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Documents citing T.N.V. Kailasa Thevar vs V. Ramaswami Ayyangar And Ors. on 12 December, 1947

For The Purpose Of Construction Of ... vs . on 29 September, 2006

Form B was prepared in total violation of Rule 4(b). In fact Form (A) and Form (B) are just identical, copied from each other except deleting one or two words or sentences here and there. A reading of Form B discloses that notice has been issued to the reputed owner requiring him to lodge a statement in writing with his objection if any within 15 days from the date of service of the notice under Form B. This procedure is not contemplated either under the Act or under the Rules and the executive brain has introduced a new procedure through Form 'B' and it is quite confusing. When Rule 4(b) is totally silent on filing objection within 15 days, Form B has been prepared wrongly by the concerned. Since Form B is not in conformity with Rule 4 (a), the authority concerned is to modify the Form and publish the new Form expeditiously. It is relevant to point out that similar direction was issued by a Division Bench of this Court in I.L.R. (1996) 2 Madras 299 (GOVT. OF TAMIL NADU v. RAMASWAMI). We deem it necessary to point out with great stress that when, even in 1996, the Government had been asked by the Court to amend Form-B in consonance with Rule-4(b), serving the purpose adumbrated therein, it is but proper for the Government, being a welfare State, to have implemented the same so that matters of this nature would not have arisen at all. We hope and trust the Government will rectify the lacunae by bringing suitable amendment.
Madras High Court Cites 22 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Sashi Ammal vs Ps. Ar. Ar. Arunachalam Chettiar By ... on 16 March, 1949

Should their position really be that of co-mortgagors, to what extent the principles laid down in Kailasa Thevar v. Ramaswami Aiyangar (1948) 2 M.L.J. 28, would apply would be a point for consideration. I think that these questions should be dealt with in the first instance by the trial Court. The petition is therefore remanded to the learned Munsif for disposal afresh in the light of the observations in this Judgment.
Madras High Court Cites 2 - Cited by 2 - Full Document

Suleman Rahim Pathan vs Dattu Babaji Patil on 15 March, 1963

It seems reliance is placed on the assumed inviolability of the principles of general law of the indivisibility of the mortgage security. But ideas change and recent legislation has modified much law that was once firmly established and could not be questioned. The general law is based on the binding nature of the mortgage transaction on the purchaser. The amount payable may turn out to be more or less than the amount mentioned in the deed but that is to be in accordance with the terms of the deed. That principle, however, ought not to be permitted to effect the mortgagee when by statute the liability of a particular class of mortgagor is affected for his benefit only. The purchaser ought to he held by his bargain to be bound by the mortgage contract and we do not see any injustice in it. Moreover, if there is a statotury enactment which has the effect of modifying the general law, there is no reason why on the basis of such general law it should be carried beyond its legitimate bounds and produce in many cases unjust results. While overruling the decisions in Kailasa Thevar v. Ramaswami [1949] A.I.R. Mad. 238, the Supreme Court recognised that by the Madras Act in the case of joint and several liability the general law of indivisibility of a mortgage stood modified.
Bombay High Court Cites 15 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

S.T.M. Vyravan Chettiar vs R.M. Rayalu Ayyar Nagaswami Ayyar And ... on 10 October, 1950

upon the decision in 'Kailasa Thevar v. Ramaswami', 1948 M W N 393: (AIR (36) 1919 Mad 238). But the facts in that case-are different. Following the earlier decisions the learned Judges held that objections as to the amount of the decree could be raised in later execution proceedings though they were not raised in prior execution proceedings. We therefore hold that the orders in E. P. Nos. 12 of 1941 & 161 of 1942 preclude the applt.
Madras High Court Cites 16 - Cited by 7 - Full Document

Esakki Thevar vs M.M. Ahmed Sha And Anr. on 23 April, 1979

62, and Kailasa Thevar v. Ramaswami Iyengar(1948) 2 M.L.J. 28 : A.I.R. 1949 Mad. 238, both of which dealing with cases, arising in mortgage suits filed by mortgagees, that the judgment-debtor can ask for amendment of such a decree applying the provisions of the Act. In this case, the decree has not been fully satisfied and therefore, there can be no restraint on the judgment-debtor to seek relief under Section 19(i) of the Act. Section 9-A cannot prevent any relief being graned under Section 19 of the Act, because the entitlement conceived of under Section 19 of the Act arises only after the decree is passed. Section 9-A does not deal with decrees but of usufructuary mortgage suit claims.
Madras High Court Cites 18 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

