17. As to what is the scope of the remedy under Section 33 of the Act, it is not necessary for me to deal with this aspect in depth as already there are a few judgments of this Court in this respect. The first judgment to which reference may be made is Ranjit Singh v. Union of India, (1962) 64 Pun LR 44, wherein it has been Observed thus:--
1. By this order, I propose to dispose of Cr. Writ No. 66/87 - Shri Ranjit Singh v. Union of India and others and Cr. Writ No. 83/87 - Shri Ganga Ram Kapoor v. Union of India and others, as both arise out of and relate to the same incident. The order of detention dated 18-11-1985 concerns both the petitioners. The detenus have failed the petitions for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus praying for quashing of the order of their detention dt. 18-11-1985, passed by respondent No. 2 Shri K. K. Tiwari, Joint Secretary to the Government of India under section 3 of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as the COFEPOSA Act). The grounds of challenge in both the petitions are the same though there is a slight change in the date of their respective detention and the service of grounds of detention.
8. The learned counsel, in this connection, placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment of the Allahabad High Court reported in Military Law Journal (Ranjit Singh Chaurasia v. The Union of India, and Ors.) In support of the contention that a Summary Court Martial had the Jurisdiction under section 73 to inflict both the punishments. For meeting the second argument, the learned counsel argued that the order of imprisonment and dismissal was passed by the Officer Commanding and it was duly promulgated in accordance with Army Rule 131. It was also clarified that the proceedings of the Summary Court Martial were duly countersigned by the General Officer Commanding. Headquarter. Bengal Area. So the conclusion was that the order of dismissal having been passed by the Court Martial the validity of the sentence cannot be challenged under the provisions of section 20. It was further argued that in this case the order of dismissal was passed by an equivalent Commander within the meaning of section 20(3) of the Act.