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Documents citing Behramji Sorabji Lalkaka vs Commissioner Of Income-Tax on 16 March, 1948

Mrs. Leela Nath vs Commissioner Of Income-Tax on 20 August, 1980

The facts of the present case are quite different and the authority cited by the learned counsel for the assessee is not applicable to the facts of the present case, It has been held in the case of Behramji Sorabji Lalkaka v. CIT [1948] 16 ITR 301 (Bom), that the expression 'revocable' in Section 16(1)(c) of the Indian I.T. Act, 1922, is not qualified in any manner and that a section does not speak for absolute and unqualified power of revocation and for the purpose of Section 16(lXc) a transfer is nevertheless revocable even if it can be revoked only with the consent of any named person or persons. Even if the assessee has to exercise the uncontrolled power of investment of the trust money in any concern in which the assessee is interested along with the other trustees that would not in any way detract from the reservation of a power for deriving any indirect benefit by the assessee."
Calcutta High Court Cites 37 - Cited by 8 - S Mukharji - Full Document

Income Tax Officer-21(3)(2), Mumbai vs Scheme A1 Of Arcil Cps002 Xi Trust, ... on 10 September, 2020

Our aforesaid view is fortified by the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Bombay in the case of Behramji Sorabji Lalkaka Vs. CIT (1948) (16 ITR 301) (Bom). In the aforesaid case, it was observed by the Hon‟ble High Court that the words "revocable transfer" are well understood in law and a transfer does not cease to be revocable because the power of revocation cannot be exercised by the settlor without the consent of the named individuals or any of them. As observed by the Hon‟ble High Court, a transfer is nonetheless revocable even if it can be revoked only with the consent of any named person or persons.
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal - Mumbai Cites 22 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

S. Venugopala Varma Rajah vs The Commissioner Of Agricultural ... on 16 August, 1967

1945-13 ITR 105 = (AIR 1945 Bom 254), Behramji Sorabji v. Commr. of Income-tax, (1948) 16 ITR 301-(AIR 1948 Bom 405), K. Subramania Pillai v. Agricultural Income-tax Officer, (1964) 53 ITR 764 (Mad) and Tarunendra Nath v. Commr. of Income-tax, AIR 1958 Cal 350 and submitted that Clause 17 in the karar giving power to the first party, the karnavan, to re-assume any property allotted, in case it is alienated or encumbered, though contingent in nature would be sufficient to make the karar a revocable settlement within the meaning of the first proviso to Section 9(1), and therefore, the third proviso would not, in any event, be attracted We find it unnecessary to express any opinion on this aspect, in view of our answers to the first and second questions.
Kerala High Court Cites 14 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

P.J.P. Thomas vs Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Calcutta. on 28 February, 1961

The other case to which our attention was called by the learned counsel for the Commissioner of Income-tax is the decision of the Bombay High Court in Behramji Sorabji Lalkaka v. Commissioner of Income-tax. This is a decision of the Division Bench of Chagla C.J. and Tendolkar J. In that case, the expression, "revocable" in section 16(1)(c) of the Indian Income-tax Act was held not to be qualified in any manner and it was held that the section did not speak of any absolute or unqualified power of revocation and for the purpose of section 16(1)(c), a transfer in none the less revocable even if it could be revoked only with the consent of any named person or persons. Further, at page 307 of the report, Chagla C.J. observed :
Calcutta High Court Cites 25 - Cited by 8 - Full Document

D.M. Netarwala vs Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Bombay ... on 12 January, 1979

8. It is true that the moneys which are paid to the wife of Netarwala are paid in pursuance of the direction given to the settlors and it could be said that the money are received by her in her own right which flows from the recitals in the trust deed. But it must be remembered that this circumstance does not take the case before us out of S. 16(3)(a)(iii). That circumstance may be relevant for taking a case out of clause (b) of S. 16(3), because clause (b) will cease to operate the moment the trust funds are delivered to the beneficiaries and the trust has come to an end. To the same effect are the observations made by this court in Behramji Lalkaka's case [1948] 16 ITR 301 (Bom) on which Mr. Khanna has relied but which have no relevance to the case before us. The question in Behramji Lalkaka's case, was whether the income received by the beneficiaries after the trust had come to an end, could be brought to tax under S. 16(1)(c) of the Act. We are not in this case dealing with the question as to whether the income earned by the wife after she had received the money after the expiration of the period for which the trust was made could be brought to tax under S. 16(1)(c). The question in the instant case is whether even though the wife received Rs. 25,000 in her own right, the interest earned on that amount of Rs. 25,000 would be clubbed by virtue of the special provision which is made under the Indian I.T. Act, 1922, in S. 16(3)(a)(iii) thereof. A transfer may be good for all purposes, but then so far as the provisions of the I.T. Act are concerned, the question of clubbing the income in the instant case with the income of Netarwala will have to be decided in the light of the special provisions in S. 16(3)(a) of the Act. Nobody can dispute that under the general law, the amount of Rs. 25,000 wholly belongs to Netarwala's wife. Title may have vested in Netarwala's wife to the sum of Rs. 25,000 under the general law. But those concepts would stand modified for the purposes of the Indian I.T. Act when we consider the special provisions with regard to the clubbing of the income under S. 16(3)(a). Indeed, the provisions of S. 16(3)(a)(iii) themselves deal with a transfer. It is not disputed even by Mr. Khanna that there has been a transfer in the instant case. All that he says is, that the transfer is not by Netarwala alone, but that there was originally a transfer by Netarwala in favour of the two settlors and that the two settlors, who were also the trustees, along with a third trustee, transferred half of the trust funds to Netarwala's wife. The question which we have to decide in the instant case is whether having regard to the provisions of S. 16(3)(a)(iii), the transaction or the chain of transactions can be so construed that the transfer in favour of the wife can be said to have been made indirectly by Netarwala. It is important to remember that S. 16(3)(a)(iii) does not deal with only a direct transfer of assets. It deals with even an indirect transfer of assets and an indirect transfer by its very nature would involve more than one transaction, the ultimate object being to give effect to the original intention of transferring funds by the husband to the wife.
Bombay High Court Cites 12 - Cited by 4 - Full Document

