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Documents citing G.V. Raman And Ors. vs Emperor on 19 February, 1929

Harihar Sinha And Ors. vs Emperor on 9 April, 1936

50. So far as the first of these reasons is concerned it seems to have been over-looked that Section 337 is available for obtaining the evidence of approvers not in all trials but only as regards trials concerning some graver offences. Curiously enough, the same misconception appears to pervade the arguments that were addressed to the Court in Raman v. Emperor 1929 Cal 319 in which the position taken up was that "if Section 494 could serve such a purpose, Section 337 would be redundant." To make these arguments logical, therefore, it will have to be maintained that the legislature never intended that in case of lesser offences, evidence of approvers and accomplices should be ever availed of. That argument would be too bold to deserve consideration; and indeed the referring Judges have nowhere suggested that that should be the position in law. Such a position would be utterly untenable and would find no support whatever in any decision of any Court in this country, so far; while on the other hand any amount of authority may be cited in support of the position that so long as an acomplice is not jointly tried he is a competent witness at the trial of his confederates, whether such accomplice is not to be tried, or is awaiting trial or has been tried and convicted or acquitted or discharged. If Section 494 may not be used for withdrawing a prosecution as against an accused person who is being jointly tried with others, there would be no means left to examine him as a witness against the others in a case in which Section 337 is not applicable. And if it be permissible to examine an accomplice as such witness when he is not to be tried or has been already tried, whatever the result of such trial may have been, there is hardly any reason apparent why by simply putting him forward as a coaccused for a time the prosecution is precluded from using him as such witness. The existence of Section 337 therefore to my mind does not necessarily exclude the idea of Section 494 being used for a similar purpose.
Calcutta High Court Cites 17 - Cited by 11 - Full Document

Rash Behari Shaw (Handa) And Ors. vs Emperor on 10 July, 1936

27. Those observations are relevant to the question whether in the present case there was any conspiracy. The case in the Madras High Court was decided in October 1924. A few months later, namely in December 1924, the same point came before the High Court of Rangoon in V.M. Abdul Rahman v. Emperor 1925 Rang 296, where it was again held that the legality of a joint trial depends on the accusation and not on the result of the trial.
Calcutta High Court Cites 39 - Cited by 20 - Full Document

Abdul Majid And Ors. vs Emperor on 27 March, 1935

8. In Section 494 no such safeguards are provided so far as sub-para. (a) is concerned. That is to say, where the case as in the present instance is withdrawn before a charge has been framed. In such a case the accused is discharged, that is to say he is liable to further prosecution for the same offence, and consequently he gives his evidence well knowing that he may be prosecuted for that offence if he does not give satisfaction to the prosecution at whose instance he has been called as a witness. The position is different under sub-para. (b) where the prosecution is withdrawn after the charge has been framed against the accused. In such a case he must be acquitted and, consequently, can give his evidence without fear of any further prosecution. I am aware that there is one decision of this Court in G.V. Raman v. Emperor, 1929 Cal 319 in which the Court held that the trial Court did not exercise its discretion wrongly in relying on the discretion of the Public Prosecutor against one of the accused, in order that his evidence might be available after his discharge against his co-accused who was being jointly tried with him, and that the procedure laid down in Section 337, Criminal P. C, namely, by tendering an accused person pardon under that section with all the safeguards mentioned therein, is not the only method of obtaining the evidence of a co-accused against another. 8. 337, Criminal P.C., does not control Section 494. The learned Judge who gave the first judgment in that case seems, with all respect, to have missed the point of the objections to the suggested procedure under Section 494, which I have already stated, because he based his decision entirely upon English cases, and text book writers, all of which deal with a position in which proposed witness is no longer in jeopardy-either he has been acquitted or a nolle prosequi has been entered against him by the Crown.
Calcutta High Court Cites 12 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

