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Badhu Jana Mahajan vs Shree Satpanth Sansthan on 28 January, 1947

15. Mr. Desai appearing for the plaintiff has, however, said that he is not keen on having a mortgage executed in favour of his client. He says that he will be content with having a decree passed in his client's favour for the amount claimed by the plaintiff on the promissory note. There is no doubt that the learned Judge did not go into the question whether or not an agreement to execute a mortgage could be specifically enforced because he took the view that the transaction was not for legal necessity. However that may be, Mr. Desai has referred us to a ease reported in Meenakshisundara Mudaliar v. Rathhasami Pillai (1918) I.L.R. 41 Mad. 959, from which it will appear that an agreement to execute a mortgage can be specifically enforced. As, however, he does not claim relief on that basis it is not necessary to consider that question.
Bombay High Court Cites 3 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

C. Sundararaja Pillai vs Sakthi Talkies (Dindigul) Ltd. And Anr. on 6 January, 1966

6. Unfortunately for the first defendant, we are quite unable to find any basis for such a point of view, either in the pleadings, or in the evidence of D.W. 1, the director, who has given evidence on behalf of the first defendant company. All that the evidence of D.W. 1 amounts to, at the highest, is that accounts were not finally looked into, when the suit transaction occurred and that there was some understanding that accounts should be ultimately settled between the parties. There was also a general impression, apparently in the minds of the other directors excluding plaintiff, that the managing agents (plaintiff and second defendant) had mismanaged the affairs, and that some acts of misfeasance could be attributable to the plaintiff. All this is very wide off the mark, when We are considering the existence of any specific evidence based on the Third Proviso to Section 92. As learned Counsel for the appellant points out, the mere execution of a promissory note by a purchaser does not extinguish the statutory vendor's lien available to a seller, and does not estop him from an action on such lien. The relevant authorities were noticed by Kailasam, J., in Dhanikachala Pillai v. Raghava Reddiar , and the learned Judge has cited and followed the earlier decisions of this Court to the same effect in Krishna swami Mudaliar v. Vijayamghava Pillai (1939) 1 M.L.J. 344, Somu Achari v. Singara Achari (1945) 2 M.L.J. 17, as well as in Kampiah Pillai v. T.R. Hari Rao (1910) 21 M.L.J. 849.
Madras High Court Cites 13 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Kamala Industrial Unit, Represented By ... vs State Bank Of India Represented By Its ... on 23 July, 1985

59 and Meenakshisundara Mudaliar alias Thiagaraja Mudaliar v. Rathnasami Pillai I.L.R. 41 Mad. 959. The learned Counsel further pointed out that on the facts and the circumstances of this case, the principle of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked and that the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner are inapplicable. No attempt was made by the Bank to close down the petitioner unit, according to the learned Counsel for the Bank.
Madras High Court Cites 5 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Vedappan Servai And Ors. vs M. Periannan Servai And Ors. on 16 May, 1928

3. Now, are the consequences exactly the same in the case of Section 144? At first sight one may think it is so; but it seems to me that as to Section 144, Clause (3), Section 435 was somewhat redundant and only made matters clear. Even without it, it is doubtful whether Section 435 applies. There is nothing in Section 144 to indicate that the Magistrate acting under that section is a Court as in the case of Section 145. Dr. Swaminathan, appearing for the petitioner, argues that the decision in Natwaja Pillai v. Rangaszuami Pillai (1923) I.L.R 47 M. 56 : 44 M.L.J. 328 purports to follow the Full Bench decision in Sundram v. The Queen (1883) I.L.R. 6 M. 203 (F.B.)
Madras High Court Cites 12 - Cited by 4 - Full Document

Thiruthiyil Unniri Kutti vs Narayana Chettiar And Ors. on 30 April, 1929

1. This second appeal is from a decree of the learned Subordinate Judge allowing respondent 1's (plaintiff's) suit for specific performance of an agreement dated 30th May 1922 between him and respondents 2 and 3 (defendants 1 and 2) whereby the latter agreed to grant the former a lease or kanom of their shop which was and is still in the occupation of the appellant (defendant 3) as a yearly tenant. The District Munsif found all the original defences to the suit on the merits against the defendants but during the trial raised at the request of defendants an additional issue (issue 5) whether plaintiff is entitled in law to specific performance. On this issue he held against the plaintiff on the ground that the bargain was for a kanom which is virtually a mortgage and that the plaintiff lender cannot get specific performance of a contract to borrow. He relied on Meenakshisundaram Mudaliar v. Ratnasami Pillai. The Subordinate Judge confirmed all the findings of fact arrived at by the District Munsif but took the view that the bargain was not one of forcing a loan on respondents 2 and 3 (defendants 1 and 2.) He said:
Madras High Court Cites 3 - Cited by 2 - Full Document
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