Arcil Retail Loan Portfolio 004 B Trust, ... vs Ito 21(1)(2), Mumbai on 28 May, 2024

As observed by the CIT(A), we find that Clause 5 of the trust deed makes it clear beyond any scope of doubt that the contribution made by the SR holders is „revocable‟. Accordingly, we have no hesitation in observing that the income therein arising has to be brought to tax in the hands of the SR holders, i.e as per the provision of Sec. 61 to 63 of the Act. Insofar, the view taken by the A.O, that as the revocation of the contributions is conditional upon the consent of the contributors holding 75% of the units, we are afraid that the same would not render the contributions as irrevocable. Our aforesaid view is fortified by the judgment of the Hon‟ble High Court of Bombay in the case of Behramji Sorabji Lalkaka Vs. CIT (1948) (16 ITR 301) (Bom). In the aforesaid case, it was observed by the Hon‟ble High Court that the words "revocable transfer" are well understood in law and a transfer does not cease to be revocable because the power of revocation cannot be exercised by the settlor without the consent of the named individuals or any of them. As observed by the Hon‟ble High Court, a transfer is nonetheless revocable even if it can be revoked only with the consent of any named person or persons. As such, on the basis of our aforesaid observations we are persuaded to subscribe to the view taken by the CIT(A), who had rightly concluded that the assessee trust is a revocable trust, and thus, the provisions of Sec. 61 to 63 of the Act would be applicable to it."
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal - Mumbai Cites 23 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Income Tax Officer Ward 22(1)(6), ... vs Arcil Shalimar Wires Industries ... on 7 June, 2024

As observed by the CIT(A), we find that Clause 5 of the trust deed makes it clear beyond any scope of doubt that the contribution made by the SR holders is „revocable‟. Accordingly, we have no hesitation in observing that the income therein arising has to be brought to tax in the hands of the SR holders, i.e as per the provision of Sec. 61 to 63 of the Act. Insofar, the view taken by the A.O, that as the revocation of the contributions is conditional upon the consent of the contributors holding 75% of the units, we are afraid that the same would not render the contributions as irrevocable. Our aforesaid view is fortified by the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Bombay in the case of Behramji Sorabji Lalkaka Vs. CIT (1948) (16 ITR 301) (Bom). In the aforesaid case, it was observed by the Hon‟ble High Court that the words "revocable transfer" are well understood in law and a transfer does not cease to be revocable because the power of revocation cannot be exercised by the settlor without the consent of the named individuals or any of them. As observed by the Hon‟ble High Court, a transfer is nonetheless revocable even if it can be revoked only with the consent of any named person or persons. As such, on the basis of our aforesaid observations we are persuaded to subscribe to the view taken by the CIT(A), who had rightly concluded that the assessee trust is a revocable trust, and thus, the provisions of Sec. 61 to 63 of the Act would be applicable to it."
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal - Mumbai Cites 19 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Income Tax Officer Ward-22(1)(6), ... vs Arcil Asset Reconstruction Fund Ii ... on 7 June, 2024

As observed by the CIT(A), we find that Clause 5 of the trust deed makes it clear beyond any scope of doubt that the contribution made by the SR holders is „revocable‟. Accordingly, we have no hesitation in observing that the income therein arising has to be brought to tax in the hands of the SR holders, i.e as per the provision of Sec. 61 to 63 of the Act. Insofar, the view taken by the A.O, that as the revocation of the contributions is conditional upon the consent of the contributors holding 75% of the units, we are afraid that the same would not render the contributions as irrevocable. Our aforesaid view is fortified by the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Bombay in the case of Behramji Sorabji Lalkaka Vs. CIT (1948) (16 ITR 301) (Bom). In the aforesaid case, it was observed by the Hon‟ble High Court that the words "revocable transfer" are well understood in law and a transfer does not cease to be revocable because the power of revocation cannot be exercised by the settlor without the consent of the named individuals or any of them. As observed by the Hon‟ble High Court, a transfer is nonetheless revocable even if it can be revoked only with the consent of any named person or persons. As such, on the basis of our aforesaid observations we are persuaded to subscribe to the view taken by the CIT(A), who had rightly concluded that the assessee trust is a revocable trust, and thus, the provisions of Sec. 61 to 63 of the Act would be applicable to it."
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal - Mumbai Cites 19 - Cited by 0 - Full Document
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