Search Results Page

Search Results

1 - 10 of 11 (0.44 seconds)

Durga Prosad Chamria vs Anardeyi Sethani on 28 May, 1946

There does not appear to be any inconsistency or vagueness in this behalf. But, it is asked, if the business of the first mentioned firm came to an end on 31-12-1916 how is it then that the arbitrator in Clause 5 finds that there had been no dissolution of the firm as it existed in 1916. The two findings, it is urged, are inconsistent and there is an obvious error on the face of the award. This criticism overlooks the principle enunciated by the Judicial Committee in the case of Sathappa Chetty v. S.N. Subramanian Chetty namely, that cessation of active business does not ipso facto constitute dissolution of the firm. The true meaning and effect of the findings in Clauses 3, 4 and 5 appear to me to be this: that the firm reconstituted under the family deed of which the plaintiff became a partner was to carry on active business up to 31-12-1916; that the firm constituted under the business deed did not affect the plaintiff's status in the first mentioned firm; that the second mentioned firm was to carry on the business of the first mentioned firm under that firm's name but that in law and in fact there was no actual dissolution of the first mentioned firm. The idea sought to be expressed seems to be that the second mentioned firm acted as the managing agent of the first mentioned firm. So read and construed the 3 clauses are perfectly consistent and clear. Indeed the final findings in Clause 8 makes the meaning still clearer.
Calcutta High Court Cites 10 - Cited by 6 - Full Document

Katta Gundayya And Ors. vs Katta Siddappa And Ors. on 27 January, 1937

5. We may add that even if it should be assumed that in 1915 the relationship of partners came into existence between the 1st plaintiff and the 1st defendant, the present suit would not be barred unless the defendants also make out that there has been a dissolution of the partnership more than 3 years prior to the institution of the suit. The onus of making out such a dissolution is on the defendants; and it is well established that the mere fact that after a particular date no further business was done will not amount to a dissolution of the partnership. See Haramohan Poddar v. Sudarson Poddar (1920) 25 C.W.N. 847, Sathappa Chetti v. Subramanian Chetti (1927) 53 M.L.J. 245 (P.C.), Din Muhammad v. Kanshi Rams A.I.R. 1930 Lah.
Madras High Court Cites 11 - Cited by 3 - Full Document

Mathra Singh And Anr. vs Arjan Singh And Ors. on 12 September, 1978

11. The learned counsel then argued that the partnership between the parties was a partnership at will and the institution of the suit for dissolution of partnership and rendition of accounts amounted to dissolution of partnership. He also urged that after the dissolution, the transferors ceased to be necessary parties. He made a reference to a judgment of a Privy Council in Sathappa Chetty v. S. N. Subrahmanyan Chetty, AIR 1927 PC 70, wherein it was observed that filing plaint in a suit for dissolution by one partner is enough of itself to put an end to a partnership at will. There is no quarrel with the proposition as enunciated by their Lordships.
Punjab-Haryana High Court Cites 3 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Jaldu Manikyala Rao vs Jaldu Pydayya on 20 April, 1943

The Judicial Committee in an appeal cited to us from Sathappa Chetti v. Subramanian Chetti 33 Beav. 577 held that in the absence of evidence that there had been art-, previous dissolution, a partnership between the plaintiff and the defendant was dissolved by what their Lordships described as writ and plaint claiming dissolution. No doubt the expression "writ" applies to its Indian counterpart "summons." The position therefore is that whatever the pleading in this case may be, the partnership between the parties was dissolved on the date of the plaint and there was nothing for the Court to do in that respect except to declare that all the relief which the Court was called upon to give was solely to order the taking of an account. For the purposes of Court-fee this is a suit to which Section 7(iv)(f) of the Court-fees Act is applicable.
Madras High Court Cites 8 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Baijnath And Anr. vs Chhote Lal And Anr. on 18 November, 1927

In support of this contention reliance has been placed by the learned Counsel on the case of Sathappa Chetti v. S.N. Subramanian A.I.R. 1927 P.C. 70, and on the decision of Chunni Lal v. Firm Sheo Charan Lal A.I.R. 1925 All. 787. It is certainly true that the mere suspension of business of partnership does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that there has been a dissolution of that partnership, but the cessation of the business coupled with the other circumstances may legitimately lead to the inference that the partnership had been dissolved. In this case the lower appellate Court after pointing out that the business was closed has adopted the reasons given by the trial Court for recording the finding that the partnership in question had been dissolved in January 1920. The decision in the unreported case referred to above turns on the peculiar terms of the agreement of partnership evidenced by the documents to which reference was made by the learned Judges in the course of their judgments. In the Privy Council decision relied upon by the learned Counsel it was not laid down by their Lordships as a general proposition of universal application that a partnership cannot be deemed to have been dissolved till all its outstandings have been realised. Having regard to the nature of the particular partnership, which formed the subject-matter of consideration in that case and having regard to the other facts pointed out by their Lordships in the course of their judgment, their Lordships came to the conclusion that the finding of the High Court in that case, that the partnership was not dissolved till all the outstandings belonging to the partnership had been realised, was correct.
Allahabad High Court Cites 2 - Cited by 2 - Full Document
1   2 Next