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Documents citing Kesaram Narasimhulu And Kesaram ... vs Vuddanda Row Narasimhulu Patnailu on 11 October, 1906

Muvvula Seetharam Naidu vs Doddi Ramu Naidu on 22 October, 1909

1. The question is whether a suit for a village officer's inam land, on the expiry of a lease to the defendant granted by the plaintiff, is cognizable by a Civil Court. The Courts below have decided against the plaintiff. The Subordinate Judge relies on the decision in Kasiram Narasimhulu v. Narasimhulu Patnaidu (1906) I.L.R. 30 M. 126. Far from supporting his view, the observations, in that case, of Miller J., at page 131, are in favour of the plaintiff, and the other learned Judges do not dissent from his remarks. Indeed it may be said that the ratio decidendi of that case supports the appellant's arguments. Both the learned Chief Justice and Justice Miller say that Sections 13 and 21 of Act III of 1895 should be read together. Section 13 confers jurisdiction on the Revenue Courts and defines the class of cases of which a Revenue Court may take cognizance. Section 21 specifics the class of suits of which the Civil Court shall not take cognizance. It is reasonable to hold, notwithstanding the apparent generality of the language of Section 21, that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is taken away in those cases in which it is conferred on the Revenue Court by Section 13. Moreover, it is a general principle of law that every presumption shall be made in favour of the jurisdiction of a Civil Court, and that it shall not be taken away except by express words or by necessary implication. We are, therefore, inclined to hold that the Civil Court has jurisdiction in this case. The express words of Section 13 make it impossible to bring such a suit as the present within them.
Madras High Court Cites 1 - Cited by 11 - Full Document

Kajuluri Viranna Alias Bulli Veeranna ... vs Tillapudi Venkayya And Ors. on 2 October, 1936

We are of opinion that in all cases where it is necessary for the plaintiff to allege for the maintenance of his suit, that the land in suit is an emolument of a service inam, the jurisdiction will remain with the Collector under Section 13 of the Act. This is a principle laid down in the Full Bench Division in Kesiram Narasimhulu v. Narasimhulu Patnaidu (1906) 16 M.L.J. 514 : I.L.R. 30 Mad. 126 (F.B.).
Madras High Court Cites 1 - Cited by 2 - Full Document

Mavoulu Seetharam Naidu vs Doddi Rami Naidu on 22 October, 1909

1. The question is whether a suit for a village officer's inam land on the expiry of a lease to the defendant granted by the plaintiff is cognizable by a Civil Court. The Courts below have decided against the plaintiff. The Subordinate Judge relies on the decision in Kesaram Narasimhulu v. Narasimhulu Patnaidu (sic). Far from supporting his view, the observations in that case of Miller, J., at page 131, are in favour of the plaintiff, and the other learned Judges do not dissent from his remarks. Indeed it may be said that the ratio decidendi of that case supports the appellant's argument. Both the learned Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Miller say that Sections 13 and 21 of Act III of 1895 should be read together. Section 13 confers jurisdiction on the Revenue Court and defines the class of suits oil which a revenue Court may take cognizance. Section 21 specifies the class of suits of which the Civil Court shall not take cognizance. It is reasonable to hold, notwithstanding the apparent generality of the language of Section 21, that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not taken away in those, cases in which it is conferred on the Revenue Court by Section 13. Moreover, it is a general principle of law that every presumption shall be made in favour of the jurisdiction of a Civil Court and that it shall not be taken away except by express, words or by necessary implication. We are, therefore, inclined to hold that the Civil Court has jurisdiction in this case. The express words of Section 13 make it impossible to bring such, a suit as the present within them.
Madras High Court Cites 1 - Cited by 5 - Full Document

The Secretary Of State For India In ... vs Ikkurti Subbarayudu And Ors. on 24 July, 1912

The finding of the lower appellate court which we have upheld is that the lands in question are not emoluments of the office of Karnam. The expression "any claim to recover the emoluments of an office " mean a claim to recover what in effect are the emoluments of an office. It cannot in our opinion by any rule of construction be extended to include a claim to recover what the plaintiff denies to be the emoluments of an office but what the defendant alleges to be such emoluments. The decision of this Court in Kesiram Narasimhulu V. Narasimhulu Patnaidu (1906) I.L.R. 30 M. 126, is strongly relied on by the Government Pleader. But that case is of absolutely no use to him. The learned Chief Justice says there " Eeading the words ' emoluments of any such office' in Section 21 in their ordinary sense they would as it seems to me, apply to a case in which the plaintiff sues to recover lands which he alleges are the emoluments of his office, this being denied by the defendants. The plaintiff's sole ground of action is that the lands sued for are the emoluments of his office and it seems to me the claim is none the less a claim for the emoluments within the meaning of the section because the defendant denied that the lands in question constitute the emoluments." The reason underlying the decision apparently was that the plaintiff admitting that his claim was to the emoluments of an office could not take an advantage of the defendant's plea; in other words the plaintiff is bound by his own statement when the question is whether the suit is for the emoluments of an office.
Madras High Court Cites 4 - Cited by 15 - Full Document

