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Documents citing R. Lalithambal vs J. Stanly Jones on 7 August, 2009

T.M.Prakash vs The District Collector on 27 September, 2013

126. The basic purpose of interpretation of statutes is further to aid in determining either the general object of the legislation or the meaning of the language in any particular provision. It is obvious that the intention which appears to be most in accordance with convenience, reason, justice and legal principles should, in all cases of doubtful interpretation, be presumed to be the true one. The intention to produce an unreasonable result is not to be imputed to a statute. On the other hand, it is not impermissible, but rather is acceptable, to adopt a more reasonable construction and avoid anomalous or unreasonable construction. A sense of the possible injustice of an interpretation ought not to induce Judges to do violence to the well settled rules of construction, but it may properly lead to the selection of one, rather than the other, of the two reasonable interpretations. In earlier times, statutes imposing criminal or other penalties were required to be construed narrowly in favour of the person proceeded against and were more rigorously applied. The Courts were to see whether there appeared any reasonable doubt or ambiguity in construing the relevant provisions. Right from the case of R. v. Jones, ex p. Daunton [1963(1) WLR 270], the basic principles state that even statutes dealing with jurisdiction and procedural law are, if they relate to infliction of penalties, to be strictly construed; compliance with the procedures will be stringently exacted from those proceedings against the person liable to be penalized and if there is any ambiguity or doubt, it will be resolved in favour of the accused/such person. These principles have been applied with approval by different courts even in India. Enactments relating to procedure in courts are usually construed as imperative. A kind of duty is imposed on court or a public officer when no general inconvenience or injustice is caused from different construction. A provision of a statute may impose an absolute or qualified duty upon a public officer which itself may be a relevant consideration while understanding the provision itself.
Madras High Court Cites 56 - Cited by 10 - S Manikumar - Full Document

M/S.Empee Distilleries Limited vs The State Of Tamil Nadu on 28 October, 2013

126. The basic purpose of interpretation of statutes is further to aid in determining either the general object of the legislation or the meaning of the language in any particular provision. It is obvious that the intention which appears to be most in accordance with convenience, reason, justice and legal principles should, in all cases of doubtful interpretation, be presumed to be the true one. The intention to produce an unreasonable result is not to be imputed to a statute. On the other hand, it is not impermissible, but rather is acceptable, to adopt a more reasonable construction and avoid anomalous or unreasonable construction. A sense of the possible injustice of an interpretation ought not to induce Judges to do violence to the well settled rules of construction, but it may properly lead to the selection of one, rather than the other, of the two reasonable interpretations. In earlier times, statutes imposing criminal or other penalties were required to be construed narrowly in favour of the person proceeded against and were more rigorously applied. The Courts were to see whether there appeared any reasonable doubt or ambiguity in construing the relevant provisions. Right from the case of R. v. Jones, ex p. Daunton [1963(1) WLR 270], the basic principles state that even statutes dealing with jurisdiction and procedural law are, if they relate to infliction of penalties, to be strictly construed; compliance with the procedures will be stringently exacted from those proceedings against the person liable to be penalized and if there is any ambiguity or doubt, it will be resolved in favour of the accused/such person. These principles have been applied with approval by different courts even in India. Enactments relating to procedure in courts are usually construed as imperative. A kind of duty is imposed on court or a public officer when no general inconvenience or injustice is caused from different construction. A provision of a statute may impose an absolute or qualified duty upon a public officer which itself may be a relevant consideration while understanding the provision itself.
Madras High Court Cites 60 - Cited by 1 - S Manikumar - Full Document

C.Ramasamy vs Hospital 'Z' Reported In (1998) 8 Scc 296 on 9 October, 2013

126. The basic purpose of interpretation of statutes is further to aid in determining either the general object of the legislation or the meaning of the language in any particular provision. It is obvious that the intention which appears to be most in accordance with convenience, reason, justice and legal principles should, in all cases of doubtful interpretation, be presumed to be the true one. The intention to produce an unreasonable result is not to be imputed to a statute. On the other hand, it is not impermissible, but rather is acceptable, to adopt a more reasonable construction and avoid anomalous or unreasonable construction. A sense of the possible injustice of an interpretation ought not to induce Judges to do violence to the well settled rules of construction, but it may properly lead to the selection of one, rather than the other, of the two reasonable interpretations. In earlier times, statutes imposing criminal or other penalties were required to be construed narrowly in favour of the person proceeded against and were more rigorously applied. The Courts were to see whether there appeared any reasonable doubt or ambiguity in construing the relevant provisions. Right from the case of R. v. Jones, ex p. Daunton [1963(1) WLR 270], the basic principles state that even statutes dealing with jurisdiction and procedural law are, if they relate to infliction of penalties, to be strictly construed; compliance with the procedures will be stringently exacted from those proceedings against the person liable to be penalized and if there is any ambiguity or doubt, it will be resolved in favour of the accused/such person. These principles have been applied with approval by different courts even in India. Enactments relating to procedure in courts are usually construed as imperative. A kind of duty is imposed on court or a public officer when no general inconvenience or injustice is caused from different construction. A provision of a statute may impose an absolute or qualified duty upon a public officer which itself may be a relevant consideration while understanding the provision itself.
Madras High Court Cites 47 - Cited by 0 - S Manikumar - Full Document

