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Sati Kanta Guha And Anr. vs State Of West Bengal on 25 July, 1977

Referring to the case of Vadilal Panchal v. D. D. Ghadigaonkar, and Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. v. State of Maharashtra, , the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy, says, It is wrong to say that at the stage of framing charges the Court cannot apply its judicial mind to the consideration whether or not there is any ground for presuming the commission of the offence by the accused. As observed in the latter case, the order framing a charge affects a person's liberty substantially and therefore, it is the duty of the Court to consider judicially whether the material warrants the framing of charge. It cannot blindly accept the decision of the prosecution that the accused be asked to face a trial.
Calcutta High Court Cites 6 - Cited by 10 - Full Document

Rajeshbhai Keshavbhai Parmar vs State Of Gujarat on 25 September, 2017

39. The judgment in the case of State of Karnataka   v.   L.Muniswamy   And   Others   (supra),    has   been  rendered in a case under Section 482 of the Code  wherein the issue was whether the inherent power  to   quash   the   proceedings   pending   before   the  learned   Sessions   Judge   on   the   ground   of  inadequacy of evidence can be exercised, or not.  On the facts of that case, it was held by the  Supreme Court that the High Court was justified  in   holding   that   the   proceedings   against   the  respondent therein ought to be quashed in order  to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court  and in order to secure the ends of justice. We  are   unable   to   assume   that   the   ingredients  required in a case of quashing can be applied in  a case of suspension of sentence, where several  other factors have to be looked into and taken  note   of   by   the   Court,   by   objectively   dealing  Page 38 of 43 HC-NIC Page 38 of 43 Created On Mon Sep 25 23:16:51 IST 2017 R/CR.MA/14865/2017 JUDGMENT with the issue whether the applicant should be  released on bail pending trial, or not.
Gujarat High Court Cites 24 - Cited by 0 - A Kumari - Full Document

Sri Lanka Venkata Subrahmanyam vs And on 4 January, 2018

34. The Apex Court three Judge Bench in State of Karnataka Vs. L. Muniswamy and Others observed that the wholesome power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. entitles the High Court to quash a proceeding when it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The High Courts have been invested with inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, to achieve a salutary public purpose. A court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. The Court observed in this case that ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice must be administered according to laws made by the legislature. It was held in this case (at p.703, para 7 of SCC):
Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana) Cites 168 - Cited by 0 - B S Rao - Full Document

Alimuddin S/O Hazari Khan vs State Of Rajasthan (2023/Rjjp/004311) on 31 March, 2023

Therefore, the learned trial Court should have relied on the judgment of State of Karnataka vs. (Downloaded on 11/11/2023 at 04:46:13 PM) [2023/RJJP/004311] (6 of 18) [CRLR-1513/2022] L. Munishwamy and Ors. (supra) which is a judgment of Larger Bench and should not have relied on a judgment of State of Rajasthan vs. Ashok Kumar Kashyap (supra).
Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur Cites 49 - Cited by 0 - A Kumar - Full Document

Irfan Khan Son Of Allanur vs State Of Rajasthan (2023/Rjjp/004311) on 31 March, 2023

Therefore, the learned trial Court should have relied on the judgment of State of Karnataka vs. (Downloaded on 11/11/2023 at 04:46:15 PM) [2023/RJJP/004311] (6 of 18) [CRLR-1513/2022] L. Munishwamy and Ors. (supra) which is a judgment of Larger Bench and should not have relied on a judgment of State of Rajasthan vs. Ashok Kumar Kashyap (supra).
Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur Cites 49 - Cited by 0 - A Kumar - Full Document

Varun Bhardwaj vs State Of H.P on 25 April, 2017

21. This Court time and again has examined scope of jurisdiction of High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and laid down several principles which govern the exercise of jurisdiction of High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of Karnataka vs. L. Muniswamy and others, 1977 (2) SCC 699,held that the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. In paragraph 7 of the judgment following has been stated:
Himachal Pradesh High Court Cites 66 - Cited by 3 - S Sharma - Full Document

T.V. Sarma vs R. Meeriah And Ors. on 15 February, 1980

In State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy the Supreme Court held that in the exercise of the wholesome power under Section 482 the High court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. When we are setting aside the order of discharge entirely based on legal bar, the lease that should be done is to give an opportunity to accused 7 to 9 under Section 227, Cr. P. C. to substantiate their plea that there is not sufficient ground to proceed against them on merits. This, in my view, is very much necessary in the interest of justice.
Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana) Cites 13 - Cited by 7 - Full Document

Harbansingh Kripalsingh vs M.K. Chakarborty And Anr. on 24 September, 1979

9. Applying this test, it is further clear that there was absolute paucity of material on the basis of which a charge could be framed. The prosecution tendered the documents in the shape of statements under section 108 of the Customs Act of accused Nos. 1, 2 and 3. Shri Patil, the learned Public Prosecutor, tried to argue that the statements of accused Nos. 1 to 3 by themselves are enough to attract the provisions and satisfy the test laid down in section 245(1) of the Code. In other words, he argued that these two statements can be looked into as substantive evidence for the purposes of framing of the charge. I am afraid, such a course is not open inasmuch as there are several difficulties in the way. In the first instance, if one peruses the statement of accused No. 3, it leaves no manner of doubt that it is self-exculpatory, meaning thereby that accused No. 3 tries to exonerate himself of the liabilities. If that was so, it cannot be used under section 30 of the Evidence Act. This is the first hurdle in the way of the prosecution for utilizing statements of accused No. 3 against co-accused. However, assuming otherwise that it can be so utilised then we are faced with a formidable hurdle. It is now well settled principle that a confessional statement or a statement containing incriminating part of co-accused can be utilised against the co-accused only for a limited purpose. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the proper course is to address oneself to other items of evidence excluding a confession of co-accused and arrived at a conclusion that it is sufficient to warrant conviction. It is, thereafter that for lending on additional assurance and tilting the balance in favour of the conclusion that was already arrived at that such statement of co-accused can be looked into. The limited purpose is properly explained by various authorities. If this test is applied, then the argument of the learned Public Prosecutor that these statements form substantive piece of evidence fails. It is more or less an accepted position that beyond these statements, there is not a title of evidence in addition to these statements. Significantly there is no incriminating statement of accused No. 2 himself. I have gone through the record and I am satisfied that the observations of the learned Magistrate about there being very little evidence other than the statement of accused is also not factually correct inasmuch as what the learned. Magistrate perhaps wanted to suggest was that there is not a title of evidence apart from the documentary evidence and, therefore, the impression sought to be created about the existence of any other evidence is not proper. Therefore, the position is that apart from the statements of accused Nos. 1 and 3 there is absolutely no evidence when the learned Magistrate was invited to frame a charge against the accused persons. The statement of accused No. 2 himself is of no assistance to the prosecution for obvious reasons.
Bombay High Court Cites 15 - Cited by 2 - Full Document
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