61) Critiquing the approach of the COMPAT, he submitted that it has
introduced the concept of ‘relevant’ turnover in Section 27 despite the
absence of the word ‘relevant’, failing to notice that wherever the Act
wanted to introduce the concept of ‘relevance’ the word ‘relevant’ has, in
fact, been used in the appropriate sections. In this regard, he referred to
Sections 2(r), 2(s), 2(t), 4(2)(e), 6, 19(6), 19(7), etc. where the expression
‘relevant’ is specifically used. He also referred to the definition of
‘turnover’ as contained in Section 2(y) of the Act, which includes value of
goods or services, and submitted that it is the aforesaid definition of
‘turnover’ which has to be applied wherever this expression occurs in the
Act and it cannot be read to have different criteria for determining penalty
and the thresholds applicable for regulation of combinations. He also
sought to highlight that where the expression is used in the same section,
it should generally be given the same meaning, as held in Suresh Chand
v. Gulam Chisti15 and Raghubans Narain Singh v. Uttar Pradesh
15
Government through Collector of Bijnor16.
In Suresh Chand Vs. Gulam Chisti reported in AIR 1990
Page No.13/36
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/
A.No.3306 of 2021
in
C.S.No.829 of 2009
Supreme Court 897, the three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
had reiterated the position of law stated in Ibrahim Bachu Bafan Vs. State
of Gujarat and others referred to supra.
"It is a cardinal rule of construction of statute that the statute must
be read as a whole and construction should be put to all the parts
together and not of anyone part only by itself. Every clause of a
statute is required to be construed with reference to the context and
other clauses of the Act so that so far as possible the meaning of
the enactment of the whole statute would be consistent. When
legislature uses the same word in different parts of the same
Section or statute, there is a presumption that the word is used in
the same sense throughout. It was so held by this Court in the
following cases: Suresh Chand v. Gulam Chisti5; Mohd. Shaft v.
Seventh Additional District & Sessions Judge, Allahabad6 and
Ors.; Raghubans Narain Singh v. The Uttar Pradesh
Government through Collector of Bijnor7 ."
17. We further find force in the submissions of the assessee that for all intent and purposes the word "manufacture" should include process as given in the definition clause of Sections 10A and 10B of the Act. All these provisions were incorporated to serve the same purpose and there is nothing in the context of Sections 10A and 10B suggests some other meaning of term "manufacture". The assessee, therefore, is justified in relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Suresh Chand (supra).
In Suresh Chand v. Culam Chisti , It was held that the words "on the date of commencement of this Act" in relation to the pendency of the suit would mean the date when such suit was instituted. The proceeding is continued for a period and a benefit of such period is given. The Supreme Court discouraged the argument that to put it differently if a proceeding is disposed of after a considerable period, benefit will be given till such time. In B. Prabhakar Rao and Ors., etc. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. etc. etc. it was held that it is open to the Court to give retrospectivity to a legislation to which the Legislature plainly and expressly refused to give retrospectivity, because unlike United Kingdom, India has a written Constitution which confers Justiciable fundamental rights and so that very refusal to make an Act retrospective or the non-application of the Act with reference to a date or to an event that took place before the enactment may, by itself, create an impermissible classification justifying the striking down of the non-retroactivity or non-application clause, as offending the fundamental right to equality before the law and the equal protection of the laws.
16. Sri M. A. Qadeer, learned counsel, appearing for U. P. Public Service Commission submits that only those candidates are entitled to be considered in O.B.C. category who were recognized as O.B.C. on the last date of submission of application form, and had applied in that category. In this examination the last date for receipt of application form was 8.2.2000. Since the petitioner's caste was notified to be included as O.B.C. on 10.3.2000 (Jaat) and 7.7.2000 (kalwar/kalar), and that the preliminary written examination was held on 28.5.2000, they cannot be given the benefit and place in the select list as O.B.C. candidates. Sri Qadeer submits that the provisions of Section 15 (1) of the Act, have one time application. These cannot be extended to the selection which was not pending on the date of commencement of U.P. Act No. 4 of 1994. He has relied upon the judgment of Supreme Court in Suresh Chandra v. Gulam Chisti, 1991 (1) ARC (SC) 415, in which while interpreting the provisions of Section 39 of U. P. Urban Building (Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, the Supreme Court held that the benefit of Sections 39, 40 and 2 (ii) of the Act, by which, the tenants in suits pending on that date of the commencement of the Act, in respect of the building to which the old Act did not apply could claim the protection of the Act by depositing the rent and other amounts within thirty days, were of one time application.