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Documents citing Brij Narain vs Mangla Prasad on 24 November, 1923

Subbarayulu Chettiar vs Ratnam Ayyar And Ors. on 28 October, 1929

12. The respondents attempted to erect this contention into an attack on the alienation as being mala fide, and to call in aid the dictum from 39 All. already cited, that the law on this subject was designed to protect alienees "for onerous consideration and in good faith;" but this is however an aspect of the case which was never put forward in the Courts below, nor is there any issue or finding on the question of good faith. I am not prepared to allow such a point to be raised in second appeal, even if I assume that it could, after the decision in Brij Narain v. Mangla Prasad be taken as a point of law at all.
Madras High Court Cites 9 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Vriddhachalam Pillai vs Chaldean Syrian Bank Ltd., Ananother on 3 December, 1963

A and B for the reason that they considered that the law applicable to determine the rights of the Bank was not the Mitakshara law as understood and explained in Brij Narain's Case(1) but the law as was understood and applied in the decisions of the High Court of Cochin prior to the Constitution. We have already dealt with the correctness of the view of the High Court on this point.
Supreme Court of India Cites 3 - Cited by 38 - N R Ayyangar - Full Document

Bal Rajaram Padval vs Maneklal Mansukhbhai on 30 July, 1931

28. I am not, therefore, satisfied on the evidence on the record that though defendant No. 1 may have acted recklessly or imprudently in the management of his business, the debts which he incurred in accepting the bills in respect of the goods he had ordered were either illegal or immoral or avyavaharika. The contracts were not gambling or wagering transactions as the goods ordered by defendant No. 1 had arrived in Bombay and were in the custody of the banks who were pressing defendant No. 1 to pay the amount of the bills accepted by defendant No. 1 to the extent of the value of the goods. There is no element of moral turpitude involved in these transactions. The debt cannot be said to be one " not sanctioned by law or custom ", or " not lawful, or customary", or one " in which no right could be established in the creditor's favour in a Court of Justice." The debts incurred by the father were antecedent debts and were dissociated in point of fact as well as in time from the mortgage sued upon, and the appellant would be bound by the mortgage according to the decision of the Privy Council in Brij Narain v. Mangla Prasad (1923) L.R. 51 I.A. 129 : s.c. 28 Bom. L.R. 500.
Bombay High Court Cites 26 - Cited by 9 - Full Document

Vadilal Purshottam vs Kanaialal Inderlal on 22 July, 1927

6. That it would have been open to Nandlal to say that it was the joint family property and to mortgage not merely his own interest but also that of defendant No. 1 in order to pay off the antecedent debt, cannot be and is not questioned in view of the law as laid down in Brij Narain v. Mangla Prasad correcting the view of antecedent debts previously enunciated in Sahu Ram Chandra v. Bhup Singh (1917) L.R. 44. I.A. 126, s. c. 19 Bom. L.R. 498. The question in this suit is, whether, because Nandlal instead of so doing purported to represent himself as sole owner and to mortgage his entire interest, concealing the existence of defendant No. 1 and defendant No. l's interest, whether this conduct of Nandlal saves the interest of defendant No. 1 in the present suit ?
Bombay High Court Cites 4 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Jagdishprasad Ramlal vs D.B. Ambashankar Uttamram Malji on 8 December, 1933

In the case in Brij Narain v. Mangla Prasad 52 Ind. Cas. 525 : 42 M 711 : 9 LW 565 : (19l9) MWN 409 : 37 MLJ 166 : 26 MLT 96, itself the debt was not independent of the mortgage in Mr. Desai's sense as it was secured by prior mortgages of the ancestral property which were renewed in the mortgaged impugned. In the present case, so far as the greater part of the consideration is concerned, it was advanced long before the execution of the mortgage and in any ordinary sense independently of it. There is no connection between the mortgage and these debts except such as arises from the fact that the mortgage was executed to secure payment of the debt, which existed already. I have no hesitation in holding that the debts amounting to Rs. 21,000 representing the advance made by plaintiff in 19-0 were antecedent debts. They were not created by the mortgage, nor were they incurred with a view to support the mortgage. They were not part of the same transaction. The mortgage executed to secure payment of those debts would, therefore, be binding upon the interest of the minor defendant No. 4, since there is no ground for holding that they were immoral or avyavaharika.
Bombay High Court Cites 6 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Bharmappa Murdeppa Soppin vs Hanmantappa Tippanna Belludi on 28 January, 1943

