Mulji Tribhovan Sevak vs The Dakor Municipality on 18 November, 1921
11. It is contended by Mr. Thakor for the appellant that there is such an inconsistency. His contention is that, in as much as this power had been delegated to the Public Works Committee, it was the mouthpiece of the Municipality, and an order by it giving permission under Sub-section (2) of Section 96 amounted to an order by the Municipality, which having been once given could not be revoked, in accordance with the decision of this Court in the three cases mentioned in the referring judgments. So far as those cases go, it is clear that Section 36 was not considered in connection with the point there decided and there is no reason to suppose that the provisions of that section had been brought to the notice of the learned Judges who gave those rulings. This is confirmed by the fact that in the first of these cases, Emperor v. Kareem Ranjan (1916) 19 Bom. L.R. 65 Batchelor J. in giving the judgment of the Court expressly guarded himself by saying: "If, however, words clearly importing such a power of subsequently overriding the permission were discoverable in the Statute, there would be no alternative but to give effect to them. No such words are, however, discoverable."