is set aside just as much as if it had been passed after contest. Fatah Chand v. Narasingh Das 16 Ind. Cas. 988 : 22 C.L.J. 383, citing In Re: South American and Mexican Company, Ex parte Bank of England (1895) 1 Ch. D. 37 : 64 L.J. Ch. D. 189 : 12 R. 1 : 71 L.T. 594 : 43 W.R. 131. The effect of the consent decree in Original Suit No. 74 of 1901 is to establish as against Sivagnana and those who like the present plaintiff claim through him that the defendant had been duly appointed junior Pandarasannadhi and continued to hold that office at the date of the decree. Consequently, unless he was subsequently removed, he was junior Pandarasannadhi at the death of Sivagnana and then became his legal representative and entitled to succeed to his office. As regards the alleged illegality in the compromise decree in so far as it restrains the plaintiff from removing the defendant in case of future misconduct, I do not think that this would be any ground for setting aside the decree altogether in a suit by Sivagnana for that purpose, for it does not affect the consideration obtained by Sivagnana for entering into the compromise.
Madras High Court Cites 9 - Cited by 7 - Full Document

Biswambar Biswas vs Nilambar Muhari on 3 May, 1929

5. He first of all contends that the decree passed on compromise in the mortgage suit cannot be set aside at the instance of a person who was no party to the suit. He is certainly entitled to succeed on that point. As pointed out by Mookerjee, J., in the case of Fateh Chand v. Narsingh Das 16. C. 638, it is not competent to a person to invite the Court to vacate a consent decree to which he is no party. Mookerjee, J., further remarked that being a stranger to the decree, the only declaration he could get was that the decree did not affect his right. The decree could not be vacated at his instance and the appeal which was terminated by the decree be heard as though no decree had been passed. The same principle applies to the present case. The plaintiff was a stranger to that decree by which expression I understand that he was not a party. He might have been interested in the result but that would not make him a party. Mr. Sircar contends that Mohesh, the plaintiff in that suit, was the benamdar of the present plaintiffs. Even if he was, that does not make the present plaintiff a party to that suit. The parties to a suit, as I understand the expression, are the persons whose names appear on the record as parties. Neither indeed was Mohesh a benamdar for the plaintiff in the present suit. The plaintiff in the present suit was not at that time the owner of the mortgage-debt, for the sale had not been completed and no title had passed. He is even now suing for a specific performance of the contract to sell. He could not have then sued on the mortgage-bond, for he did not own it and Mohesh alone could have sued. Mr. Sircar seems to argue that by the agreement and the payment of consideration the title passed.
Calcutta High Court Cites 4 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Biswambar Biswas vs Nilambar Murari And Ors. on 3 May, 1929

4. He first of all contends that the decree passed on compromise in the mortgage suit cannot be set aside at the instance of a person who was no party to the suit. He is certainly entitled to succeed on that point. As pointed out by Mukerji, J., in Fateh Chand v. Narsing Das (1915) 22 C.L.J. 383, at p. 388 it is not competent to a person to invite the Court to vacate a consent decree to which he is no party. Mukerji, J., further remarked that being a stranger to the decree the only declaration he could get was that the decree did not affect his right. The decree could not be vacated at his instance and the appeal which was terminated by the decree be heard as though no decree had been passed. That same principle applies to the present case. The plaintiff was a stranger to that decree by which expression I understand that he was not a party. He might have been interested in the result but that would not make him a party. Mr. Sircar contends that Mohesh the plaintiff in that case was the benamidar of the present plaintiff. Even if he was, that does not make the present plaintiff a party to that suit. The parties to a suit, as I understand the expresssion, are the persons whose names appear on the record as parties. Neither indeed was Mohesh a benamidar for the plaintiff in the present suit. The plaintiff in the present suit was not at that time the owner of the mortgage debt for the sale had not been completed and no title had passed. He is even now suing for a specific performance of the contract to sell. He could not have been sued on the mortgage bond for he did not own it and Mohesh alone could have sued. Mr. Sircar seems to argue that by the agreement and the payment of consideration the title passed.
Calcutta High Court Cites 4 - Cited by 0 - Full Document
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