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Documents citing M/S. Sant Ram & Company vs The State Of Rajasthan & Ors on 20 November, 1996

Johari Forts And Palaces Pvt. Ltd. vs Maharaja Narendra Singh And Ors. on 27 March, 2001

16. Section 9 corresponds to the provisions of Section 41(b) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (for short Act 1940) read with Schedule wherein the Court had power to grant interim reliefs for the purpose of and in relation to arbitration proceedings. However pendency of proceedings in relation to arbitration was a pre condition for exercise of powers by the Court to grant interim relief under Section 41(b) of the Act 1940 (vide M/s Sant Ram & Co. v. State of ajasthan and Ors. ). Under Section 41(b) of the Act 1940 the Court was required to pass an order keeping in view the three limitations which were imposed thereunder, namely; (i) Powers could be exercised to same extent and in manner as it could for the purpose, and in relation to any proceedings before it; (ii) Powers could be exercised only for the purpose and in relation to arbitration proceedings and; (Hi) Exercise of those powers was not to prejudice any power which might be vested in an arbitrator or umpire. While enacting Section 9 of the Act, the limitations above referred to have been retained except the one contained in Clause (ii).
Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur Cites 40 - Cited by 0 - B S Chauhan - Full Document

Peter John Uralil vs Babu Thomas on 2 September, 2003

Section 9 is essentially based on Article 9 of the UNCITRAL Model. Analogous provision under the Arbitration Act, 1940 Act is Section 41(b) read with Second Schedule to the said Act. But, the powers of the court under the 1996 Act are wider. Under the 1940 Act, pendency of the court proceedings was a condition precedent for exercise of power (See: Sant Ram and Company v. State of Rajasthan and Ors. (AIR 1997 SC 2557). Section 9 is an independent power and pendency of a court proceeding was not necessary to attract jurisdiction under Section 9 of the 1996 Act. Being an independent statutory power, by agreement between the parties, power of the court cannot be restricted; but, under Section 17, power of the arbitrator to take interim measure of protection can be restricted by agreement between the parties as Section 17 begins with the words "Unless otherwise agreed by the parties". Courts have no power to adjudicate on merits of the case in the guise of passing orders under Section 9. The list of interim measures or protection given in Clauses (a) to (d) of Section 9(ii) is not exhaustive. Clause (e) indicates that other interim measures for protection also can be granted by the court at its discretion, if it appears to the court just and convenient. Therefore, power under Section 9 is wider than Section 44(3) of the old Act and power of the arbitrator under Section 17 of the 1996 Act. Power of the court under Section 9 is a statutory power and not emanating from the arbitration agreement.
Kerala High Court Cites 15 - Cited by 1 - J B Koshy - Full Document

Pradeep Anand vs I.T.C. Ltd. & Ors. on 13 March, 2000

In M/s.Sant Ram and Company Vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, , it was held that to avail the remedy under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, when an Application for Injunction under Section 41(b) read with Schedule II is filed, the Court shall have, pending proceedings for the purpose of and in relation to the Arbitration proceedings availed through the process of the Court, the same power of making Orders in respect of any matters set out in the second Schedule as it had for the purpose of and in relation to any proceedings before the Court. The initiation of pendency of any proceedings in the Court in relation to the Arbitration proceedings would, therefore, be a pre-condition for the exercise of the power by the Civil Court under Section 41(b) and second Schedule of the Act. By filing a Petition under Sections 30 and 33 of the Act, the ITC had initiated proceedings in Court in relation to the Arbitration proceedings.
Delhi High Court Cites 42 - Cited by 0 - S K Mahajan - Full Document

Dr. Anand David Saldanha vs Dr. K. Rathnaraj Ballal on 15 July, 1997

In Sant Rain's case, supra, the facts were that the party concerned straightaway filed an application under Order 39, Rule 1, CPC read with Section 41(b) of the old Arbitration Act. The learned District Judge before whom the said application was filed, rejected the same on the ground that it was not maintainable when no arbitration proceeding was pending and the said order was confirmed in an appeal by the High Court. Therefore, the facts in the case are much similar to the facts in this case. But it is submitted by the learned Counsel that the provisions of the old Arbitration Act are quite different from Section 9 of the present Arbitration Act. Section 4K(b) of the Arbitration Act, 1940, reads as follows:
Karnataka High Court Cites 14 - Cited by 0 - A M Farooq - Full Document

Dr. Anand David Saldanha vs K. Rathnaraj Ballal on 15 July, 1997

In Sant Ram's case the facts where that the part concerned straight-away filed an application under order 39, Rule 1, C.P.C. read with Section 41(b) of the old Arbitration Act. The learned District Judge before whom the said application was filed, rejected the same on the ground that it was not maintainable when no arbitration proceeding was pending and the said order was confirmed in an appeal by the High Court. Therefore, the facts in the case are much similar to the facts in this case. But it is submitted by the learned Counsel that the provisions of the old Arbitration Act is quite different from Section 9 of the present Arbitration Act. Section 41(b) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 reads as follows :
Karnataka High Court Cites 14 - Cited by 3 - A M Farooq - Full Document

Nepc India Ltd., Formerly Nepc Micon ... vs Sundaram Finance Ltd. on 22 June, 1998

In Sant Ram's case, the facts were that the party concerned straight-away filed an application under 0.39, Rule 1, C.P.C. read with Section 41 (b) of the old Arbitration Act. The learned District Judge before whom the said application was filed, rejected the same on the ground that it was not maintainable when no arbitration proceeding was pending and the said order was confirmed in an appeal by the High Court. Therefore, the facts in the case are much similar to the facts in this case. But it is submitted by the learned Counsel that the provisions of the old Arbitration Act is quite different from Section 9 of the present Arbitration Act. Section 41(b) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 reads as follows:
Madras High Court Cites 37 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Sundaram Finance Ltd vs Nepc India Ltd on 13 January, 1999

Under the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940, the powers of the Court to pass interim orders were derived from Section 41(b) read with 2nd Schedule to the Arbitration Act, 1940. Mr. Gopal Subramaniam,0 learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent, placed reliance on Sant Ram & Co. v. State of Rajasthan and Others, [1997] 1SCC 147 wherein at page 150 it was observed that "The initiation of pendency of any proceed-ings in the Court in relation to the arbitration proceedings would, therefore, be a precondition for the exercise of the power by the civil court under the Second Schedule of the Act." Even if this be the position under the 1940 Act we still have to examine whether there has been any change in the law with the promulgation of The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
Supreme Court of India Cites 21 - Cited by 532 - Full Document
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