Adusumilli Suryanarayana And Anr. vs Atchuta Potanna And Ors., Battula ... on 9 October, 1913

In Narasimhulu v. Narasimhulu (1906) 16 M.L.J. 333, the principle was recognised with reference to Section 13 (1), (ii) of Act III of 1895 and the preamble to Madras Act VIII of 1869 that inarns are prima facie to be taken as assignments of the Melvaram right only. For the purposes of that Act the above mentioned section contains a special proviso reserving the jurisdiction of Civil Courts over suits for the recovery of the land itself.
Madras High Court Cites 21 - Cited by 13 - Full Document

The Secretary Of State For India In ... vs Srinivasachariar And Ors. on 7 August, 1916

3. The learned Government Pleader's main contention was that the position of an inamdar after enfranchisement approximates to that of a ryotwari tenant, and not to that of the zemindar, and that consequently the holding is subject to the levy of royalties on minerals in the lands. He referred to the well-recognised principle that ordinarily a grant to an inamdar except in cases of waste lands shall be presumed to be that of the melwaram only and not of the land itself [see Narasimhulu v. Narasimhulu 16 M.L.J. 333 ; 1 M.L.T. 102, Rajyi v. Balkrishna Gangadhar 29 B. 415 ; 7 Bom L.R. 439.
Madras High Court Cites 9 - Cited by 13 - Full Document

A. Suryanarayana vs A. Patanna And Eight Ors. on 9 October, 1913

In Narasimhulu v. Narasimhulu (1906) 16 M.L.J., 333, the principle was recognized with reference to Section 13(i), (ii) of Act III of 1895 and the preamble to Madras Act, VIII of 1869 that imams are prima facie to be taken as assignments of the melvaram right only. For the purposes of that Act the above-mentioned section contains a special proviso reserving the jurisdiction of Civil Courts over suits for the recovery of the land itself.
Madras High Court Cites 24 - Cited by 37 - Full Document

Muthu Gowndan vs Perumal Iyen And Ors. on 7 January, 1921

502 not counting the obiter dictum in Narasimhulu v. Narasimhulu (1906) 16 M.L.J. 333 held that the Courts should start with a presumption that the grant was of the melvaram alone and the onus was on the inamdar to. prove that he had both the warams or, therefore, had the right to eject. Their Lordships of the Privy Council held that no such presumption exists. They point out such a presumption was based on the assumption " that the right of the ruler was confined to a right to receive as revenue a share in the produce of the soil from the cultivator" and then say "That is an assumption which no Court is entitled to make, indeed that fact would support the contrary assumption that the soil was vested in the "rulers...." (p. 1019). If the assumption on which any presumption is to be based should be not, that the rulers were owners of a share in the revenue, but that the soil was vested in the rulers, it follows that the presumption as to the extent of the grant should correspondingly change i. e, it is not merely the melwaram but the whole right in the soil, for the ordinary rule in construing grants is, that the grantor grants all that he has and which can therefore be granted. That this is what their Lordships meant is clear from the sentence at P. 1020. " It is not proved, nor is there any evidence to suggest, that at the date of the grant there were any tenants in the village holding lands with any rights of occupancy by custom or otherwise." Who is to prove ? Obviously, the tenants who were the defendants in that case. This sentence, in my opinion, throws the burden of proof on the tenants and indicates one mode in which it can be discharged. Again, at P. 1021, their Lordships say. " But a grant of a village by or on behalf of the Crown under the British rule is in law to be presumed to be subject to such rights of occupancy, if any, as the cultivators at the time of the grant may have had," i.e. may be proved to have had. Who is to prove the right which by subjecting the ownership, sub-tracts from or diminishes it. The person who relies on it, or the tenant.
Madras High Court Cites 14 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Muthu Goundan vs Perumal Iyen And Five Ors. on 7 January, 1921

10. In the above mentioned cases, their Lordships of the Privy Council had to consider Section 3(2)(d) of the Estates Land Act, for the purpose of deciding the question of jurisdiction, viz., whether the suits were rightly laid before the Civil Courts. The inams in those cases were enfranchised whole inam villages and the question whether the grant was of the melvaram alone had to be considered. For some time the Madras High Court had, in a series of cases [all decided after Marapu Tharalu v. Telukula Neelakanta Behara (1907) I.L.R., 30 Mad., 502, not counting the obiter dictum in Narasimhulu v. Narasimhulu (1906) 16 M.L.J., 333] held that the Courts should start with a presumption that the grant was of the melvaram alone and the onus was on the inamdar to prove that he had both the varams, and, therefore, had the right to eject. Their Lordships of the Privy Council held that no such presumption exists. They point out that such a presumption was based on the assumption.
Madras High Court Cites 13 - Cited by 13 - Full Document
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