Fourthly, The law relating to quashing of charges is also explicity
discussed by Apex Court in Inspector General Police versus K.S.
Swaminathan, (1996) 11 SCC 498 wherein the apex court has held
that the charges can be interfered in the judicial review when they
are vague and should not be contrary to the law. The court will not
go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the charges at the time of
examination of charges in a pending enquiry.
11. The next contention, which was raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the charge memo is vague. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dy.Inspector General of Police Vs. K.S.Swaminathan, referred supra has considered the scope of judicial review in examining the correctness of the charge particularly at the time of framing the charges held as follows:-
Similarly, in Dy. Inspector General of Police v. K.S. Swaminathan (supra) cited by Mr. Das the Supreme Court in Paragraph 4 of the judgment, while holding that the Court of the Tribunal could not justified at the time of framing of the charges to go into whether the charges are true, has held that at the stage of framing of the charges, the statement of facts and the charge sheet supplied are required to be looked into by the Court of Tribunal for the purpose of finding out as to whether the statement of facts and materials in support thereof supplied to the delinquent officer disclosed the alleged misconduct.
In Dy. Inspector General of Police v K.S. Swaminathan [(1996) 11 SCC 498], it has been held that judicial review in quashing the charges is limited. The Tribunal or Court has only to see whether statement of facts and material supplied to the delinquent disclose the misconduct alleged.
In Deputy Inspector General of Police v. K.S. Swaminatha, 1996 (11) SCC 498, the Supreme Court set aside an order of the Tribunal when the Tribunal interfered with the charge memo that was vague and held at para 4 explaining the scope of powers of judicial review by the Tribunal as follows:
7. Respondents have controverted these allegations and stated that the very prayer in the application is not legally tenable in view of settled position of law that no court or Tribunal would be justified to go into whether such charges are true for this is a matter for consideration of relevant evidence etc. at the enquiry. Therefore, in view of the ruling of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dy. Inspector General of Police v. K.S. Swaminathan , the Tribunal should reject the present OA. Moreover, the Apex Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan v. B.K. Meena has repeatedly held that stay of disciplinary proceedings by Tribunals cannot be a matter of course because the Inquiry Officer has to conduct an enquiry expeditiously and staying of an enquiry impedes departmental proceedings and is not conducive for effective administration.
14. It is settled in law that correctness of charges at the stage of
framing of charges is beyond the scope of judicial review. The Court has
only to see whether statement of facts and material supplied by the
department to the delinquent discloses any misconduct alleged. See Deputy
Inspector General of Police vs. K.S. Swaminathan (1996) 11 SCC 498.
Similarly the judgment in the case
of Deputy Inspector General of Police v. K.S.Swaminathan (supra) is on
the issue that even if the charge memo is totally vague and does not disclose
any misconduct for which the charges have been framed, it cannot be gone
into at the stage of framing of charges for it would be a matter of evidence
for consideration at the enquiry by the Enquiry Officer.
Thus it may not be appropriate to allow the petitioner to challenge the action of the respondents in closing the proceeding of recording of summary of evidence inasmuch as it would always be open to the petitioner to challenge the same after the completion of the General Court Martial proceedings of any action adverse to him is taken on that basis. Normally, the court should be reluctant to interfere with disciplinary proceedings at an interlocutory stage when the same are still in progress. [Refer: 1. Dy. Inspector General of Police v. K.S. Swaminathan, , 2.