G.L. Biswas And Ors. vs The State on 8 August, 1950

In G.V. Raman v. Emperor, 57 Cal. 44 : (A. I. R. (16) 1929 Cal. 593 : 30 Cr. L. J. 1107), it was pointed out that when a Magistrate follows the procedure of a warrant case with a view to try the case himself, and the accused exercises his right to reserve cross-examination till after charge, and if in the midst of the trial or immediately after finishing the evidence for the prosecution the Magistrate decides to commit the accused to the Sessions, he is not compelled under Section 347, Criminal P. C., to refuse to allow the accused to cross-examine the witnesses and accused should not lose the right he had reserved before such decision of the Magistrate. The Bombay and the Lahore High Courts also seem to favour the same view.
Patna High Court Cites 26 - Cited by 2 - Full Document

Kerala Transport Co. vs D.S. Soma Shekar And Ors. on 25 September, 1981

Likewise the decision cited by Sri Jagirdar in Raman v. Emperor (AIR 1929 Cal 319 at page 321) : (1930-31 Cri LJ 315 at pp. 317, 318) that an order of discharge of an accused person, many be interfered with at the instance of a third party when such an order has the effect of operating to the detriment of such third person and that he has in such cases a right to apply in revision against such an order, also does not apply to the facts of the case for the same reasons stated above and further, the facts in the said case differ from the facts of the cases on hand.
Karnataka High Court Cites 38 - Cited by 6 - Full Document

Mohima Ranjan Roy And Ors. vs The State on 30 May, 1966

6. We have already indicated the facts that no prayer for de novo trial was made but by the order of the Court as quoted before, a de novo enquiry was directed to be made. In the concluding portion of the judgment his Lordship however said that the learned Magistrate should proceed in accordance with law by following the provisions of Chapter XVIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In any event, this Single Bench decision clearly goes to show that a principle of law has been laid down to the effect that de novo enquiry should be started in cases which are dealt with by the Magistrate under Section 347 of the Code. Now we have to examine whether in view of this Court's decision we are required, in the present Rule to direct the learned Magistrate that his order for cross-examination of the witnesses as passed on 19-1-66 should be set aside and he be directed to embark upon a fresh and de novo enquiry. Mr. Justice Debabrata Mookerjee appears to have followed a Calcutta decision in the case of G.V. Raman v. Emperor . Their Lordships made an observation as follows in that decision:
Calcutta High Court Cites 29 - Cited by 0 - A C Gupta - Full Document

Giribala Dasi vs Mader Gazi And Anr. on 15 June, 1932

18. The legislature not having defined the circumstances under which a withdrawal is permissible, it would not be right to attempt to lay down any hard and fast rule, circumscribing the limits within which a withdrawal may be made. It seems that the Sessions Judge when he recommended the question of withdrawal to the District Magistrate, the Public Prosecutor when he made the application for withdrawal and the District Magistrate in the explanation that he has submitted, have all been of the view that after a commitment to the Court of Session a concurrence of opinion between the Judge and the Public Prosecutor that the prosecution case is a weak one and is not likely to end in a conviction is, by itself, sufficient to justify the Public Prosecutor in making an application for withdrawal and the Judge in according his consent thereto. This however is not the correct view to take of the law. Section 494 has b8en expressed in very general words no doubt, but that is so only because it does not intend to limit the materials on which action may by taken to matters appearing on the record only. My attention has been drawn to the observations of Mitter, J., in the case of C. V. Raman v. Emperor , where he has said:
Calcutta High Court Cites 2 - Cited by 14 - Full Document

Sher Singh vs Jitendranath Sen on 12 May, 1931

It has been pointed out that the terms of Section 494 are very wide, that the Court has been given a discretion and that the test is whether in giving consent the Court had been influenced by circumstances which ought not to have been considered: see the case of G. V. Raman v. Emperor . It has been held in English cases that a nolle prosequi is usually granted where any improper and vexatious attempts are made to oppress the defendant, as by repeatedly preferring defective indictments for the same supposed , offence, or if it is clear that an indictment is not sustainable against the defendant: see Archbold's Criminal Pleadings, 28th Edn, p. 127.
Calcutta High Court Cites 6 - Cited by 5 - Full Document
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