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Documents citing Sundaram Finance Ltd vs Nepc India Ltd on 13 January, 1999

Himachal Pradesh Cooperative Group ... vs Umesh Goel And Anr. on 20 November, 2007

"Party" is defined in Clause (h) of Sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the A&C Act to mean "a party to an arbitration agreement". So, the right conferred by Section 9 is on a party to an arbitration agreement. The time or the stage for invoking the jurisdiction of court under Section 9 can be: (i) before, or (ii) during arbitral proceedings, or (iii) at any time after the making of the arbitral award but before it is enforced in accordance with Section 36. With the pronouncement of this Court in Sundaram Finance Ltd. v. NEPC India Ltd. the doubts stand cleared and set at rest and it is not necessary that arbitral proceedings must be pending or at least a notice invoking arbitration clause must have been issued before an application under Section 9 is filed. A little later we will revert again to this topic. For the moment suffice it to say that the right conferred by Section 9 cannot be said to be one arising out of a contract. The qualification which the person invoking jurisdiction of the court under Section 9 must possess is of being a "party" to an arbitration agreement. A person not party to an arbitration agreement cannot enter the court for protection under Section 9. This has relevance only to his locus standi as an applicant. This has nothing to do with the relief which is sought for from the court or the right which is sought to be canvassed in support of the relief. The reliefs which the court may allow to a party under Clauses (i) and (ii) of Section 9 flow from the power vesting in the court exercisable by reference to "contemplated", "pending" or "completed" arbitral proceedings. The court is conferred with the same power for making the specified orders as it has for the purpose of and in relation to any proceedings before it though the venue of the proceedings in relation to which the power under Section 9 is sought to be exercised is the Arbitral Tribunal. Under the scheme of the A&C Act, the arbitration clause is separable from other clauses of the partnership deed. The arbitration clause constitutes an agreement by itself. In short, filing of an application by a party by virtue of its being a party to an arbitration agreement is for securing a relief which the court has power to grant before, during or after arbitral proceedings by virtue of Section 9 of the A&C Act. The relief sought for in an application under Section 9 of the A&C Act is neither in a suit nor a right arising from a contract. The right arising from the partnership deed or conferred by the Partnership Act is being enforced in the Arbitral Tribunal; the court under Section 9 is only formulating interim measures so as to protect the right under adjudication before the Arbitral Tribunal from being frustrated. Section 69 of the Partnership Act has no bearing on the right of a party to an arbitration clause to file an application under Section 9 of the A&C Act.
Delhi High Court Cites 62 - Cited by 7 - V Sen - Full Document

Mr Puneet Malhotra And Anr vs Mr.R.S.Gai on 23 October, 2008

It was further submitted relying on the observations of the Supreme Court in the case "Sundaram Finance Ltd. Vs. NEPC India Ltd. (1999)2 SCC 477" that the scheme of the 1996 Act and the 1940 Act is totally different and the provisions of the 1940 Act cannot be referred for interpreting the provisions of the 1996 Act. It was, therefore, submitted that the 1996 Act is not a re-enactment of the 1940 Act. It was submitted that the 1996 Act is entirely a new enactment. It was further submitted that section 34 of the 1996 Act cannot be said to be an enactment of Section 30 or section 33 of the 1940 Act. The learned Advocate General took us through the provisions of Sections 30 and 33 of the 1940 Act and the provisions of Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and submitted ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 14:01:11 ::: 20 that width and amplitude of challenge provided by two provisions is totally different. It was submitted, therefore, that section 34 of the 1996 Act cannot be said to be a re-enactment with modification of Sections 30 or 33 of the 1940 Act. The learned Advocate general took us through some decisions to show what, according to him, is the meaning of term "modification". It was submitted that although heading of section 34 of the 1996 Act is similar to that of Section 33 or Section 30 of the 1940 Act, the substance thereof is entirely new.
Bombay High Court Cites 35 - Cited by 0 - D K Deshmukh - Full Document

