Search Results Page

Search Results

1 - 6 of 6 (1.74 seconds)
Documents citing Munna Lal And Anr. vs Hajira Jan And Anr. on 22 June, 1910

Mathura Prasad vs Hardeo Bakhsh Singh And Ors. on 8 April, 1920

In Muhammadan law, vide Tyabjee's Principles of Muham-madan Law, paragraph 541 A, by the word sharik or co-sharer is meant " the owner of an undivided share in the property of which the subject of pre-emption forma a part or share. Clearly on the facts of the present case the plaintiff is not the owner of an "undivided share of the property which forms th]e, subject of pre-emption. He has no share in it whatsoever of :any sort. Our attention is called to the decision of this Court in Munna Lal v. Hajira Jan (1910) I.L.R. 33 All. 28, but if that judgment is carefully read it is by no means in favour of the present appellant, in fact, it is dead against him. It is perfectly true that in that case there had been what is known in Revenue law as a perfect partition and the two estates were entirely separate. In that case attention was called to certain decisions in cases of imperfect partitions of villages, but in each of those cases ,it was distinctly noted that there was still some portion of property which had been left joint and undivided, It is clear that, within the meaning of the Muhammadan law, the plaintiff in the circumstances of the present case is not a shafi-i-sharih. His contention that he was a shafi-i-hhalil depended upon the oral evidence of one kahar, whose evidence was rejected by the court below, and we consider rightly rejected.
Allahabad High Court Cites 1 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Mathura Prasad vs Hardeo Baksh Singh And Ors. on 8 April, 1920

In Muhammadan Law, vide Tyabji's Principles of Muhammadan Law, paragraph 54l-A, by the word sharik or co-sharer is meant the owner of an undivided share in the property of which the subject of pre emption forms apart or share. Clearly on the facts of the present case the plaintiff is not the owner of an undivided share of the property which forms the subject of pre emption. He has no share in it whatsoever of any sort. Our attention is called to the decision of this Court in Munna Lal v. Hajira Jan 7 Ind. Cas. 404 : 7 A.L.J. 879 : 88 A. 28, but if that judgment is carefully read, it is by no means in favour of the present appellant; in fast, it is dead against him. It is perfectly true that in that case there had been what is known in Revenue Law as a perfect partition and the two estates were entirely separate. In that case attention was called to certain decisions in oases of imperfect partitions of villages, but in each of those oases it was distinctly noted that there was still some portion of property which had been left joint and undivided. It is clear that within the meaning of the Muhammadan Law the plaintiff in the circumstances of the present case is not a shafi-i-sharik. His contention that he was a shafi-i-khalik depended upon the oral evidence of one Kahar whose evidence was rejected by the Court below, and we consider rightly rejected.
Allahabad High Court Cites 1 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Fazal Ahmad vs Tasadduq Husain on 18 February, 1919

There were other reasons also which might have explained why the second demand was not made earlier. Another point was lightly touched on, namely, that the Muhammadan law of preemption does not apply to zamindari property, but is restricted to houses, gardens and small plots of lands. It may well be doubted whether the Muhammadan law ever did extend to estates, but it would seem that the law, rightly or wrongly, has been extended. The matter was mooted in the case of Munna Lal v. Hajira Jan (1910) I.L.R., 33 All, 28. A Bench of this Court held that the Muhammadan law did apply to the zamindari property. We now come to the main issue in the case, namely, whether or not the plaintiff lost his right to pre-empt by reason of the fact that he had ceased to be a co-sharer at the date of the institution of the suit. It appears that about four days after the institution of the suit and a considerable time after the sale of the property which it is sought to pre-empt, the plaintiff made what is in form at least a usufructuary mortgage of his share in the village to a third party. The amount secured by the mortgage was Rs. 12,000 and the mortgage was, as we have said, usufructuary in form, the period being six years. It was alleged by the defendant vendee that this was in reality a sale. The court of first instance dealing with this matter says:
Allahabad High Court Cites 1 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Shaikh Fazal Ahmad vs Tasadduq Husain on 18 February, 1919

There were other reasons also which might have explained why the second demand was not made earlier. Another point was lightly touched on, namely, that the Muhammadan Law of pre-emption does not apply to Zemindari property but is restricted to houses, gardens and small plots of lands. It may well be doubted whether the Muhammadan Law ever did extend to estates, but it would seem that the law rightly or wrongly has been extended. The matter was mooted in the case of Munna Lal v. Hajira Jan 7 Ind. Cas. 404 : 33 A. 33 A. 23 : 7 A.L.J. 879. A Bench of this Court held that the Muhammadan Law did apply to Zemindari property.
Allahabad High Court Cites 1 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Keshab Singh vs Bansi Singh on 28 March, 1919

783 and Munna Lal v. Hajira Jan 7 Ind. Cas. 404 : 33 A. 28 : 7 A.L.J. 879. The first of these cases is exactly in point, and in both these oases it was held that when there has been a perfect partition, although certain properties--a village chaupal, wells, tanks, and such other properties--were left undivided, no right of pre-emption on the ground of common appurtenances existed. The test appears to be whether or not there has been a perfect partition. The formation of separate mahals with separate tauzi numbers is clear indication of such a partition, and I agree that this appeal must be dismissed with costs.
Patna High Court Cites 1 - Cited by 1 - Full Document
1