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Documents citing Ishwar Devi Malik And Ors. vs Union Of India Through The Secretary To ... on 19 March, 1968

Prem Devi Pandey And Ors. vs Dayal Singh And Ors. on 28 May, 1976

I fail to understand why the deceased in this case would have lived only 16 years, while the deceased mentioned in Ishwari Devi case should have lived for 20 years. The life expectancy is naturally a matter of I guess-work, but it should not vary from case to case. Statistically, if a person has achieved a certain age he has a greater chance of longer life than say a child of two years. If one is considering the case of a child of two years the average life might be only 45 or even less. But taking the case of a person who is already 42 years, the expectancy of longer life is naturally enhanced. I think, that in all justice, I should accept the same test as was adopted in the Division Bench and and come to the conclusion that the expectancy was at least 20 years. Of course, this expectancy is based on pure averages. The deceased in actual fact might have lived even up to 100 years, or he might have died in quite normal circumstances within a few months. However, if in one case a person aged 40 years is accepted to live till the age of 60, I do not see why a person who is 42 years, should not be expected to live up to 62 years. I am, therefore, of the view that the loss of pacuniary benefit to which the appellants are entitled must be considered on the basis that the deceased would have lived another twenty years.
Delhi High Court Cites 5 - Cited by 10 - Full Document

Rajasthan State Road Transport ... vs Smt. Kistoori Devi And Ors. on 17 October, 1985

The object of introducing these provisions was to provide a speedy remedy for the adjudication of claims relating to accidents involving motor vehicles. We do not think that the legislature intended that a different Law of Tort should be applicable to persons injured in motor as vehicles accidents from those injured in other accidents. We do not think that it was intended by the use of the expression 'compensation' that the persons injured should be entitled to more than damages which they would be entitled under the Law of Tort. The expression 'just' in our view does not have any added significance, as compensation would by itself mean a proper recompense for the injuries. Even without the addition of the word 'just' there can be no doubt that the compensation awarded must be what is considered 'just' by the Court in the circumstances of the case. The learned counsel for the respondent relied upon the decision is Ishwari Devi v. Union of India in which it was observed that the Fatal Accidents Act is a general law providing for compensation to the representatives of a deceased person or to his estate for the loss occasioned by his death as a result of an accident. On the other hand, the Motor Vehicles Act is a special law, which by Sections 110 to 110-F provides for adjudication upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of, or injury to persons, arising out of the use of motor vehicles. The decisions under the Fatal Accidents Act are not directly applicable to a claim made under the Motor Vehicles Act. The Claims Tribunal is empowered to determine the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just. The word 'just' has wider ambit than the word used in Sections i-A and 2 of the Fatal Accidents Act. The Tribunal need not strictly follow and apply the basis of the assessment of compensation indicated in the various decisions under the Fatal Accidents Act or under English Law. It is, however, to be noted, on a perusal of decision, that ultimately compensation was awarded under the head namely, compensation for pecuniary or material loss caused by the death of a person. It was stated that this principle provides a sound and reasonable basis in assessing just compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act.
Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur Cites 41 - Cited by 16 - N M Kasliwal - Full Document

Municipal Corporation Of Delhi vs Kuldip Lal Bhandari And Ors. on 20 April, 1970

The attention of the learned single Judge was not drawn to the deduction of 15 per cent considered just in lshwari Devi v. Union of India, 1968 Scj 141, where a similar question had been considered by the Division Bench of this court, and it was observed that since' the payment was being made immediately in lump-sum, and also because of the uncertainties of life, such as the deceased of the claimants might die before the expiry of the normal span of life, some scaling down of the assessed compensation was called for. A deduction of 15 per cent was considered by that Bench to be fair and just, and which in our opinion also, is so. Making the deduction of Rs. 7,320.00, which is 15 per cent of Rs. 48,804.00 the amount of compensation as assessed above, the net compensation due to the beneficiaries works out to Rs. 41,840.00. which we award to respondents Nos. 1 to 3 against the appellant and respondents Nos. 4 and 5.
Delhi High Court Cites 4 - Cited by 0 - H R Khanna - Full Document

Ku. Champa Banerjee And Anr. vs Chotanagpur Chemicals And Industries ... on 30 July, 1971

In the case of Smt. Tshwar Devi Malik v. Union of India, AIR 1969 Delhi 183, a claim had been made by the heirs of a deceased person who had got squeezed between two buses and sustained injuries resulting in his death. This person was about 40 years of age and earning a monthly income of about Rupees 1700/- per month. Their Lordships I. D. Dua, C. J. and T. V. R. Tatachari, J. considered the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act and the Motor Vehicles Act and held that the various decisions deciding claims under the Motor Vehicles Act (Fatal Accidents Act?) have no direct application to a claim made under the Motor Vehicles Act in view of the difference between the language of Sections 1A and 2 of the Fatal Accidents Act and Section HOB of the Motor Vehicles Act, Their Lordships go on to say:
Patna High Court Cites 24 - Cited by 2 - N L Untwalia - Full Document

