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Documents citing State Of Orissa & Ors vs M/S. Tata Sponge Iron Ltd on 18 September, 2007

M/S. Chinteshwar Steel Pvt. Ltd., ... vs State Of Maha., Thr. Sect. Industries, ... on 7 April, 2017

7. State of Orissa v. Tata Sponge Iron Ltd., (supra) upholds the view of the Orissa High Court. High Court has held that the operational guidelines being in the nature of a subordinate sub-delegated legislation, the same must be in consonance with the IPR and by reason thereof no other or further condition could have been stipulated so as to prevail over the policy decision itself holding. The operational guidelines provided a limitation or time period for sales tax incentives, High Court found that by sub-delegated legislation, a delegatee can not effectively amend or supplant legislation. Operational guidelines and the terms thereof clearly indicated that the stipulations regarding time period find mention in Clause 5 of the operational guidelines. Said stipulation relate only to industries covered under Paras 7.3 and 7.4 of IPR, 1992 and apply to those industries only for which time periods have been stipulated in IPR itself and not to the industries/activities covered under Paras 7.2 and 7.5. Since the petitioner's industry was covered in the EMD category under Para 7.5 of IPR, 1992 read with Entry 44 of SRO No. 1091 of 1992, Clause 5 of the operational guidelines did not apply to it. High Court was of the view that Clause 5 of the operational guidelines and stipulation in the eligibility form (the eligibility certificate), to the extent it provided for a period of time were not in consonance with IPR, 1992, and without jurisdiction/without sanction of ::: Uploaded on - 12/04/2017 ::: Downloaded on - 13/04/2017 00:27:35 ::: Judgment wp1010.16 8 law and ultra vires IPR, 1992. High Court also held that the operational guidelines and/or instructions were made for administration of incentive contained in the policy and not for the purpose of imposing any new stipulation and/or conditions alien to and/or not in consonance with the passing of the 1992 Policy. It cannot in law be read into and allowed to operate since it would frustrate the very objective sought to be achieved by the 1992 Policy Declaration. This view of the High Court is affirmed in paragraphs 19 to 21 of the reported judgment.
Bombay High Court Cites 10 - Cited by 0 - B P Dharmadhikari - Full Document

M/S G.P.Ceramics Pvt.Ltd vs Commr.Trade Tax Up on 19 November, 2008

37. It is not a case where the application was incomplete by itself. It was also not a case where having regard to the provisions of the Act, Rules, Notifications as also the information required to be furnished in terms of paragraph 10 of Form 46, any other or further information was necessary to be obtained or furnished. If the appellant, thus, had fulfilled the eligibility criteria for grant of exemption, it had acquired a right in respect thereof and we see no reason why it should have been deprived therefrom. It is in that sense the exemption notification was required to be construed liberally in favour of the appellant. {See State of Orissa & Ors. V. TATA Sponge Iron Ltd. [(2007) (8) SCC 189 para 21].
Supreme Court of India Cites 12 - Cited by 24 - S B Sinha - Full Document

Commnr. Of Central Excise, New Delhi vs M/S. Hari Chand Shri Gopal & Ors on 18 November, 2010

v. State of Kerala & Ors. (2007) 2 SCC 725, State of Orissa and others v. Tata Sponge Iron Ltd. (2007) 8 SCC 189, Commissioner of Central Excise, Jaipur v. Mewar Bartan Nirmal Udyog 2008 12 (231) ELT 27 (SC), State of Haryana v. Samtel India Ltd. 2008 (15) VST 176 (SC) and G.P. Ceramics Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner, Trade Tax, Uttar Pradesh (2009) 2 SCC 90.
Supreme Court of India Cites 25 - Cited by 282 - Full Document

Shri Rani Sati Foods And Grains Private ... vs Industry Department on 21 November, 2014

16.     The plea taken by the respondent­State of Jharkhand  that the date of issuance of letter of "consent to operate" would  be the date from which an industry would be deemed to have  commenced   its   "actual   commercial   production"   is   untenable.  The   deeming   provision   under   Section   25(6)   of   the     Water  (Prevention   and   Control   of   Pollution)   Act,   1974   has   been  incorporated to avoid a situation in which an industry may be  ready for production however, if the industry starts production  without   valid   environmental   clearance,   the   industry   may   be  prosecuted   for   violating   the   environmental   laws.     Merely  because   the   letter   of   "consent   to   operate"   has   been   issued  16 subsequently, that is, after the lapse of 4 months' period from  the date of application, it would not lead to an inference that  the industry has started its "actual commercial production" only  from   the   date   "consent   to   operate"   was   issued   or   thereafter.  Such   an   interpretation   may   lead   to   further   confusion   in   the  system because there may be a situation in which an industry  may   produce   a   clinching   evidence   of   its   "actual   date   of  production", which is prior to the date of "consent to operate".  However, I may hasten to add that the validity period indicated  in   the   "consent   to   operate",   that   is,   the   date   from   which   an  industry is permitted to operate which undoubtedly would be a  date prior to the date of issue of "consent to operate", cannot be  the   sole   factor   for   deciding   the   "date   of   actual   commercial  production" of the industry.   Mr. Anil Kumar Sinha, the learned  Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner­Vaishnavi Ferro Tech  (P) Limited relied on decision in  "State of Bihar and others Vs.   Suprabhat Steel Ltd. and Others"  reported in   (1999) 1 SCC 31  and in  "State of Orissa   and Others Vs. Tata Sponge Iron Ltd."  reported   in  (2007)   8   SCC   189  and   submitted   that   if   a  circular/guideline   is   found   to   be   repugnant   to   Jharkhand  Industrial Policy­2001, the same cannot be given effect to.  I find  that the instruction contained in letter dated 22.05.2012 of the  Secretary, Department of Industries and other letters, not to fix  17 the "date of commercial production" prior to the date of first  "consent   to  operate" does not  indicate  any rational basis  and  therefore, the first "consent to operate" cannot form the basis for  fixing   the   "date   of   commercial   production".  Such   a  direction/guideline   would   also   contravene   the   provisions   of  Jharkhand Industrial Policy­2001.   Similarly, the electricity bill  or   the   sale   invoices/sale   letter   etc.   also   cannot   be   the   sole  conclusive   evidence   to   decide   the   "date   of   actual   commercial  production".
Jharkhand High Court Cites 15 - Cited by 0 - S Chandrashekhar - Full Document

M/S Atul Gases (A Unit Of Atul Generator & ... vs Commissioner Of Commercial Taxes, U.P. ... on 9 January, 2018

35. It is not a case where the application was incomplete by itself. It was also not a case where having regard to the provisions of the Act, Rules, Notifications as also the information required to be furnished in terms of paragraph 10 of Form 46, any other or further information was necessary to be obtained or furnished. If the appellant, thus, had fulfilled the eligibility criteria for grant of exemption, it had acquired a right in respect thereof and we see no reason why it should have been deprived therefrom. It is in that sense the exemption notification was required to be construed liberally in favour of the appellant. {See State of Orissa & Ors. V. TATA Sponge Iron Ltd. [(2007) (8) SCC 189 para 21]."
Allahabad High Court Cites 13 - Cited by 1 - A K Mishra - Full Document
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