V. Kanna And V. Krishnan vs The District Collector And The Special ... on 25 March, 2008

Form B was prepared in total violation of Rule 4(b). In fact Form (A) and Form (B) are just identical, copied from each other except deleting one or two words or sentences here and there. A reading of Form B discloses that notice has been issued to the reputed owner requiring him to lodge a statement in writing with his objection if any within 15 days from the date of service of the notice under Form B. This procedure is not contemplated either under the Act or under the Rules and the executive brain has introduced a new procedure through Form 'B' and it is quite confusing. When Rule 4(b) is totally silent on filing objection within 15 days, Form B has been prepared wrongly by the concerned. Since Form B is not in conformity with Rule 4 (a), the authority concerned is to modify the Form and publish the new Form expeditiously. It is relevant to point out that similar direction was issued by a Division Bench of this Court in I.L.R. (1996) 2 Madras 299 (Govt. of Tamil Nadu v. Ramaswami). We deem it necessary to point out with great stress that when, even in 1996, the Government had been asked by the Court to amend Form-B in consonance with Rule-4(b), serving the purpose adumbrated therein, it is but proper for the Government, being a welfare State, to have implemented the same so that matters of this nature would not have arisen at all. We hope and trust the Government will rectify the lacunae by bringing suitable amendment.
Madras High Court Cites 14 - Cited by 0 - P Jyothimani - Full Document

V.Kanna vs The District Collector on 25 March, 2008

Form B was prepared in total violation of Rule 4(b). In fact Form (A) and Form (B) are just identical, copied from each other except deleting one or two words or sentences here and there. A reading of Form B discloses that notice has been issued to the reputed owner requiring him to lodge a statement in writing with his objection if any within 15 days from the date of service of the notice under Form B. This procedure is not contemplated either under the Act or under the Rules and the executive brain has introduced a new procedure through Form 'B' and it is quite confusing. When Rule 4(b) is totally silent on filing objection within 15 days, Form B has been prepared wrongly by the concerned. Since Form B is not in conformity with Rule 4 (a), the authority concerned is to modify the Form and publish the new Form expeditiously. It is relevant to point out that similar direction was issued by a Division Bench of this Court in I.L.R. (1996) 2 Madras 299 (GOVT. OF TAMIL NADU v. RAMASWAMI). We deem it necessary to point out with great stress that when, even in 1996, the Government had been asked by the Court to amend Form-B in consonance with Rule-4(b), serving the purpose adumbrated therein, it is but proper for the Government, being a welfare State, to have implemented the same so that matters of this nature would not have arisen at all. We hope and trust the Government will rectify the lacunae by bringing suitable amendment.
Madras High Court Cites 14 - Cited by 3 - P Jyothimani - Full Document

Km.N.Sp.N. Valliammai Achi vs J.A. Ramachandra Ayyar And Ors. on 3 December, 1958

