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Documents citing Mohanlal Chunilal Kothari vs Tribhovan Haribhai Tamboli on 2 May, 1962

Eknath Kira Akhadkar And Ors. Etc. vs Administrative Tribunal And Ors. Etc. on 27 January, 1983

In Mohanlal Chunilal Kothari v. Tribhovan haribhai Tambloi , it was held that the Court is bou,d OT apply the law as it finds on the date of its judgment . In the said case, the appellants were landlords and the responcdets tenants in the possession of certain lands situated in the erstwhile State of Baroda before it became part of Bombay. The Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Landa Act was extended to baroada 1-8-1949. The suits had been instituted on the basis that the respondent had notice in March 1950 with effect from the beginning of the new agricultural season in May , 1951. Respondents did not comply with the terms of the notice and continued in Poseidon of the lands, to which they had been inducted and therefore the landlords instituted the suits of for possession. There suits were decreed and second appeal was dismissed. During the ppendeancu of the suit at three appellate sage, a second notifiacation had been issued under S. 88(1), Bombay Tenncacy and Agriculrtual Landas Act, 1948 canceling the first Notification. It was in such background that there Supreme court gave the above ruling. Te right the that appellants had in await case to get apposition of the lands by virtue of the first Notification had been taken away by the second Notification and, therefore, such Notification had necessarily retrospective effect, particularly when it was meant to protect the rights tat some people ahd Bedford the first Notification which rithss had been taken way Bu that same Notification. The factual position before me is completely different , being pertient to not that is not the casde of either party that the of the landlord to seek eviction of the tenant for non-payment of rents had ben taken way. In fact , the case of the petitioners is only that such rights were qualified by the amendment.
Bombay High Court Cites 22 - Cited by 4 - Full Document

Mehta Keshavlal Pragji vs Bhatia Dwarkadas Gokaldas on 16 January, 1969

14. Now it is true, as urged by Mr. Dave, that an appeal is a continuation of the suit or that it can be said to be a re-bearing of the suit by the appellate Court, and that, therefore, whenever any law is made applicable while any such suit or appeal is pending before the Court, that law could govern the matter, and that way with this Act coming into force, the provisions contained therein may be given effect to even at the appellate stage. He also sought support for this proposition from the case of Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry and Ors. , and the case of Mohanlal Chunilal Kothari v. Tribhovan Haribhai Tamboli . But that would depend upon the fact that while applying any such new enactment or law as the case may be, the Court has to see as to whether there has been any other provision contained therein which limits the application thereof to any suits or appeals as the case may be. If it does, as the Legislature is entitled to do, it has to be given effect to. It cannot be ignored by the Court. Even if any anomalous positions were to arise, it would not be for the Courts to solve them if the intention of the Legislature is otherwise clear and unambiguous emerging from the definite provisions of the Act. It was pointed out by Mr. Dave that in appeal if the appellate Court while deciding the appeal set aside a decree for possession passed by the trial Court and remands the suit for retrial, the suit would that way be one which could be called pending before the trial Court and would have to be dealt with under the provisions of the new Act though applied at the stage of the pending appeal which was not to be so governed. Such a position may not be a common affair. It would be a rare position. But what appeared to the Legislature was that suits of the kind referred to in the proviso if pending, must be governed by the new Act provided Part II was applied. But in doing so, it wisely carved out an exception by saying that if once the decrees or orders are passed and that the appeals arise thereform before the coming into operation of the Act, those appeals shall be decided and disposed of as if new Act had not been passed. In other words, they would be dealt with under the law that prevailed at the date when the decrees were passed. That was perfectly a reasonable way of looking at things and the Legislature has rightly and very carefully made the provision to that effect. A finality to the rights of the parties was given if they were. already decided in suits. In our view, therefore, the provisions contained in Section 12(1) have to be considered in the light of the proviso and the Exception therebelow contained in Section 50 of the Act and as provided in the Exception the Act would not apply to the pending appeals and execution proceedings. They are required to be decided and disposed of as if the Act had not been passed.
Gujarat High Court Cites 14 - Cited by 3 - Full Document

Jawaharlal Gulabchand And Anr. vs The Surat Dairy Co. Ltd. And Ors. on 21 February, 1964

In the other appeal in Mohanlal v. Tribhovan also the Supreme Court went into the question whether the land in question was in an exempted area under Section 80(1)(d) holding that the Civil Court would have no jurisdiction to entertain a suit for possession only if the tenant could take advantage of the provisions of the Act. Thus in both these cases the suit in a Civil Court was not held one incompetent and the question of exemption was determined by the Civil Court Finally I come to a decision of the Division Bench of this Court consisting of Miabhoy and Mody JJ. in First Appeal No. 1009 of 1960 decided on 5th February 1963. In that case the question had to be considered whether the person was a tenant or a deemed purchaser on a construction of the various provisions of the Act. In that case a contention was raised by the learned Advocate General that there was nothing either expressly or impliedly in the Tenancy Act which conferred jurisdiction over the revenue authorities to decide the question as to whether the provisions of the Tenancy Act did or did not apply to the suit. Repelling that contention it was observed:
Gujarat High Court Cites 25 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Narayan Gopal Mhatre vs Shankar Sitaram Sontakke on 2 March, 1967

13. Later similar question arose in Mohanlal v. Tribhovan , in relation to Section 88(1)(d) as it then stood which was similar to Section 88(1)(B) after amendment of 1956. The State Government issued a notification under the said section exempting the area in which the lands in dispute were situated. The case was heard by a larger bench of five Judges. In this case also the judgment was delivered by the learned Chief Justice who said that (p. 360) :
Bombay High Court Cites 10 - Cited by 2 - Full Document

Xoc Malik Bepari vs Josefato Francisco Pinto And Ors. on 18 July, 1986

Refiquennessa v. Lal Bahadur Chetri, , Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills v. Subhash Chandra Yograj Sinha, ; Mohanlal Chunilal Kothari v. Tribhovan Haribhai Tamboli, ; Smt. Safali Roy Chowdhary v. A.K. Dutta, ; Ganesh Flour Mills Company Ltd. v. Ramesh Chand, 1979(2) R.C.J. 418 (Delhi) and A. Krishnaswami v. S. Rasheeda, 1981(1) R.C.J. 320 (Madras), and after going through the relevant facts and the Statement of Objects and Reasons for the amendment, held the view that the said amendment to sub-section (2)(a) of section 22 of the Act was merely prospective in nature and not retrospective. The said decision of the Single Judge of this Court was appealed from the Division Bench has, in Letters Patent Appeals Nos.
Bombay High Court Cites 20 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

H.V. Rajan vs C.N. Gopal And Ors. on 9 August, 1974

6. It is not necessary for us to examine what impediments existed from time to time since the filing of the suit by reason of the changes in the Rent Control law, because what we are concerned is whether relief can now be given when that impediment can no longer bar the Court from granting a decree In Mohanlal Chunilal Kothari v. Tribhuvan Haribhai Tamboli has been held that a Court can take into account the present position and mould its relief. Now the only question is whether any relief can be given to the appellant. It is not denied before us, nor was it denied before the High Court, that the lease in favour of the appellant was a demise in presenti, that is Exhibit D is an agreement of lease and not an agreement to lease. Curiously enough though the High Court accepted this position in the earlier stages of its judgment, in the (sic) ??? er part it seems to have overlooked what it had stated earlier and treated (sic) ??? lease as if it was an agreement to lease. On this basis it applied the doctrine illustration as barring any remedy for the enforcement of Exhibit D. It said to para 5 :
Supreme Court of India Cites 7 - Cited by 15 - Full Document
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