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Documents citing Rangaswami Naicker vs Chinnammal And Anr. on 23 July, 1963

Chellammal vs Nallammal on 3 March, 1971

31. The Bench decision of this Court reported in Rangaswami Naicker v. Chinnammal , referred to earlier, is binding on. me. Even so, the reason why in the preceding discussion I have referred to the wealth of case-law in which the rule of ejusdem generis was held to govern in the interpretation of Section 14(2) is that this aspect has not been adverted to in some of the decisions dealing with arrangements and allotment of properties in lieu of maintenance. In my view the reason why the Legislature deliberately excluded in Section 14(2) property acquired by a Hindu female, by inheritance, at a partition or in lieu of maintenance, is very significant and affords a conclusive answer to the interpretation of the word "acquired" in Sub-section (2). The Legislature is well aware that in the case of inheritance or partition there is undoubtedly a pre-existing right, "right" with regard to the property as such, and so there can be no question that property acquired by inheritance or partition should not be included under Section 14(2), as it is not a fresh route of title - the idea being that if the Hindu female had already a pre-existing right over the properties in her possession either by inheritance or partition, she should become the absolute owner and Sub-section (2) should leave those cases totally unaffected.
Madras High Court Cites 53 - Cited by 6 - Full Document

L. Bakthavatsalam vs R. Alagiriswamy (Died) on 12 October, 2007

70. ..... It is only when property is acquired by a Hindu female as a new grant for the first time and the instrument, decree, order or award giving the property prescribes the terms on which it is to be held by the Hindu female, namely, as a restricted owner, that sub-section (2) comes into play and excludes the applicability of sub-section (1). The object of sub-section (2), as pointed out by this Court in Badri Pershad's case (supra) while quoting with approval the observations made by the Madras High Court in Rangaswami Naicker v. Chinnammal (AIR 1964 Mad.487), is "only to remove the disability of women imposed by law and not to interfere with contracts, grants or decrees etc. by virtue of which a woman's right was restricted" and, therefore, where property is acquired by a Hindu female under the instrument in virtue of a pre- existing right, such as a right to obtain property on partition or a right to maintenance and under the law as it stood prior to the enactment of the Act, she would have no more than limited interest in the property, a provision in the instrument giving her limited interest in the property would be merely by way of record or recognition of the true legal position and the restriction on her interest being a "disability imposed by law" would be wiped out and her limited interest would be enlarged under sub-section (1)...."
Madras High Court Cites 62 - Cited by 8 - P Jyothimani - Full Document

Sampuran Singh (Deceased) And Ors. vs Labh Singh And Anr. on 7 July, 1976

"Sub-section (2) of Section 14 is more in the nature of a proviso or an exception to Sub-section (1). It can come into operation only if acquisition in any of the methods indicated therein is made for the first time without there being any pre-existing right in the female Hindu who is in possession of the property. The Madras High Court was right in the observations made in Rangaswami Naicker v. Chinnammal, AIR 1964 Mad 387 that Sub-section (2) made it clear that the object of Section 14 was only to remove the disability on women imposed by law and not to interefere with contracts, grants or decrees etc., by virtue of which a woman's right was restricted."
Punjab-Haryana High Court Cites 9 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Unknown vs Chennai Garr Tech Limited

“If Subhrai Bai was entitled to a share in her husband's properties then the suit properties must be held to have been allotted to her in accordance with law. As the law then stood she had only a life interest in the properties taken by her. Therefore the recital in the deed in question that she would have only a life interest in the properties allotted to her share is merely recording the true legal position. Hence it is not possible to conclude that the properties in question were given to her subject to the condition of her enjoying it for her lifetime. Therefore 118/133 http://www.judis.nic.in S.A.No.675 of 2019 the trial court as well as the first appellate court were right in holding that the facts of the case do not fall within Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.” It will be seen from these observations that even though the property was acquired by Subhrai Bai under the instrument of partition, which gave only a limited interest to her in the property, this Court held that the case fell within sub-section (1) and not sub-section (2). The reason obviously was that the property was given to Subhrai Bai in virtue of a pre-existing right inheriting in her and when the instrument of partition provided that she would only have a limited interest in the property, it merely provided for something which even otherwise would have been the legal position under the law as it then stood. It is only when property is acquired by a Hindu female as a new grant for the first time and the instrument, decree, order or award giving the property prescribes the terms on which it is to be held bv the Hindu female, namely, as a restricted owner, that sub-section (2) comes into play and excludes the applicability of sub-section (1). The object of sub-section (2) as pointed out by this Court in Badri Pershad case while quoting with approval the observations made by the Madras High Court in Rangaswami Naicker v. Chinnammal [AIR 1964 Mad 387 : ILR (1964) 1 Mad 570 : 77 Mad LW 9] is “only to remove the disability of women imposed by law and not to interfere with contracts, grants or decrees etc. by virtue of which a woman's right was restricted” and, therefore, where property is acquired by a Hindu female under the instrument in virtue of a pre-existing right, such as a right to obtain property on partition or a right to maintenance and under the law as it stood prior to the enactment of the Act, she would have no more than limited interest in the property, a provision in the instrument giving her limited interest in the property would be merely by way of record or recognition of the true legal position and the restriction on her interest being a “disability imposed by law” 119/133 http://www.judis.nic.in S.A.No.675 of 2019 would be wiped out and her limited interest would be enlarged under sub-section (1). But where property is acquired by a Hindu female under an instrument for the first time without any pre-existing right solely by virtue of the instrument, she must hold it on the terms on which it is given to her and if what is given to her is a restricted estate, it would not be enlarged by reason of sub-section (2). The controversy before us, therefore, boils down to the narrow question whether in the present case the properties were acquired by the appellant under the compromise in virtue of a pre-existing right or they were acquired for the first time as a grant owing its origin to the compromise alone and to nothing else.” (emphasis supplied)
Madras High Court Cites 38 - Cited by 0 - C V Karthikeyan - Full Document

