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Documents citing Ramabai Govind vs Raghunath Vasudeo on 12 July, 1951

Special Secretary, Land And Land And ... vs State Bank Of India And Ors. on 12 April, 1988

In the case of Ramabai Govind v. Raghunath , it was held that a trustee as such has no right to sell the trust property unless the deed of trust confers such a power. There is no such express power conferred by the Act upon the trustee. The limitation imposed by Section 36, Trusts Act on the power of a trustee to lease the trust property is suggestive of this fact. A trustee no doubt is a legal owner of the property the beneficial ownership in the same vesting in: the beneficiary or the cestui que trust. Merely because the property is vested in that trustee or the legal owner, the trustee is not entitled to sell the same. He is not the full owner of the property in the real sense of the term, because there is a beneficial interest and the ownership therein carved out in the property The legal ownership which vests in the trustee is for the purposes of the trust and the administration of the provisions of the trust.
Calcutta High Court Cites 67 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

The Regional Director vs O.L. Of Prasad Mills Ltd. on 3 July, 2001

19.2 The learned counsel has relied on judgement in the case of RAMABAI GOVIND VS. RAGHUNATH VASUDEO reported in AIR 1952 Bombay 106 where the court has on page No. 110 in para 5(a) has observed as follows: "Unless and until the trustee succeeds in establishing before a Court of law that no part of the trust property formed part of the consideration for the purchase of that property and he had purchased it out of his own separate property or properties, he would not be able to claim the property as his own, and the beneficiary or the cestui que trust would be entitled to that property. This is the position which is clearly laid down in law and is well recognised in the text books and the authorities as above stated."
Gujarat High Court Cites 52 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Mahant Dharmendra Das vs State Of U.P. Through S.D.M. Bakshi Ka ... on 5 May, 2022

In support of his submission, learned counsel for the applicant relied upon the judgment of Bombay High Court in the case of Ramabai Govind Vs. Raghunath Vasudeo AIR 1952 Bombay 106, judgment of Calcutta High Court in the case of Misrilal Raidani Vs. Netaichand Nandi AIR 1934 Calcutta 372 and judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bhinka and others Vs. Charan Singh AIR 1959 SC 960.
Allahabad High Court Cites 18 - Cited by 0 - S K Gupta - Full Document

P.N. Venkatasubramania Iyer And Ors. vs P.N. Easwara Iyer And Ors. on 21 January, 1965

Reference has also been made to Ramabai v. Raghunath, and Rajanikanta Pal v. Jaganmohan Pal, 50 Ind App 173: (AIR 1923 PC 57). But, so long as the question is regarded as one of mixture of the funds from both joint and separate properties, by the maintenance of a common account or otherwise, this might not affect the separate character of the property already acquired, as I have emphasised; Mayne is specific that, here, the analogy of a trustee and a cestui que trust might not apply. Certainly, such mixture will raise a presumption with regard to the subsequent accretions from such mixed funds.
Madras High Court Cites 30 - Cited by 14 - Full Document

Dr. Avinash Prakashchandra Banait And ... vs Jyoti W/O Moreshwar Kelkar And Others on 27 April, 2026

The instrument of trust, which is the vayasthapatra in the suit, also does not confer on the executor or even the executor de son tort the power to sell the same, as we have already indicated. Unless, therefore, it was contended that the sale of the property was a step towards the realization, protection or benefit of the trust property, and for the protection or support of a beneficiary who was not competent to contract, the sale could not be justified. The powers of the trustee are really limited and, as a matter of fact, it is laid down in the further provision contained in S. 36, Trusts Act that "Except with the permission of a principal Civil
Bombay High Court Cites 34 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Kadi Municipality vs New Chhotalal Mills Company Ltd. on 27 July, 1964

