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Gangadhar Singh And Ors. vs Shyam Sunder Singh on 21 March, 1958

5. As already pointed out, the first proceeding under Section 145 Cr. P. C. was started only on 25-8-1954 in respect of 14.28 acres of the Sir lands and the next proceeding in respect of the remaining lands was initiated on 25-10-1954. The dispossession of the plots mentioned above had taken place more than two months prior to the commencement even of the first proceeding under Section 145 Cr. P. C. On behalf of the petitioners it was urged before the Magistrate that they should be held to have been in possession of Bundhan Duli, Dersa Uper three duli and Jhua Bhag lands by virtue of the second proviso to Sub-section (4) of Section 145, Cr. P. C. The learned Magistrate relying on a decision of Panigrahi C. J. in Subarna v. Kartika, AIR 1954 Ori 183 (A), which held that inasmuch as the opposite party had applied to the Magistrate for preventive action as early as 21-6-1954, the delay on the part of the Magistrate in initiating a proceeding under Section 145 Cr. P. C. till 25-8-1954 should not adversely affect his right and that "the date of the order" for the purpose of computing the period of two months under the aforesaid proviso to Sub-section (4) of Section 145, Cr. P. C. should be the date on which the opposite party approached the Sub-divisional Magistrate, namely 21-6-1954, and not the actual date on which the proceeding was initiated.
Orissa High Court Cites 15 - Cited by 6 - Full Document

R.H. Bhutani vs Miss Mani J. Desai & Ors on 23 April, 1968

second proviso to sub-s. (4-) and sub-s. (6) contemplate not a fugitive act of trespass or interference with the possession of the applicant, the dispossession there referred to is one that amounts to a completed act of forcible and wrongful driving out a party from his possession: (of Subarna Sunami v. Kartika Kudal) (1) It is thus fairly clear that the fact that dispossession of the appellant was a completed act and the appellant had filed a criminal complaint and the police had taken action thereunder do not mean that the Magistrate could not proceed under s. 145 and give direction permissible under sub-s. (6).
Supreme Court of India Cites 11 - Cited by 98 - J M Shelat - Full Document

Altab Ali vs Jagadish Chandra Adhikari on 17 June, 1960

16. Various decisions were cited before me for die first party in support of their contention that the date of the preliminary order must be deemed to relate back to the date of the application by the party. It is enough if I cite the later decisions which have considered the earlier decisions. They are Chunchu Narayana v. Karrapati Kesappa , Bhadramma v. Kotam Raj AIR 1955 Hyd 140 and Smt. Subarna Sunami v. Kartika Kudei .
Gauhati High Court Cites 9 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Smt. Tarulata Devi And Ors. vs Nikhil Bandhu Mishra And Ors. on 8 February, 1982

The second proviso to Sub-section (4) and Sub-section (6) contemplates not a fugitive act of trespass or interference with the possession of the applicant the dispossession there referred to is one that amounts to a completed act of forcible and wrongful driving out a party from his possession (of Subanna Sunami v. Kartika Kudal . It is thus fairly clear that the fact that dispossession of the appellant was a completed act and the appellant had filed a criminal complaint and the police had taken action thereunder do not mean that the Magistrate could not proceed under Section 145 and give directions permissible under Sub-section (6).
Gauhati High Court Cites 4 - Cited by 5 - Full Document
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