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Jahan Singh vs Dr. Hardat Singh And Anr. on 1 August, 1934

The reason is that I consider that the opinions expressed by the learned Judges as to whether or no the case of a secured debt came within Rule 2, in Brij Narain Rai v. Mangla Prasad Rai 1924 P.C. 50, were also obiter dicta and are therefore not binding on us. The facts of the case reported as Jagadish Prasad v. Hoshyar Singh 1928 All 596, were these : A father of a joint family had created a mortgage of ancestral property. The creditor sued the father alone and obtained a mortgage decree. Before the sale could take place, the sons instituted a suit for a declaration that the mortgage was not binding upon them. The only question for consideration was whether in that case the mortgagee decree-holder could proceed with the sale without establishing that the mortgage debt was contracted without family necessity. The point was decided against the mortgagee and it was held that before the sale takes place, the mortgagee must, in order to bind the sons who were not parties to the suit in which a decree had been obtained, prove that the debt was binding upon the sons.
Allahabad High Court Cites 8 - Cited by 2 - Full Document

Sheo Prasad vs Balwant Singh And Ors. on 15 June, 1926

13. The facts of this case are set out in the judgment of my learned brother, Mr. Justice Sulaiman, with which I agree. But in view of the importance of the question raised, I will shortly state my own views. The plaintiff mortgagee brought a suit against the executant of the mortgage, Balwant Singh, and certain other members of the joint Hiudu family and their transferees on a mortgage, dated 9th April 1918. The consideration for that mortgage consisted of three bonds, certain expenses relating to the execution and registration of the deed and some money which was for the payment of Government revenue. The only point which I propose to consider is the question whether the three bonds found to have been for consideration constituted antecedent debts. The judgment of the learned Additional Subordinate Judge was passed before the recent decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Brij Narain v. Mangala Prasad A.I.R. 1924 P.C. 50 and he held that inasmuch as all the bonds set off in suit are mortgage bonds, they cannot be held binding as antecedent debts on the family.
Allahabad High Court Cites 9 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

B. Gauri Shanker Singh And Ors. vs Pt. Sheo Nandan Misra And Ors. on 19 February, 1924

45. The question what is an antecedent debt has been recently considered by a Full Board of the Privy Council in Brij Narain Rai v. Mangala Prasad Rai 77 Ind. Cas. 689 : 21 A.L.J. 934 : 46 M.L.J. 28 : 5 P.L.T. 1 : 28 C.W.N. 253; (1924) M.W.N. 68 : 19 L.W.72 : 2 P.L.R. 41 : 10 Order and A.L.R. 82; (1924) A.I.R. (P.C.) 50 : 33 M.L.T. 457 (P.C.). Their Lordships, after referring to the previous authorities, have laid down certain propositions which they would wish to lay down as the result of those authorities. We are bound, therefore, to accept the most recent pronouncement as the final authority on the matter, I concede that, on the actual facts of that case, the question which we have to consider in the present case did not directly arise, for the previous mortgage-deeds were all deeds within six years of the mortgage-deed in suit and the personal remedy of the mortgagor had not become barred by time. Nevertheless, the five propositions laid down by their Lordships must be unreservedly accepted. In these five propositions I understand the basis of the liability of Hindu sons to be three-fold. That liability may either be based on the existence of a legal necessity or on the ground of the personal obligation of the sons to pay their father's debt, or on the ground of the transfer being in lieu of an antecedent debt. I understand each of these to be a distinct and separate basis. It is true that the original foundation of the doctrine of an antecedent bebt might have been the pious obligation of the Hindu sons to pay their father's debt but by a long series of decisions it has been recognised as a distinct basis. Their Lordships define an antecedent debt as one which is antecedent in fact as well as in time, that is to say, that the debt must be truly independent and not part of fine transaction impeached. Their Lordships also add that the liability cannot be affected by the question whether the father, who contracted the debt or burdens the estate, is alive or dead.
Allahabad High Court Cites 10 - Cited by 3 - Full Document

Mt. Siraj Fatima And Ors. vs Mahmood Ali And Ors. on 27 February, 1932

In the case of Brij Narain Mal v. Mangla Prasad A.I.R. 1924 P.C. 50 the counsel for the defendant had to admit before their Lordships of the Privy Council that the previous decree was not binding on the minors in respect that they were not properly represented. There the father had been appointed as their guardian though his own alienation was being impugned by the minor sons. Side by side with this view, their Lordships of the Privy Council have also laid down that even though thoro be no formal appointment of a guardian ad litem, a minor is bound by a decree obtained by him if his interest had been duly protected and he was effectively represented by his mother, even though there was an absence of an order appointing her as his guardian : Wait an v. Bankey Behari [1903] 30 Cal. 1021,
Allahabad High Court Cites 30 - Cited by 30 - Full Document

M.V. Maya, Nadan And Brothers vs Arunachalam Chettiar And Ors. on 25 March, 1926

10. But apart from this there seam to be other difficulties in the way of the plaintiff. The plaint does not allege that the 1st defendant is liable on the ground that though the debt was contracted by the firm of "V.M.A.C. & Sons., and A.P." the 1st defendant being the undivided son of Ponsivalai Chetty and being in possession of the joint family property is liable for the suit debt. Paragraph 9' of the plaint merely refers to the liability of Defendants 2 to 6 as the undivided sons of the 1st defendant on the ground that Defendant 1 and his sons 2 to 6 form an undivided family of which the 1st defendant is the manager. of has nothing to do with the liability of the 1st defendant on the ground of the larger joint family of which Ponsivalai Chetty is the manager. If the liability of the defendant is based on the ground that he is the son of Ponsivalai Ohetty and the debt is not illegal and immoral and that he is liable along with his father even during his lifetime, Brij Narain v. Mangal Prasad A.I.R. 1924 P.C. 50, the reply is that when the father is discharged the son cannot continue to be liable, the son's liability depending for its existence on that of the father: (see Mayne's Hindu Law, page 399, 9th Edn.).
Madras High Court Cites 2 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Thakur Lal Singh vs Jagraj Singh And Ors. on 19 December, 1927

15. Having regard to these observations of their Lordships I am not prepared to hold that their Lordships ever intended to lay down that the mere fact of a decree for sale having been passed precludes a Hindu son, who was not a party to the decree, from challenging that decree except on the ground that the mortgage debt was for illegal or immoral purposes. The second proposition of law laid down at p. 104, in Brij Narain's case A.I.R. 1924 P.C. 50, appears to be restricted to the case of a simple money debt incurred by, and a simple money decree obtained against, the father and has no reference to a decree for sale, and that proposition is based upon the obligation of Hindu sons to pay debts due from their father.
Allahabad High Court Cites 6 - Cited by 1 - Full Document
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