Kamlesh Shukla And Others vs Smt. Annapurna Devi And Anr on 17 February, 2022

17. The object of sub-section (2), as pointed out by Hon'ble the Apex Court in Badri Prasad's case (supra) while quoting with approval the observations made by the Madras High Court in Rangaswami Naicker v. Chinnammal, AIR 1964 Mad 387, is "only to remove the disability of women imposed by law and not to interfere with contracts, grants or decree etc. by virtue of which a woman's right was restricted" and, there- fore, where property is acquired by a Hindu female under the instrument in virtue of a pre-existing right, such as a right to obtain property on partition or a right to maintenance and under the law as it stood prior to the enactment of the Act, she would have no more than limit- ed interest in the property, a provision in the instrument giving her limited interest in the property would be merely by way of record or recognition of the true legal position and the restriction on her interest being a "disability imposed by law" would be wiped out and her limited interest would be enlarged under sub-section (1). But where property is acquired by a Hindu female under an instrument for the first time without any pre-existing right solely by virtue of the instrument, she must hold it on the terms on which it is given to her and if what is given to her is a restricted estate, it would not be enlarged by reason of sub-section (2).
Allahabad High Court Cites 10 - Cited by 0 - S C Sharma - Full Document

Raghunath Sahu And Anr. vs Bhimsen Naik And Anr. on 24 July, 1964

Sub-section (2) therefore refers to instrument under which a person acquires a title for the first time prescribing a limited estate. Similarly, the decree or order of a Civil Court or the award, referred to in Sub-section (2), must refer to cases where for the first time a person acquires a limited estate. If those instruments, decree or order or award prescribe a restricted estate, Sub-section (1) has no application to such cases, and the restricted estate cannot be enlarged into an absolute estate. Authorities are unanimous on this point and no dissenting voice has been brought to our notice--AIR 1962 Cal pp. 438, Lalchand Bhur v. Sm. Sushjia Sundari Dasi, AIR 1962 Cal 623; Rangaswami Naicker v. Chinnammal, 77 Mad LW p: (AIR 1964 Mad 387); Smt. Janak Dulari v. Dist.
Orissa High Court Cites 10 - Cited by 7 - Full Document

Smt. Jaswant Kaur vs Harpal Singh And Ors. on 4 April, 1977

In Sampuran Singh v. Labh Singh, I had said, "The clear object of Section 14(2) as was pointed out in Rangaawami Naicker v. Chinnammal, AIR 1964 Mad 387, was not to interfere with contracts' grants or decree etc. by virtue of wtiich woman's right was restricted though the disability on woman imposed by law was removed by Section 14(1). If a donor expressly gave a life interest in some property to a Hindu female, it was not to be enlarged, into an absolute estate. If similarly a Hindu female entered into a contract restricting the nature of her own interest in property to that of a life interest, it was not to stand enlarged by Section 14(1) of the Act The freedom of the donor to give such interest as he pleased and the freedom of contracting parties to create such interest as they agreed upon was not meant to be encroached upon by Section 14(1). That is the effect of Section 14(2). If as a result of some agreement between the parties, a Hindu female is left with some interest which she already has in the property, namely, a Hindu widow's estate that would stand enlarged into an absolute estate under Section 14(1) of the Act. Section 14(2) would not be applicable to such case. On the other hand, if a Hindu female expressly enters into a contract restricting the interest already possessed by her, the interest so restricted of her own volition or agreement would not get enlarged as & result of Section 14(1). In such a case Section 14(2) alone would be applicable."
Punjab-Haryana High Court Cites 10 - Cited by 13 - Full Document

Seth Badri Prasad vs Srimati Kanso Devi on 26 August, 1969

7. Sub-section (2) of Section 14 is more in the nature of a proviso or an exception to Sub-section (1). It can come into operation only if acquisition in any of the methods indicated therein is made for the first time without there being any pre-existing right in the female Hindu who is in possession of the property. The Madras High Court was right in the observations made in Rangaswami Naicker v. Chinnammal and Anr. that Sub-section (2) made it clear that the object of Section 14 was only to remove the disability on women imposed by law and not to interfere with contracts, grants or decrees etc. by virtue of which a women's right was restricted.
Supreme Court of India Cites 8 - Cited by 38 - Full Document

Badri Pershad vs Smt. Kanso Devi on 26 August, 1969

Sub-section (2) of s. 14 is more in the nature of a proviso or an exception to sub-s. (1 ). It can come into operation only if acquisition in any of the methods indicated therein is made for the first time without there being any preexisting right in the female Hindu who is in possession of the property. The Madras High Court was right in the observations made in Rangaswami Naicker v. Chinnammal & Another(1) that sub-s. (2) made it clear that the object of s. 14 was only to remove the disability on women imposed by law and not to interfere with contracts, grams or decrees etc. by virtue of which a women's right was restricted.
Supreme Court of India Cites 13 - Cited by 87 - A N Grover - Full Document
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