K. Narayana Reddiar vs P. Venugopala Reddiar on 16 January, 1975

We do not think that it was intended by the use of the expression 'compensation' that the persons injured should be entitled to more than damages which they would be entitled under the law of tort. The expression 'just' in our view does not have any added significance, as compensation would by itself mean a proper recompense for the injuries. Even without the addition of the word 'just' there can be no doubt that the compensation awarded must be what is considered 'just' by the Court in the circumstances of the case. The learned counsel for the respondent relied upon the decision in Ishwar Devi v. Union of India, in which it was observed that the Fatal Accidents Act is a general law providing for compensation to the representatives of a deceased person or to his estate for the loss occasioned by his death as a result of an accident. On the other hand, the Motor Vehicles Act is a special law which by Sections 110 to 110-F provides for adjudication upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of, or injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles. The decisions under the Fatal Accidents Act are not directly applicable to a claim made under the Motor Vehicles Act. The Claims Tribunal is empowered to determine the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just. The word 'just' has wider ambit than the word used in Sections 1-A and 2 of the Fatal Accidents Act. The Tribunal need not strictly follow and apply the basis of the assessment of compensation indicated in the various decisions under the Fatal Accidents Act or under English law. It is, however, to be noted, on a perusal of detention, that ultimately compensation was awarded under the head namely compensation for pecuniary or material loss caused by the death of a person. It was stated that this principle provides a sound and reasonable basis in assessing just compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act.
Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana) Cites 8 - Cited by 17 - Full Document

Amarjit Kaur And Ors. vs Vanguard Insurance Co. Ltd. And Ors. on 1 April, 1969

(7) In Ishwari Devi v. Union of India, a Division Bench of this Court observed in paragraph 39 that Section 110 to 110-F of the Act being a special law enacted in 1956 were self-contained and the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 were nto applicable in terms to an application made under Section 110-A of the Act. The Division Bench, however, did nto say that Sections 110-A to 110-F, of the Act enacted any new principle for the determination either of the liability or of the quantum of compensation and that they were self-contained in these respects. On the contrary, they held on agreement of the learned counsels for both the sides in paragraph 41 that the principles underlying Section 1 of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 were applicable to the determination of the compensation for death caused by a motor vehicle. The conclusion of the Division Bench is not, thus, really different from the one reached by me above.
Delhi High Court Cites 14 - Cited by 25 - Full Document

Amarjit Insurance Co. Ltd. And Ors. vs Vanguard Insurance Co. Ltd. And Ors. on 12 May, 1981

(19) In Ishwari Devi and others v. Union of India and others, 1968 A.CJ. 141(10), a Bench of this Court negatived the contention that the benefit arising out of life insurance should be deducted vis-a-vis the five applicants, other than the wife. on the ground that it was not known whether it was life insurance simplicitor or whether the deceased was insured for accidents also, whether the insurer nominated any particular individual, and whether the amount was duly claimed and collected by any of all of the applicants. Why the deduction was allowed from the claim of the wife is not commented upon except that one may read the rule that pecuniary advantages and disadvantages from the accidental death have to be weighed and assessed.
Delhi High Court Cites 14 - Cited by 0 - S Ranganathan - Full Document

Sqn. Ldr. D.D. Upadhayay And Ors. vs U.P. State R.T.C. And Anr. on 27 January, 1992

The principle propounded in the case of Smt. Ishwari Devi Malik (supra) did not arise for consideration as to the powers of a Claims Tribunal or Court considering the compensation under Motor Vehicles Act, being wider in so far as heads of damages are concerned than those covered by Sections 1A and 2 of the Fatal Accidents Act. The earlier decision for this reason does not seem to have been referred to before the latter Bench because they were considering an entirely different question.
Delhi High Court Cites 15 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

D.D. Upadhayaya And Ors. vs Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport ... on 27 January, 1992

(23) I am fortified, in the view I am taking, by a Division Bench judgment of this Court , Smt. Ishwari Devi Malik and others v. Union of India through the Secretary to the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi and others, where it was held that : "THE Fatal Accidents Act is a general law providing for compensation to the representatives of a deceased person or to his estate for the loss occasioned by his death as a result of an accident. On the other hand, the Motor Vehicles Act is a special law which, by section 110 to 110-F provides for adjudication upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of, or injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles."
Delhi High Court Cites 14 - Cited by 7 - Full Document
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