7. We have perused the entire records and heard the learned Counsel on both sides. Mr. R. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, the learned Counsel for Valliammai Achi, and Mr. Natesan, the learned Counsel for Soundarapandian Chetttiar the assignee from the puisne mortgagee, have argued the case fully and fairly. There is no dispute by Mr. R. Gopalaswami Ayyangar that full satisfaction was rightly entered in E.A. No. 703 of 1953 filed by the mortgagor Ramachandra Iyer, as the entire scaled down amount due by that individual had been paid by Soundarapandian Chettiar. The contest by Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar centred round the full satisfaction entered in E.A. No. 641 of 1953, filed by Soundarapandian Chettiar, the assignee from the puisne mortgagee, who was liable to pay the unsealed amount. Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar urged that it was unheard of to enter full satisfaction regarding this unsealed decree when admittedly the difference between Rs. 20, 409-14-0, covered by the unsealed amount, and Rs. 17,822-4 o, covered by the scaled down amount, had not been paid. When we asked Mr. Natesan under what law or rule he claimed full satisfaction to be entered when there had been no satisfaction regarding this amount covered by the difference, he said that, as a matter of fact, the difference had not been paid, but, as a matter of law, it must be deemed to have been wiped out. According to him, when a decree is passed by a Court for the scaled down amount against an agriculturist judgment debtor, and for the unsealed down amount against the non-agriculturist judgment debtor, but the property is wholly owned by the agriculturist judgment debtor, the moment the entire amount due by the agriculturist judgment-debtor is paid, the entire property stands redeemed, and the liability for the difference due under the unsealed amount is automatically wiped out. He relied for this extraordinary proposition on a ruling of a Bench of this Court in Subrahmaniam Chettiar v. Ramachandra Reddiar (1946) 2 M.L.J. 429; Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar pointed out, quite rightly that this ruling went on the basis of an old line of cases which ended with the Bench ruling in Kailasa Thevar v. Ramaswami Ayyangar (1948) 2 M.L.J. 28, which was reversed by the Supreme Court on appeal in Ramaswami Ayyangar v. Kailasa Thevar . Natesan ingeniously argued that the Supreme Court case could be distinguished from the present case. According to him, if, in the same property, different mortgagors have got different, and separable interests, and some of them are agriculturists and some of them are non-agriculturists, and a decree for the scaled down amount is passed against the agriculturists and for the unscaled amounts against the non-agriculturists, then the decree-holder can execute the decree for the saied-down amount against the agriculturists, and for the unscaled amount against the non-agriculturists, but that, in a case like this, where the entire ownership vested in one man, Ramachandra Iyer, that rule would not apply, and the difference between the unsealed and scaled amounts would be wiped out the moment the scaled down amount was paid by the owner, the mortgagor. To illustrate the point more clearly, this is what he says. Suppose a house is owned by five brothers, one of whom is a Judge paying income-tax, disqualifying him from the benefit of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act, another is a trader paying sales-tax, disqualifying him from the benefit of the Madras Agriclturists Relief Act, the third is a house owner paying property-tax, disqualifying him from the benefit of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act, the fourth is an agriculturists entitled to the benefit of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act, and the last is an unemployed man not entitled to the benefit of the Madras Agricultur'sts Relief Act then a decree for the scaled down amount will be passed against the fourth and a decree for the unsealed amount will be passed against the other four and the agriculturist judgment-debtor can get his 1/5th interest freed from the liability on payment of the scaled down amount; but the other four can get their 1/5th interest each freed only by paying the unsealed amount. But, Mr. Natesan said that this is only confined to this peculiar set of circumstances, and that it will not apply to a case, like ours, where the entire property is owned by the agriculturist judgment-debtor and the non-agriculturist judgment-debtor is only a puisne mortgagee against whom the original mortgagee could not proceed personally, or even bring a suit for redemption.
Madras High Court Cites 2 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Km. N. Sp. N. Valliammai Achi vs J.A. Ramachandra Ayyar And Ors. on 3 December, 1958

Mr. Gopalaswami Aiyangar pointed out quite rightly that this ruling went on the basis of an old line of cases which ended with the Bench ruling in Kailasa Thevar v. Ramaswami Aiyangar, 1948-2 Mad LJ 28: (AIR 1949 Mad 238), which was reversed by the Supreme Court on appeal in Ramaswami Aiyangar v. Kailasa Thevar, . Mr. Natesan ingeniously argued that the Supreme Court case could be distinguished from the present case. According to him, if, in the same property, different mortgagors have got different, separate and separable interests, and some of them are agriculturists and some of them are non-agriculturists, and a decree for the scaled down amount is passed against the agriculturists and for the unsealed amounts against the non-agriculturists, then the decreeholder can execute the decree for the scaled down amount against the agriculturists, and for the unsealed amount against the non-agriculturists, but that, in a case like this, where the entire ownership vested in one man, Ramachandra Iyer, that rule would not apply, and the difference between the unsealed and scaled amounts would be wiped out the moment the scaled down amount was paid by the owner, the mortgagor.
Madras High Court Cites 2 - Cited by 2 - Full Document

Velugubantla Narayya vs Kona Venkanna And Ors. on 30 April, 1953

These principles, in our opinion, have not in any manner been affected or altered by the decision of the Supremo Court in -- ' (A)' which was an appeal against the decision of Happoll and Govindarajachari JJ. in -- 'Kailasa Thevar v. Ramaswami Iyengar', AIR 1949 Mad 238 (L). The question that arose in that case was in execution of a decree which was of a composite character. The decree against defendant 1 was for a larger sum, that is the full amount due under the mortgage. But as against defendants 2 to 7 the debt was scaled. down, and there was only a decree for a lesser amount as against them. Defendant 1 made an application in the executing Court after depositing a sum of Rs. 3250 that as the amount deposited by him together with the payments already made by him discharged the debt as scaled down by the High Court in favour of defendants 2 to 7, full satisfaction should he entered. The High Court took the view that the benefit which defendants 2 to 7 obtained could be claimed also by defendant 1 and that satisfaction of the decree should be entered as with the deposit made by defendant 1, the scaled down amount was paid up. But this view was not accepted by the Supreme Court. It was observed that it is not open to the executing Court to go behind the decree, and it was its plain duty to give effect to the terms of the decree that was already passed, it was also pointed out that though under the general law, the mortgage decree was one and indivisible, exceptions to the rule as admitted only where the integrity of the mortgage was broken at the instance of the mortgagee himself.
Madras High Court Cites 7 - Cited by 0 - Full Document
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