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Hardik Bharatbhai Patel Thro. His Fater ... vs State Of Gujarat & on 18 December, 2015

11 But this progressive and enlightened view taken by the Federal Court   was   overruled   by   the   Judicial   Committee   of   the   Privy   Council   in  King   Emperor v. Sadashiv Narayan. 74. Ind App 89 : (AIR 1947 PC 82). The   Judicial  Committee   held   that  incitement  to  disorder   is   not   an  essential   element of the offence of sedition but it is enough to excite or attempt to   excite feelings of disaffection, that is, ill­will against the Government. They   quoted   with   approval   the   relevant   passage   from   Mr.   Justice   Strachey's   charge to the jury in Bal Gangadhar Tilak's case, (1898) ILR 22 Bom 112   a passage from which we have also quoted earlier, and observed that they   would adopt the language of Mr. Justice Strachey "as exactly expressing   their   view   in   the   present   case.
Gujarat High Court Cites 48 - Cited by 21 - J B Pardiwala - Full Document

Kedar Nath Singh vs State Of Bihar on 20 January, 1962

In this connection it may be recalled that the Federal Court had, in defining sedition in Niharendu Dutt Majumdar v. The King Emperor (2) held that "the acts or words complained of must either incite to disorder or must be such as to satisfy reasonable men that that is their intention or tendency", but the Privy Council overruled that decision and emphatically reaffirmed the view expressed in Tilak's case to the effect that "the offence consisted in exciting or attempting to excite in others certain bad feelings towards the Government and not in exciting or attempting to excite mutiny or rebellion, or any sort of actual disturbance, great or small" -King Emperor v. Sadashiv Narayan Bhalerao. Deletion of the word "sedition" from the draft article 13(2), therefore, shows that criticism of Government exciting disaffection or bad feelings toward it is not to be regarded as a justifying ground for restricting the freedom of expression and of the press, unless it is such as to undermine the security of or tend to overthrow the State. It is also significant that the corresponding 800 Irish formula of "undermining the public order or the authority of the State" (article 40(6)(i) of the Constitution of Fire, 1937) did not apparently find favour with the framers of the Indian Constitution. Thus, very narrow and stringent limits have been set to permissible legislative abridgement of the right of free speech and expression, and this was doubtless due to the realisation that freedom of speech and of the press lay at the foundation of all domocratic organisations, for without free political discussion no public education, so essential for the proper functioning of the processes of popular government, is possible, freedom of such amplitude might involve risks of abuse. But the framers of the Constitution may well have reflected, with Madison who was "the leading spirit in the preparation of the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution"
Supreme Court of India Cites 33 - Cited by 194 - B P Sinha - Full Document

Ram Nandan vs State on 16 May, 1958

In England there is no statutory definition of sedition; its meaning and content have been laid down in many decisions some of which are referred to by the Chief Justice, but these decisions are not relevant, when you have a statutory definition of that which is termed sedition, as we have in the present case.
Allahabad High Court Cites 45 - Cited by 8 - Full Document

In Re: "Saptaha" A Bengali Bi-Weekly ... vs Unknown on 30 August, 1949

But the Judicial Committee in King Emperor v. Sadashiv Narayan Bhalerao, 74 I. A. 89 : (A. I. R. (34) 194T P.C. 82 : 48 Cr. L. J. 791) held that the decision in Niharendu Dutt Majumdar's case : (A. I. R. (29) 1942 F. C. 22 : 43 Cr. L. J. 504) by the Federal Court proceeded on a wrong construction of Section 124A, Penal Code, and of Rule 34 (6) (e), Defence of India Rules and was inconsistent with the ratio decidendi of the Tilak case, and pointed out that there was no material distinction between Rule 34 (6) (e), Defence of India Rules and Section 124A, Penal Code. The Judicial Committee has settled the law and it is not an essential ingredient of the offence that the words or acts complained of must either incite to disorder or must be such as to satisfy reasonable men that that is their tendency or intention.
Calcutta High Court Cites 11 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Sagolsem Indramani Singh And Ors. vs State Of Manipur on 26 May, 1954

Section 124-A, Penal Code, thus clearly shows that sedition does not necessarily involve any crea-ition of disorder. The Privy Council overruled the decision in 'Niharendu's case (N) in 'King Emperor v. Sadashiv Narayan' AIR 1947 PC 82 (O) and it was held that the law laid down in 'Tilak's case (B)' relating sedition was good law; vide also 'Sajani Kanta Das v. State' AIR 1S40 Cal 244 (PB) (Sic); 'Sachin Das v. Emperor' AIR 1936 Cal 524 (P & Q).
Gauhati High Court Cites 31 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Ghulam Sarwar vs State Of Bihar And Ors. on 29 April, 1965

It must be pointed out that the view taken by the Federal Court in Niharendu Dutt Majmundar's case, AIR 1942 FC 22 was disapproved by the Privy Council in Emperor v. Sadashiv Narayan, AIR 1947 PC 82. Delivering the opinion of the Privy Council in that case, Lord Thankerton pointed out that the word "sedition" did not occur either in the body of Section 124A or the relevant rule of the Defence of India Rules, the language of either of which did not justify the view taken by the Federal Court that the acts or words complained of must either incite to disorder or must be such as to satisfy reasonable men that that is their intention or tendency.
Patna High Court Cites 14 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Bharat vs State on 18 April, 2012

In this connection it may be recalled that the Federal Court had, in defining sedition in Niharendu Dutt Majumdar v. King- Emperor8 held that "the acts or words complained of must either incite to disorder or must be such as to satisfy reasonable men that that is their intention or tendency", but the Privy Council overruled that decision and emphatically reaffirmed the view expressed in Tilak case9 to the effect that "the offence consisted in exciting or attempting to excite in others certain bad feelings towards the Government and not in exciting or attempting to excite mutiny or rebellion, or any sort of actual disturbance, great or small"- King-Emperor v. Sadashiv Narayan Bhalerao10. Deletion of the word "sedition" from the draft Article 13(2), therefore, shows that criticism of Government exciting disaffection or bad feelings towards it is not to be regarded as a justifying ground for restricting the freedom of expression and of the press, unless it is such as to undermine the security of or tend to overthrow the State. It is also significant that the corresponding Irish formula of "undermining the public order or the authority of the State" [Article 40(6)(i) of the Constitution of Eire, (1937)] did not apparently find favour with the framers of the Indian Constitution. Thus, very narrow and stringent limits have been set to permissible legislative abridgement of the right of free speech and expression, and this was doubtless due to the reaslisation that freedom of speech and of the press lay at the foundation of all democratic organisations, for without free political discussion no public education, so essential for the proper functioning of the processes of popular Government, is possible. A freedom of such amplitude might involve risks of abuse. But the framers of the Constitution may well have reflected, with Madison who was "the leading spirit in the preparation of the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution", that "it is better to leave a few of its noxious branches to their luxuriant growth, than, by pruning them away, to injure the vigour of those yielding the proper fruits".
Gujarat High Court Cites 47 - Cited by 0 - H Devani - Full Document
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