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Documents citing Emperor vs Parashram Bhika on 15 December, 1932

Emperor vs Durgadas Radhakisan on 5 September, 1933

20. As regards the principles which should govern the action of the Sessions Judge under Section 436 of the Code, I have nothing to add to, or subtract from, what is stated in Emperor v. Parashram Bhika (1932) 35 Bom. L.R. 245 But every thing I stated in that case was stated on the assumption that the Magistrate had considered all the evidence and had also applied his mind to all the material issues in the case. The only question here which has caused me any difficulty is whether this particular aspect of the case to which I have just referred, namely, the representations alleged to have been made by some of the accused about the capital and about the time when the loans would be received, has been properly considered by the learned Magistrate. He has referred in his order to an admission by the police prosecutor that there was not clear and sufficient evidence to bring home the offence of cheating to the accused. This, I may say, appears to me somewhat incomprehensible. The only way in which one could say that there might be the offence of conspiracy to cheat, although there was no cheating established, is if the intention to cheat was present but had not been given effect to either because the police raid ended the activities of the company so quickly or because the representations made by the accused, though intended to deceive, had not in fact deceived anybody. I think there is something to be said for each of those propositions as my learned brother has pointed out. But the Magistrate does not seem to have attached importance to that aspect of the case. The view he seems to have taken was that the accused honestly believed those representations to be true. However that may be (in view of the exhaustive judgment of my learned brother I do not desire to go into details), it is sufficiently clear that the Magistrate has considered the evidence on this point as well as on the other points in the case, and I think it would be impossible to say that there is any lacuna in the case or that any material issue has not been explored. That being so, I consider that it was not a case for interference under Section 436.
Bombay High Court Cites 12 - Cited by 2 - Full Document

Durgadas Radhakisan And Ors. vs Emperor on 5 September, 1933

21. As regards the principles which should govern the action of the Sessions Judge under Section 436 of the Code, I have nothing to add to, or subtract from, what is stated in Emperor v. Parashram Bhika 143 Ind. Cas. 289 : 35 Bom. L.R. 245 : A.I.R. 1933 Bom. 158 : Ind. Rul. (1933) Bom. 266 : 34 Cr. L.J. 564 : (1933) Cr. Cas. 470 : 57 B. 430. But everything I stated in that case was stated on the assumption that the Magistrate had considered all the evidence and had also applied his mind to all the material' issues in the case. The only question here which has caused me any difficulty is whether this particular aspect of the case to which I have just referred, namely, the representations alleged to have been made by some of the accused about the capital and about the time when the loans would be received, has been properly considered by the learned Magistrate. He has referred in his order to an admission by the Police Prosecutor that there was not clear and sufficient evidence to bring home the offence of cheating to the accused. This, I may say, appears to me somewhat incomprehensible. The only way in which one could say that there might be the offence of conspiracy to cheat, although there was no cheating established, is if the intention to cheat was present but had not been given effect to either because the Police raid ended, the activities of the company so quickly or because the representations made by the accused, though intended to deceive, had not in fact deceived anybody. I think there is something to be said for each of those propositions as my learned brother has pointed out. But the Magistrate does not seem to have attached importance to that aspect of the case. The view lie seems to have taken was that the accused honestly believed those representations to be true. However that may be (in view of the exhaustive judgment of my learned brother I do not desire to go into details), it is sufficiently clear that the Magistrate has considered the evidence on this point as well as on the other points in the case, and I think it would be impossible to say that there is any lacuna in the case or that any material issue has not been explored. That being so, I consider that it was not a case for interference under Section 436.
Bombay High Court Cites 11 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Meharban Singh vs Bhola Singh And Ors. on 17 September, 1934

In a recent Nagpur case : Emperor v. Parashram 1931 Nag 38, the view taken was that a person complaining of forcible dispossession under Section 145. could not claim the benefit of that section if the dispossession took place more than two months prior to the date of the preliminary order under Clause 4, Section 105. The Madras view in the above-mentioned case was not followed.
Allahabad High Court Cites 2 - Cited by 9 - Full Document

Smt. Subarna Sunami And Ors. vs Kartika Kudei And Ors. on 9 March, 1954

As I have already stated above there has been some conflict of views as to whether the expression "two months next before the date of such order" should be literally construed or whether a more liberal interpretation should be adopted. The cases reported in - 'Pitchai Moopan v. Narayanaswamy Moopan', 4 Mad Cri C 168 (C); - 'Arunachala v. Chinna Durai' AIR 1945 Mad 216 (D); - 'Emperor v. Baijnath' AIR 1929 Oudh-526 (E); - 'Meharban Singh v. Bhola Singh' AIR 1935 All 35 (P) and - 'Emperor v. Parashram' AIR 1931 Nag 38 (G), take the extreme view that the period of two months from the date of the order would mean two months from the (sic)gate of the preliminary order and not two months from the date of the complaint.
Orissa High Court Cites 5 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Lakshami Narain Singh And Ors. vs Jugeshwar Jha And Ors. on 7 May, 1952

On the other hand, on behalf of the second party, it was contended that the words of the first proviso to Section 145 (4) of the Code are clear enough and must be given effect to. However, reliance was placed upon the cases of - 'Meharban Singh v. Bhola, Singh' A.I.R. 1935 All 35 (D); - 'Emperor v. Parashram' AIR 1931 Nag 38 (E) and certain observations in the case of - 'Ghulam Husain v. Sajawal Shah' A.I.R. 1933 Lah. 143 (P), It is the first principle which a Court has to observe in construing an Act, to give to the words in tile Act their plain and ordinary meaning, where there is no ambiguity in the words used in the Act. The first proviso to Section 145 (4) reads as follows:
Patna High Court Cites 3 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Yashodabai Keshav Thakur Desai vs Bhaskar Moreshwar Kamat on 4 April, 1972

5. Mr. Mehta, the learned advocate for the respondent, invited my attention to Emperor v. Parashram Bhika (1932) Bom. L.R. 245. That was a case where one Rupchand had filed a suit against one Jaffar Ali. Rupchand was the complainant and Jaffar Ali the accused. The suit was postponed for settlement to March 14, 1932. The complainant alleged that on that day accused Nos. 1, 2 and 3 came to his house under the pretext of settling the matter. They over-powered the complainant by throwing him down and snatching away an account book from him, which was mentioned for the purpose of settlement. Accused No. 3 ran away with the book and accused Nos. 1 and 2 followed him. They ran to the motor car in which accused Nos. 4 and 5 (police constables) were sitting, the complainant pursuing them. Accused Nos. 4 and 5 tore the book and gave some pages to accused No. 1 and some to accused No. 2. Accused No. 2 went away in a motor car. Accused Nos. 4 and 5 arrested the complainant and forcibly took him to the Police Station along with accused No. 1. The complainant prosecuted accused Nos. 1-3 under Sections 395, 323, 451 and 342 of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 114, and accused Nos. 4 and 5 under Sections 395, 342 and 220 read with Section 114 of the Code. The trial Magistrate recorded the evidence for the prosecution and came to the conclusion that there was no evidence of conspiracy between accused Nos. 4 and 5 and the other accused to help the latter. He, therefore, discharged accused Nos. 4 and 5 under Section 253, Criminal Procedure Code and framed charges against accused Nos. 1, 2 and 3. The Sessions Judge set aside the order of discharge passed by the Magistrate and directed that accused Nos. 4 and 5 be committed for trial to the Court of Session along with accused Nos. 1 to 3. There was, therefore, revision application to this Court.
Bombay High Court Cites 17 - Cited by 0 - Full Document
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