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Documents citing Mrs. Nisha Raj And Anr. vs Mr. Pratap K. Kaula And Ors. on 20 December, 2007

Colgate Palmolive Company And Anr. vs Hindustan Unilever Ltd. on 10 December, 2013

24. Taking a cue from the aforesaid judgments in Nisha Raj v. Pratap K. Kaula (supra) and Shah Babulal Khimji (supra), we must apply the tests whether the second impugned order irretrievably prejudices the rights of the appellant or whether it decides a matter of moment or affects vital and valuable rights of the parties which work serious injustice to the party concerned. In our view, the answer to this must be in the negative, particularly, in the light of the fact that the earlier interim application seeking similar reliefs had been heard and decided by the learned Single Judge by the impugned order. Accordingly, the present appeal is restricted to challenging the impugned order and on the material placed and the contentions advanced before the learned Single Judge in respect of I.A. 13434/2013.
Delhi High Court Cites 16 - Cited by 20 - V Bakhru - Full Document

Ms. Shoes East Ltd vs Housing & Urban Development ... on 3 July, 2010

13) The counsel for plaintiff while arguing relied upon 151(2008)DLT402 ­ Mrs. Nisha Raj and Anr. Vs. Mr. Pratap K. Kaula and Ors. that Section 269UC provides for restrictions on transfer of immovable property. Under Rule 48L Form 37­1 is prescribed which is to be filed before the Appropriate Authority signed by both the transferor and the transferee within 15 days from the date on which the agreement for transfer is entered into. The counsel for plaintiff further submitted that defendant no. 1 never executed the agreement for transfer as they were incapable to do so till 4.7.1997 i.e. till the lease was executed in favour of defendant no. 1 and the allotment in favour of plaintiff cannot be termed as the agreement for transfer under section 269 UC of Income Tax Act, as it was a mere allotment and as admitted by defendant no. 1 that plaintiff was only a licencee. The counsel for plaintiff further submitted that coming to section 269UC of the income Tax Act it imposes restrictions on transfer of certain immovable properties in the absence of an Agreement in the prescribed form, for transfer. The plaintiff submitted that when the suit was filed in Jan., 1997, the perpetual lease deed had not been executed in favour of defendant no. 1 which was executed subsequently to the filing of the suit in view of which plaintiff could have not sought the execution of agreement till defendant no. 1 had the perpetual lease in their favour of the suit land.
Delhi District Court Cites 107 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Jai Chand Gaur vs Shri Sukhdev Singh S/O Shri Dewan Singh on 24 December, 2009

In the given facts and circumstances of the case and provisions of Sec.53 A of Transfer of Property Act decision in Jafar Mian Vs. Qaiser Jahan Begum & Ors. AIR 2007 Allahabad 5; Babu Lal Vs. M/s. Hazari Lal Kishori Lal AIR 1982 SC 818; Nisha Ran & Anr. Vs. Pratap K. Kaula & Ors. 151 (2008) DLT 402; P.C. Varghese Vs. Devaki Amma Balambika Devi AIR 2006 Supreme Court 145, do not come to the aid of the plaintiff This issue is therefore decided against the plaintiff.
Delhi District Court Cites 12 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

04-12-2015 vs M/S.Felguera Gruas India Private Ltd., ...

In reply arguments, Sri D.Prakash Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for appellant, taking clue from the judgment of Delhi High Court in Nisha Rajs case (8 supra), though contended that where there is no scope for retrieving the situation or no scope for restitution, the Delhi High Court has held that ordering notice constitutes refusal, it is the case of appellant that pursuant to contracts entered into, he has given certain information i.e. designs, technical information etc., to the respondent and the same cannot be used by the respondent in view of the illegal termination of contract. If the appellant has spent any amount for such documentation, designing etc., it is always open for him to claim suitable damages in the proceedings to be initiated for arbitration, as such, having regard to the claim of appellant, it cannot be said that there is no scope either for restitution or for retrieving the situation. As evident from the judgments relied on by the learned counsel for respondent, we are also of the considered view that ordering notice to the respondent by impugned docket order does not involve any adjudication of the rights of the parties nor put an end to the proceedings. It is only a step towards final adjudication after hearing the parties. Merely because ad interim order is not granted and notice is issued, it cannot be construed as refusal. As there is no positive denial of the request made by the appellant herein, it does not constitute refusal within the meaning of Section 37(1)(a) of the Act. Even if we go by ordinary dictionary meaning, unless there is a positive denial of interim relief, mere ordering notice in the application cannot be construed as refusal of relief. In any event, it is always considered that appeal is not a matter of right, but it is only a creature under statute. In view of the plain language under Section 37(1)(a) of the Act, we are of the considered view that no appeal is maintainable against the order issuing notice on the application for grant of injunction.
Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana) Cites 21 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Naresh Gaur & Others vs Uma Gupta on 13 August, 2009

On the aspect of limitation reference is made to the judgment in Panchanan Dhara v. Monmatha Nath Maity (2006) 5 SCC 340, Kuldip Gandotra v. Shailendra Nath Endlay AIR 2007 Delhi page1 and Nisha Raj v. Pratap K. Kaula 151 (2008) DLT 402. Reference is also made to Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 to contend that time is not the essence of the contract in transactions of sale of immovable property.
Delhi High Court Cites 14 - Cited by 4 - S Muralidhar - Full Document
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