A difference of opinion arose between Sir Shah Sulaiman, the learned Chief Justice, and the other members of the Court as to whether in the second proposition in Brij Narain v. Mangla Prasad (supra) the word "debt" included a secured debt, or referred only to ah unsecured debt. I entertain no doubt that Sir Shah Sulaiman was right in thinking that the word "debt" in the second proposition covers all forms of debt, including secured debts. But it is obvious that the second proposition is dealing with recovery of a debt, not in its character as a mortgage debt, but as a debt for which a decree has been obtained, and the decree is being executed. Where a mortgage is created, not for necessity, or for payment of an antecedent debt, it binds only the father's interest in the property, and it is only that interest which can be sold under a mortgage decree. But if the debt is not for immoral purposes, the sons are liable, and if a personal decree is obtained against the father, then that decree can be enforced by sale of the sons' interest in the property. There must, however, in my opinion, be a personal decree against the father for payment of the debt, and not merely a decree for payment of the debt by sale of the mortgaged property.
Bombay High Court Cites 2 - Cited by 5 - Full Document

Shamrao Keshav Rajadhyaksha vs Shantaram Balaji Naik on 5 October, 1934

4. Mr. Thakor's argument for the appellants against the propriety of this dismissal has mainly been concerned with the substantial question of law underlying the technical ones on which" the suit has in fact been dismissed. But, it seems to us, that there are considerable difficulties in his way. The argument is based on the Privy Council decisions in Brij Narain v. Mangla Prasad and Sanyasi Charon Mandal v. Krishnadhan Banerji (1922) L.R. 49 I.A. 108 : S.C. 24 Bom. L.R. 700.
Bombay High Court Cites 3 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Fozmal Bhutaji vs Shridhar Vithal on 6 September, 1945

The debt is a debt incurred by the father, and by reason of its being an antecedent debt within the meaning of the observations of Lord Dunedin in Brij Narain v. Mangla Prasad the right, title and interest of the sons are bound by the alienation, it being an alienation for an antecedent debt. 'There is no other argument which the sons can avail themselves of, when a suit is filed by the mortgagee on a debt I which was an antecedent debt and was secured by the alienation of the property by the father. In such an event, the alienation which is made by the father being deemed in law to be an alienation not only of the father's right, title and interest in the property but also of the right, title and interest of the sons in that property, what is the subject-matter of the mortgage is the whole of the joint family property including the right, title and interest of the sons therein and what the mortgagee does in filing a suit for the realisation of that mortgage is that he makes the subject-matter of that suit for realisation of the mortgage security, the whole of that property including the right, title and interest of the sons therein. It makes not the slightest difference to the position that when the suit is filed by the mortgagee the father is dead and that according to the strict position in Hindu law the right, title and interest of the father in the property has survived over to the other members of the joint family, viz. the sons. The whole of the joint family property including the father's right, title and interest therein which has survived over to the sons and including the sons' right, title and interest in that property, is the subject-matter of that suit for realisation of the mortgage security and the whole of that property including the father's and the sons' right, title and interest therein is liable to satisfy the mortgage. This is the true position in Hindu law and the passage which has been cited by Mr. Desai from Section 293(5) at p. 343 of Mulla's Hindu Law does riot affect the position at all. I am therefore of opinion that Mr. Desai's contention in this behalf also fails, that the right, title and interest of defendants Nos. 1 to 5 the surviving members of the joint family constituted by the deceased Vithal Ramchandra Parulkar and defendants Nos. 1 to 5 herein are also bound by the terms of this indenture of mortgage dated November 17, 1922, and the suit filed for the realisation of this mortgage security having been filed within sixty years of the due date, viz. November 16, 1923, is within time.
Bombay High Court Cites 31 - Cited by 0 - Full Document
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