A.Ram Mohan vs State By on 30 March, 2015

126. The basic purpose of interpretation of statutes is further to aid in determining either the general object of the legislation or the meaning of the language in any particular provision. It is obvious that the intention which appears to be most in accordance with convenience, reason, justice and legal principles should, in all cases of doubtful interpretation, be presumed to be the true one. The intention to produce an unreasonable result is not to be imputed to a statute. On the other hand, it is not impermissible, but rather is acceptable, to adopt a more reasonable construction and avoid anomalous or unreasonable construction. A sense of the possible injustice of an interpretation ought not to induce Judges to do violence to the well settled rules of construction, but it may properly lead to the selection of one, rather than the other, of the two reasonable interpretations. In earlier times, statutes imposing criminal or other penalties were required to be construed narrowly in favour of the person proceeded against and were more rigorously applied. The Courts were to see whether there appeared any reasonable doubt or ambiguity in construing the relevant provisions. Right from the case of R. v. Jones, ex p. Daunton [1963(1) WLR 270], the basic principles state that even statutes dealing with jurisdiction and procedural law are, if they relate to infliction of penalties, to be strictly construed; compliance with the procedures will be stringently exacted from those proceedings against the person liable to be penalized and if there is any ambiguity or doubt, it will be resolved in favour of the accused/such person. These principles have been applied with approval by different courts even in India. Enactments relating to procedure in courts are usually construed as imperative. A kind of duty is imposed on court or a public officer when no general inconvenience or injustice is caused from different construction. A provision of a statute may impose an absolute or qualified duty upon a public officer which itself may be a relevant consideration while understanding the provision itself.
Madras High Court Cites 83 - Cited by 0 - S Manikumar - Full Document

Gopal Ansal vs State on 12 May, 2017

CRL.REV.P. 262/2016, CRL.REV.P. 263/2016, CRL.REV.P. 264/2016 & CRL.REV.P. 265/2016 Page 78 of 106 It is not necessary that each conspirator must know all the details of the scheme nor be a participant at every stage. It is necessary that they should agree for design or object of the conspiracy. Conspiracy is conceived as having three elements: (1) agreement (2) between two or more persons by whom the agreement is effected; and (3) a criminal object, which may be either the ultimate aim of the agreement, or may constitute the means, or one of the means by which that aim is to be accomplished. It is immaterial whether this is found in the ultimate objects. The common law definition of 'criminal conspiracy' was stated first by Lord Denman in Jones case [R. v. Jones, (1832) 4 B & Ad 345 : 110 ER 485] that an indictment for conspiracy must 'charge a conspiracy to do an unlawful act by unlawful means'...."
Delhi High Court Cites 156 - Cited by 1 - S Mridul - Full Document

Shailesh Manubhai Parmar vs Election Commission Of India Through ... on 21 August, 2018

―454. The distinguishing feature between ―constituency-based representation‖ and 22 ―proportional representation‖ in a representative democracy is that in the case of the list system of proportional representation, members are elected on party lines. They are subject to party discipline. They are liable to be expelled for breach of discipline. Therefore, to give effect to the concept of proportional representation, Parliament can suggest ―open ballot‖. In such a case, it cannot be said that “free and fair elections” would stand defeated by “open ballot”. As stated above, in a constituency-based election it is the people who vote whereas in proportional representation it is the elector who votes. This distinction is indicated also in the Australian judgment in R. v. Jones7.In constituency-based representation, ―secrecy‖ is the basis whereas in the case of proportional representation in a representative democracy the basis can be ―open ballot‖ and it would not violate the concept of ―free and fair elections‖, which concept is one of the pillars of democracy.‖
Supreme Court of India Cites 28 - Cited by 13 - D Misra - Full Document

M/S.Vertex Stock & Shares Pvt. Ltd., (In ... vs 1) Sri Vemuri Venkatewara Rao, Ex. ... on 27 September, 2018

(R. v. Jones ; Knuller (Publishing, Printing and Promotions) Ltd v Director of Public Prosecutions ). No person can be convicted of any offence except for violation of the law in force at the time of commission of the act charged. Consequently the offence under Section 454(5) would be what Parliament has, on a plain and literal meaning being given to the said provision, has prescribed. Giving it any other meaning would result in the offence being prescribed by the Court which is impermissible. (B.K. Bedi2). The ingredients of an offence, under Section 454(5), are twofold i.e., the person (a) without reasonable excuse, (b) makes default in complying with any of the requirements of the said Section. (B.K. Bedi2).
Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana) Cites 89 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

M/S.Vertex Stock & Shares Pvt. Ltd., (In ... vs 1) Sri Vemuri Venkatewara Rao, Ex. ... on 27 September, 2018

(R. v. Jones ; Knuller (Publishing, Printing and Promotions) Ltd v Director of Public Prosecutions ). No person can be convicted of any offence except for violation of the law in force at the time of commission of the act charged. Consequently the offence under Section 454(5) would be what Parliament has, on a plain and literal meaning being given to the said provision, has prescribed. Giving it any other meaning would result in the offence being prescribed by the Court which is impermissible. (B.K. Bedi2). The ingredients of an offence, under Section 454(5), are twofold i.e., the person (a) without reasonable excuse, (b) makes default in complying with any of the requirements of the said Section. (B.K. Bedi2).
Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana) Cites 89 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Arun Kumar @ Manee vs State Of H.P on 10 January, 2025

The common-law definition of 'criminal conspiracy' was stated first by Lord Denman in Jones case [R. v. Jones, (1832) 4 B & Ad 345: 110 ER 485] that an indictment for conspiracy must 'charge a conspiracy to do an unlawful act by unlawful means' and was elaborated by Willies, J. on behalf of the judges while referring the question to the House of Lords in Mulcahy v. R. [(1868) LR 3 HL 306] and the House of Lords in unanimous decision reiterated in Quinn v. Leathem [1901 AC 495: 85 LT 289 : (1900-03) All ER Rep 1 (HL)] :
Himachal Pradesh High Court Cites 123 - Cited by 0 - V S Thakur - Full Document
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