The contention was that the Tharav had no binding effect ab initio and there was, therefore, no question of its continuing in force after the merger of the Baroda State. Now to this contention a preliminary objection was raised by Mr.B.G.Thakore, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the Company. He submitted that this contention could not be allowed to be raised in these Letters Patent Appeals since it had not been taken before the learned Judge who heard the Second Appeals and for the matter of that it had not been taken even before the learned Assistant Judge or the learned trial Judge. He pointed out the limits of our jurisdiction hearing a Letters Patent Appeal and relied on three decisions of the High Court of Bombay, namely, Shripad v. Shivram, 36 Bom L R 1052: (AIR 1934 Bom 466), Sattappa v. Mohamed Saheb, 38 Bom L R 221: (AIR 1936 Bom 227) and Ramabai Govind v. Raghunath, 53 Bom L R 883: (AIR 1952 Bom 106). It is clear from these decisions that a new point which has not been urged before the Judge hearing a Second Appeal cannot be allowed to be urged for the first time of the hearing of a Letters Patent Appeal. Now it cannot be disputed that this point which is sought to be raised by Mr.S.N.Patel was not alleged before the learned Judge at the time of the hearing of the Second Appeals nor was it taken before the learned Assistant Judge or the learned trial Judge. We cannot, therefore, permit this point to be raised for the first time of the hearing of this Letters Patent Appeals before us. But apart from this objection founded on the fact that these are Letters Patent Appeals, there is another cogent reason why we cannot permit the Municipality to raise this point. This point is now sought to be raised is in complete contradiction of the basis on which the case has been argued in all the three Courts. The case has throughout proceeded on the basis that the Tharav was a valid and binding Tharav up to the date of the merger and the only argument was that it cease to be in force on merger. It was never the case of the Municipality so far that the Tharav did not have any binding effect at all right from the commencements. The Municipality cannot, therefore, be allowed to take up a stand altogether inconsistent with the stand taken up by it up to the State. But even if we were to allow the Municipality to raise this point we do not think there is any substance in it. The only reason suggested on behalf of the Municipality in support of the contention that the Tharav had no binding effect ab-initio was that the B Class Municipalities Act did not make any provision for granting exemptions from payment of octroi duty and that the Baroda State had, therefore, no power to make the Tharav granting such exemption. The argument was that there being no power under the B Class Municipalities Act to grant exemption, the Tharav if valid, amounted to an amendment of the Act and this it was not open to the Baroda State to do by merely making a Tharav, for the only way in which an amendment to the Act could be carried out was by following the same traditional form of enactment and making what purported to be an express amendment of the Act. Now there is no substance in this contention. It must be remembered that the Ruler of the Baroda State was an absolute monarch and there is no prohibition on the power of an absolute monarch to act in such manner a he likes. There is no constitutional requirement which compels an absolute ruler to amend his enactment in any particular form. He being the fountain of all authority, his will is law howsoever expressed and whatever he says has binding effect, whether it be a legislative, executive or judicial act. If, therefore, the Ruler or his delegate the Diwan made the Tharav granting exemption from octroi duty payable under the Rules framed under the B Class Municipalities Act, the Tharav must have binding effect and it cannot be argued that if the Tharav was to have the effect of amending the B Class Municipalities Act, it should have been enacted in any particular form or should have been expressly made as an amendment to the Act. We are, therefore, of the view that there is no substance in this contention urged on behalf of the Municipality and it must be rejected.
Gujarat High Court Cites 6 - Cited by 5 - P N Bhagwati - Full Document

P.V. Aliyamma vs E.K. Thomas on 1 September, 2006

6. Counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the additional share as per A1 registered partition deed should enure to the benefit of the plaintiff since the 'Stridhanam' amount received from the plaintiffs father was utilised for the benefit of the defendant's family. Further it is also pointed out that the intention of the plaintiff's father-in-law and members of the family was to give one share to the plaintiff acknowledging the receipt of 'Stridhanam' and the plaintiff's share of the property was entrusted to defendant in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff. Counsel placed reliance on a judgment of the Bombay High Court in Ramabai v. Raghunath and contended that a presumption has to be drawn that the defendant was keeping the property in trust for the plaintiff.
Kerala High Court Cites 4 - Cited by 1 - K Radhakrishnan - Full Document

Aliyamma vs Thomas on 1 September, 2006

6. Counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the additional share as per Al registered partition deed should enure to the benefit of the plaintiff since the 'sthridhanam' amount received from the plaintiff's father was utilised for the benefit of the defendant's family. Further it is also pointed out that the intention of the plaintiff's father-in-law and members of the family was to give one share to the plaintiff acknowledging the receipt of 'sthridhanam' and the plaintiffs share of the property was entrusted to defendant in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff. Counsel placed reliance on a judgment of the Bombay High Court in Ramabai v. Raghunath and contended that a presumption has to be drawn that the defendant was keeping the property in trust for the plaintiff.
Kerala High Court Cites 4 - Cited by 0 - K Radhakrishnan - Full Document
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