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Documents citing Dcm Shriram Industries Ltd. vs Union Of India And Ors. on 22 August, 1995

State Of Bihar & Ors vs Kalyanpur Cements Ltd on 8 January, 2010

In DCM Ltd. vs. Union of India (1996) 5 SCC 468, this Court reiterated that "It is well settled that the doctrine of promissory estoppel represents a principle evolved by equity to avoid injustice and, though commonly named promissory estoppel, it is neither in the realm of contract nor in the realm of 38 estoppel. The basis of this doctrine is the inter-position of equity which has always proved to its form, stepped in to mitigate the rigour of strict law. It is equally true that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is not limited in its application only to defence but it can also find a cause of action. This doctrine is applicable against the Government in the exercise of its governmental public or executive functions and the doctrine of executive necessity or freedom of future executive action, cannot be invoked to defeat the applicability of this doctrine. It is further well established that the doctrine of promissory estoppel must yield when the equity so requires. If it can be shown by the Government or public authority that having regard to the facts as they have transpired, it would be unequitable to hold the Government or public authority to the promise or representation made by it, the court would not raise an equity in favour of the person to whom the promise or representation is made and enforce the promise or representation against the Government or public authority. The doctrine of promissory estoppel would be displaced in such a case because on the facts, equity would not require that the 39 Government or public authority should be held bound by the promise or representation made by it."
Supreme Court of India Cites 34 - Cited by 64 - S S Nijjar - Full Document

Gama Hotel & Resorts Private. Ltd. & Anr vs West Bengal Industrial Infrastructure on 10 May, 2010

Now, it would be convenient to consider the basic question involved herein. The doctrine of promissory estoppel exercised consideration of the Supreme Court in various reported decisions. Reference may be made to the decisions reported in (1979) 2 SCC 409 : Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. vs. State of U.P., (1986) 2 SCC 365 : Bakul Cashew Co. vs. STO, (1995) 1 SCC 274 : Kasinka Trading vs. Union of India, (2002) 2 SCC 188 : Sharma Transport vs. Govt. of A.P., (1996) 5 SCC 468 : DCM Ltd. vs. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 398 : Shrijee Sales Corporation vs. Union of India, (1997) 7 SCC 251 : Pawan Alloys Castings (P) Ltd. vs. UPSEB, and (2005) 1 SCC 625 : Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. vs. Commercial Tax Officer.
Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side) Cites 10 - Cited by 0 - D Datta - Full Document

Ellora Mechanical vs Collector Of Central Excise on 5 December, 1997

4. Shri P.K. Jain, ld. SDR, contended that the main question raised was in relation to manufacture. He drew attention to the Apex Court decision in DCM v. Union of India - 1977 (1) .E.L.T. 199 wherein it has been held that manufacture is generally understood to mean, bringing into existence a new substance. In the instant case bare plastic film was printed. In the market bare plastic films and printed plastic films were known differently and had different characteristics." No consumer would purchase bare plastic films when he wanted printed plastic films. The moment something is printed permanently on plastic films, its use along with its characteristics and its name, changed. The appellants had themselves stated that printed plastic films were used for decoration, etc. Bare plastic films could not be used for decoration. Therefore, there was no question about the process not being a manufacturing process and the goods not being dutiable. As regards Trade Notice No. 17/89, he submitted that printing of plastic films and sheets cannot make it a product of printing industry. They merit classification only under Chapter 39 from 1-3-1987. They could not have been classified under Chapter 49 even before 1-3-1987 as Chapter 49 encompassed only products of paper printing industry. The appellants had failed to produce any evidence to show their bona fides regarding the classification of the product so 'as to arrive at a reasonable belief that they were not suppressing any information. The appellants had also not produced any records or correspondence with the Department regarding the disputed item during the period in question. Ld. SDR, therefore, submitted that the appellants had deliberately and willfully suppressed and mis-declared the goods with intent to evade payment of duty and the allegation in SCN had been substantiated and the longer period of limitation has been rightly invoked.
Customs, Excise and Gold Tribunal - Delhi Cites 3 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Alaska Export vs Commissioner Of Customs on 23 January, 1998

2. Shri K.K. Anand, learned Advocate for the appellants, contends that it is the date of filing of the Bill of entry for home consumption which determines the rate of duty in clauses (a) and (b) of Section 15 of the Customs Act, 1962 and since the ex-bond bill of entry was filed on 3-11-1995, the rate of duty applicable on that date would be the determining factor and since on that date there was no imposition of anti-dumping duty on the goods in question, such duty is not payable by the importers/applicants. To support his contention, he relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of DCM and Anr. v. Union of India 1995 Supp (3) SC Cases 223.
Customs, Excise and Gold Tribunal - Delhi Cites 11 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Surendra Bahadur Singh vs Union Of India Thru' Ministry Of Small ... on 23 May, 2012

In STO v. Durga Oil Mills, (1998) 1 SCC 572; Bakul Cashew Co. v. STO, (1986) 2 SCC 365; Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P., (1979) 2 SCC 409; DCM Ltd. v. Union of India, (1996) 5 SCC 468; Pawan Alloys & Casting (P) Ltd. v. UPSEB, (1997) 7 SCC 251; Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer, (2005) 1 SCC 625; State of Jharkhand v. Ambay Cements, (2005) 1 SCC 368 and State of Bihar & Ors. v. Kalyanpur Cements Ltd., (2010) 3 SCC 274, the doctrine of promissory estopple has been firmly established.
Allahabad High Court Cites 6 - Cited by 0 - S Ambwani - Full Document

Commissioner Of Customs vs Forward Leather Company on 2 May, 2003

4. Ld. Counsel submitted that the 'dressing' was not a process of manufacture of converting raw fur skin of lambs into a tanned one. Raw fur skin of lambs, which is fresh after slaughter of the lambs, is required to be dressed to remove impurities for hygienic purposes and for immediate preservation of fur skin. The said skins are imported for the purpose of tanning in India and for re-export. They are not manufactured items as it does not undergo various process of manufacture. He submits that mere process of applying oil to preserve it from decay does not make it a manufactured item and it continues to be a raw dressed skin of lamb. He contended that the process should bring into existence a new marketable commodity as held by the Apex Court in the case of DCM Ltd. v. UOI - 1977 (1) E.L.T. (J 199) (S.C.)
Customs, Excise and Gold Tribunal - Tamil Nadu Cites 5 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

G And Y Soap Works vs Cce on 18 November, 2002

5. It is not necessary for us to consider the concept of "merchant manufacturer". By applying the criterion of manufacturer as laid down by the Supreme Court in DCM Ltd. v. UOI 1977 ELT J199, J204, : 1973 April Cen-Cus 56 (SC) : ECR C 216 SC a person at whose hands the new produce emerges is the manufacturer. The fact that this has been done on behalf or on account of another person cannot render that other person also manufacturer of the goods. We do not also see the relevance in the reliance by the departmental representative of the parts of the Ujagar Prints judgement. It is precisely because of the perceived conflict within the parts of the judgment that a clarification was applied for and obtained by applying the clarificatory order of the Supreme Court 1989 (39) ELT 493 : 1989 (21) ECR 1 (SC). It is clear that the assessable value of the goods manufactured by a job worker is a total of the cost of the raw materials or components, the cost of job worker and the profit of the job worker. This is the value that has been declared and the value then ought to have been accepted. The appellant succeeds on this point.
Customs, Excise and Gold Tribunal - Mumbai Cites 2 - Cited by 0 - Full Document
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