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Excel Crop Care Ltd. vs Competition Commn. Of India on 8 May, 2017

61) Critiquing the approach of the COMPAT, he submitted that it has introduced the concept of ‘relevant’ turnover in Section 27 despite the absence of the word ‘relevant’, failing to notice that wherever the Act wanted to introduce the concept of ‘relevance’ the word ‘relevant’ has, in fact, been used in the appropriate sections. In this regard, he referred to Sections 2(r), 2(s), 2(t), 4(2)(e), 6, 19(6), 19(7), etc. where the expression ‘relevant’ is specifically used. He also referred to the definition of ‘turnover’ as contained in Section 2(y) of the Act, which includes value of goods or services, and submitted that it is the aforesaid definition of ‘turnover’ which has to be applied wherever this expression occurs in the Act and it cannot be read to have different criteria for determining penalty and the thresholds applicable for regulation of combinations. He also sought to highlight that where the expression is used in the same section, it should generally be given the same meaning, as held in Suresh Chand v. Gulam Chisti15 and Raghubans Narain Singh v. Uttar Pradesh 15 Government through Collector of Bijnor16.
Supreme Court - Daily Orders Cites 72 - Cited by 51 - A K Sikri - Full Document

Kross S.A. vs Vijay Munjal And Anr. on 10 October, 2023

"It is a cardinal rule of construction of statute that the statute must be read as a whole and construction should be put to all the parts together and not of anyone part only by itself. Every clause of a statute is required to be construed with reference to the context and other clauses of the Act so that so far as possible the meaning of the enactment of the whole statute would be consistent. When legislature uses the same word in different parts of the same Section or statute, there is a presumption that the word is used in the same sense throughout. It was so held by this Court in the following cases: Suresh Chand v. Gulam Chisti5; Mohd. Shaft v. Seventh Additional District & Sessions Judge, Allahabad6 and Ors.; Raghubans Narain Singh v. The Uttar Pradesh Government through Collector of Bijnor7 ."
Delhi High Court Cites 14 - Cited by 0 - C H Shankar - Full Document

Income-Tax Officer vs Anjaneya Cold Storage Ltd. on 6 April, 1994

17. We further find force in the submissions of the assessee that for all intent and purposes the word "manufacture" should include process as given in the definition clause of Sections 10A and 10B of the Act. All these provisions were incorporated to serve the same purpose and there is nothing in the context of Sections 10A and 10B suggests some other meaning of term "manufacture". The assessee, therefore, is justified in relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Suresh Chand (supra).
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal - Delhi Cites 18 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Ram Kumar And Anr. vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Anr. on 12 May, 2004

20. Similar view was again expressed by the Supreme Court in Atma Ram Mittal v. Ishwar Singh Punia, AIR 1988 SC 2031, impliedly overruling Vineet Kumar's case, and in Suresh Chand v. Gulam Chisti, 1990 (1) ARC 233 and in Ramesh Chandra v. IIIrd ADJ and Ors., (1992) 1 SCC 751, and again by the Supreme Court in Bhola Nath Varshney v. Mulk Raj Madan, (1994) 2 SCC 127.
Allahabad High Court Cites 16 - Cited by 0 - T Agarwala - Full Document

Harish Tandon vs State Of U.P. And Anr. on 30 March, 2006

In Suresh Chand v. Culam Chisti , It was held that the words "on the date of commencement of this Act" in relation to the pendency of the suit would mean the date when such suit was instituted. The proceeding is continued for a period and a benefit of such period is given. The Supreme Court discouraged the argument that to put it differently if a proceeding is disposed of after a considerable period, benefit will be given till such time. In B. Prabhakar Rao and Ors., etc. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. etc. etc. it was held that it is open to the Court to give retrospectivity to a legislation to which the Legislature plainly and expressly refused to give retrospectivity, because unlike United Kingdom, India has a written Constitution which confers Justiciable fundamental rights and so that very refusal to make an Act retrospective or the non-application of the Act with reference to a date or to an event that took place before the enactment may, by itself, create an impermissible classification justifying the striking down of the non-retroactivity or non-application clause, as offending the fundamental right to equality before the law and the equal protection of the laws.
Allahabad High Court Cites 31 - Cited by 1 - A Lala - Full Document

Prashant Kumar vs State Of U.P. And Anr. on 19 July, 2005

16. Sri M. A. Qadeer, learned counsel, appearing for U. P. Public Service Commission submits that only those candidates are entitled to be considered in O.B.C. category who were recognized as O.B.C. on the last date of submission of application form, and had applied in that category. In this examination the last date for receipt of application form was 8.2.2000. Since the petitioner's caste was notified to be included as O.B.C. on 10.3.2000 (Jaat) and 7.7.2000 (kalwar/kalar), and that the preliminary written examination was held on 28.5.2000, they cannot be given the benefit and place in the select list as O.B.C. candidates. Sri Qadeer submits that the provisions of Section 15 (1) of the Act, have one time application. These cannot be extended to the selection which was not pending on the date of commencement of U.P. Act No. 4 of 1994. He has relied upon the judgment of Supreme Court in Suresh Chandra v. Gulam Chisti, 1991 (1) ARC (SC) 415, in which while interpreting the provisions of Section 39 of U. P. Urban Building (Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, the Supreme Court held that the benefit of Sections 39, 40 and 2 (ii) of the Act, by which, the tenants in suits pending on that date of the commencement of the Act, in respect of the building to which the old Act did not apply could claim the protection of the Act by depositing the rent and other amounts within thirty days, were of one time application.
Allahabad High Court Cites 15 - Cited by 3 - S Ambwani - Full Document
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