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Mahesh Chandra Sharma vs State Of Rajasthan An Anr. on 5 April, 1974
Insp. Indra Sharma vs . State & Anr. on 8 September, 2008
Nathu Lal vs State Of Rajasthan on 28 August, 1986
14. It would be thus seen that Mahesh Chand's case (supra) has certainly provided the guide lines for cancellation of the bail at the time of commitment of the accused to the court of session, in a case where bail had been granted under Section 167(2) Cr. P.C. However, it appears to us that Bashir's case (supra) decided by the Apex court clinches the issue, because in this case the bail was granted to the accused under Section 167(2) Cr. PC and the question was when bail can be cancelled ? Their Lordships of the Supreme Court at page 58 have discussed important aspect of case and observed under:
Bhanwarlal And Ors. vs Rajasthan State Road Transport ... on 12 March, 1984
143. Now coming to the second but much more important controversy about the entertainment of writ petitions even when a reference should be made under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act is concerned, I must confess at the very outset that though, at least a dozen decisions of this Court both of single Bench and Division Bench have repeatedly repelled the objection regarding non-maintainability of the writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution in such cases and catena of those cases includes my own, yet, I am inclined to reconsider the objection in much more minute details, again. It may be noticed at the very outset that this Court except the solitary dissent of decision in Mahesh Chandra v. State of Rajasthan 1974 WLN 564, per Gupta J., has repeatedly held that the doors of Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be closed on account of availability of the remedy under Section 10 of the Act.
Ramchandra Sharma vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors. on 16 September, 1980
31. Then Shri Singhvi argued that the petitioners were promoted as far back as January 1961 and the impugned order came to be passed for the first time in March 1976 even after filing of the writ petition by Shri Rameshwar Joshi. There was no fault of the petitioners. It would be most unfair and unjust for the respondents to effect recovery of the excess pay drawn by the petitioners. The respondents themselves had taken the position that P.G. is a promotion post and continued to pass such orders even in the year 1971. Orders of promotions and reversions were passed and recovery was made by Exhibits 11 and 12. In the circumstances of the case, the respondents be directed not to effect recovery of the excess pay said to have been drawn by the petitioner. Reliance has been placed in support of this submission on decisions of this court in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 570/ 1967 Mahesh Chandra v. State of Rajasthan decided oh July 18,1972 and in S B. Civil Writ Petition No. 271/1969 Iqbal Ahmed v. State of Rajasthan decided on November 30,1973, D.B. Civil Writ petition No. 1412/1969 decided on December 15,1979.
Kishan Kumar vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors. on 13 April, 1982
7. I have considered the aforesaid decisions and have come to the conclusion that the preliminary objection should be over-ruled. A contention was raised in Mahesh Chandra's case 1974 RLW 338 that the petitioner had .an alternative remedy under the Act, which he should have pursued and, therefore, the writ petition should be dismissed on that ground.
Durel Behera vs Suratha Behera And Anr. on 25 September, 1986
With respect I express my. dissent,, illegal detention, by itself and taken alone, is no ground for bail and has not been recognised as such by. the Code. Bail is no remedy and has never been conceived or intended in law to be a remedy for illegal detention. To hold otherwise would "introduce a stage of compulsory bail not contemplated by the Code". To be entitled to be released on bail the accused must show that his case is either covered by Clause (i) of proviso to Section 167(2) or by the provisions of Chapter XXXIII of the Code. If the detention is illegal by reason of infringement of Section 309(2), the remedy is not an application for bail but an application for a writ of habeas corpus. {See Mahesh Chand's case, paragraphs 25, 27 and 29).
Bhopal Singh vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors. on 8 November, 1976
This view was also followed in a subsequent case Mahesh Chandra Sharma v. State of Rajasthan 1074 RLW 338 wherein it was held that the Irrigation Department of the State Government is an industry within the meaning of the Act. It should however be noticed that the reason why it was so held was because the Court came to the conclusion that the Irrigation department of the Government were engaged in activities which were analogous to trades or business because the irrigation facilities and supply of water was provided on payment of certain charges. I do not see how the ratio of those cases is in any way applicable. It is not the petitioner's case that for the work performed by the locust warning organisation any charges are received or any money is collected from the agriculturists. These two cases are therefore distinguishable.
Suresh Kumar Koli vs State Of Rajasthan And Anr. on 11 July, 2002
7. It is thus evident that a candidate must not have defaulted chest measurement less than 81 Cms. and inflated less than 86 Cms. During the course of arguments Mr. Katta, invited my attention towards medical certificate issued by Medical Officer, Danta (Sikar), according to which the chest measurement of the petitioner was shown to be 84-89 Cms. No opinion can be expressed at this juncture on the basis of this medical certificate but in view of the ratio indicated in Mahesh Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, (supra), I deem it appropriate to direct the respondents to conduct the re-examination of the petitioner in regard to his chest measurement.
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