Mr Puneet Malhotra And Anr vs Mr.R.S.Gai on 23 October, 2008

It was further submitted relying on the observations of the Supreme Court in the case "Sundaram Finance Ltd. Vs. NEPC India Ltd. (1999)2 SCC 477" that the scheme of the 1996 Act and the 1940 Act is totally different and the provisions of the 1940 Act cannot be referred for interpreting the provisions of the 1996 Act. It was, therefore, submitted that the 1996 Act is not a re-enactment of the 1940 Act. It was submitted that the 1996 Act is entirely a new enactment. It was further submitted that section 34 of the 1996 Act cannot be said to be an enactment of Section 30 or section 33 of the 1940 Act. The learned Advocate General took us through the provisions of Sections 30 and 33 of the 1940 Act and the provisions of Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and submitted ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 14:01:24 ::: 20 that width and amplitude of challenge provided by two provisions is totally different. It was submitted, therefore, that section 34 of the 1996 Act cannot be said to be a re-enactment with modification of Sections 30 or 33 of the 1940 Act. The learned Advocate general took us through some decisions to show what, according to him, is the meaning of term "modification". It was submitted that although heading of section 34 of the 1996 Act is similar to that of Section 33 or Section 30 of the 1940 Act, the substance thereof is entirely new.
Bombay High Court Cites 35 - Cited by 0 - D K Deshmukh - Full Document

Bhanja Minerals Pvt. Ltd. vs Bihar Sponge Iron Ltd. [Alongwith Arb. ... on 13 October, 2006

19. The order under Section 9 can be passed by way of an interim measure of protection before or during the arbitral proceeding or at any time after making of arbitral award but before it is enforced in accordance with Section 36 of the Act. So, it is an interim measure of protection. The Act is implicit that the dispute must have arisen, it is referable to Arbitration Tribunal and when an application under Section 9 is filed before commencement of the arbitral proceeding, there has to be manifest intention on the part of the applicant to take recourse to the arbitral proceeding if at the time when application under Section 9 is filed, the proceeding has not commenced under Section 21 of the Act. While exercising the jurisdiction under Section 9, the Court should satisfy itself that effective steps have been taken to commence the arbitral proceeding. The Court could also pass a conditional order to put the applicant to such term as it may deem fit with a view to see that steps are taken by the applicant for commencing the arbitral proceeding. (See Sundaram Finance Ltd. v. NEPC India Ltd. (supra). In the case at hand, it is an admitted fact that till date no effective steps have been taken for appointment of an arbitrator and learned Counsel for BSIL submits that this Court may appoint an arbitrator in this proceeding, which I am not inclined to do. But fact remains that since the filing of the appeal on 14.7.2006 till its hearing, no effective step has been taken by BSIL for appointment of an arbitrator. BSIL is enjoying the interim order without discharging the obligation of appointing an arbitrator. The impugned order is also silent regarding the steps taken by BSIL for appointment of an Arbitrator.
Orissa High Court Cites 24 - Cited by 1 - B P Das - Full Document

S.K. Vijayakumar S/O Lt. S.N. ... vs S.K. Ravikumar S/O Lt. S.N. ... on 17 October, 2006

In support of his submission, he has placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Sundaram Finance Ltd. v. NEPC India Ltd. and the decision of this Court, in Dr. Anand David Saldanha v. Dr. K. Rathnaraj Ballal 1998 (2) KM 383 and Allahabad High Court decision reported in Deepak Mitra v. District Judge, Allahabad and Ors. AIR 2000 Allahabad 9.
Karnataka High Court Cites 25 - Cited by 0 - V G Gowda - Full Document

S.B.P. & Co vs Patel Engineering Ltd. & Anr on 26 October, 2005

In Sundaram Finance Ltd. v. NEPC India Ltd., a two Judge Bench was called upon to consider whether under Section 9 of the Act, the 'court' had jurisdiction to pass interim orders before arbitral proceedings commenced and before an arbitrator was appointed. Considering the scope of the said provision, this Court held that the 'court' had no jurisdiction to entertain application under Section 9 before initiation of arbitration proceedings.
Supreme Court of India Cites 118 - Cited by 183 - P K Balasubramanyan - Full Document

Sri Swaminathan Construction, A Regd. ... vs Sri Thirunavukkarasu Dhanalakshmi ... on 14 December, 2007

In respect of the submission of Mr. S. Silambanan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the 1st respondent, based on the decision Sundaram Finance Ltd. v. NEPC India Limited, at the outset we wish to state that the said decision will not apply to a case where an application is filed under Section 9 of Act 26/1996 after the passing of the award. The ratio laid down in the said decision in paragraph 19 would go to show that the statement of law held therein is in a case where an application is filed under Section 9 before the commencement of the arbitral proceedings therefore, the ratio laid down in the said decision does not apply to the facts of this case.
Madras High Court Cites 28 - Cited by 0 - F M Kalifulla - Full Document
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