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Documents citing Kashinathsa Yamosa Kabadi, Etc vs Narsingsa Bhaskarsa Kabadi, Etc on 10 February, 1961

Natvarlal Maganlal Amin (Deed. Through ... vs Amin Thakorbhai Maganbhai on 12 February, 1985

The High Court held that it was a finding of fact by the Court below on full consideration of the evidence that the properties were divided by metes and bounds by the arbitrator and the parties were in possession of their respective properties allotted to them, and then after referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in Kashinathsa v. Narsingsa (supra) held that the ratio of the decision of that case fully applied to the case before the Orissa High Court, It thus appears from the facts of the case before the Orissa High Court that the suit was filed in respect of the very same properties which were actually divided by metes and separate possession was handed over to the respective parties to whom the respective properties were allotted and in that view of the matter, held that the suit was not barred. This decision of the Orissa High Court is thus not of any assistance to the plaintiff in the present case. It is true that the parties in the present case also have acted upon a part of the award by the defendant executing the sale-deed. Ex. 144 in favour of the wife of the plaintiff, but we are not concerned with that part of the award. We are concerned with that part of the award which has not been acted upon and it cannot be said that the suit is maintainable simply because the remaining part of the award is acted upon. I fail to understand how this decision of the Orissa High Court could have been pressed into service by the learned trial Judge.
Gujarat High Court Cites 8 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

John vs Elikutty on 8 April, 2009

In the decision reported in Kashinathsa v. Narsingsa, AIR 1961 SC 1077, the award of the court was accepted by the parties and subsequently ignoring such acceptance, a suit was instituted by one of the parties. Defence was set up on the basis of such acceptance. An award was passed by the Arbitrators regarding division of properties. In the circumstances, it was held that the award passed by the Arbitrators was not required to be registered under Section 17 of the Registration Act and that the partition thus effected based on the award dividing the family properties between the members of the family are binding on the parties.
Kerala High Court Cites 15 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Kailashpati Singhania And Ors. vs Ram Gopal Gupta And Ors. on 25 August, 1972

The above observations aptly apply to the instant case. As will be later shown, the award and the decree based on the award were both essentially declaratory in nature. Besides, in the instant case also, the rights and liabilities of the parties under the award and the decree both were only contingent. That is to say, nobody could claim ex facie on the basis of cither of them that any amount was due to or by any party. It could only be determined or found out when certain acts were performed and certain events took place. Sri Jagdish Swarup, learned counsel for the appellants, in support of his contention that Section 32 of the Arbitration Act was not applicable to the case also relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Kashinathsa Yamosa v. Narasingsa Bhaskarsa, AIR 1961 SC 1077. On the basis of this decision, it was urged that the suit essentially was based on events which had taken place subsequent to the award in question and that, therefore, Section 32 would not be applicable. In the Supreme Court case, the question was whether a certain plea taken by the defendant was barred by Section 32 and dealing with this question it was observed that where an award made in arbitration out of the court is accepted by the parties and is acted upon voluntarily and a suit is thereafter sought to be filed by one of the parties ignoring the acts done in pursuance of the acceptance of the award, the defence that the suit is not maintainable is not founded on the plea that there is an award which bars the suit but that the parties have by mutual agreement settled the dispute, and that the agreement and the subsequent follow up acts of the parties are binding. It was further observed that by setting up a defence in the case that there has been a division of the property and the parties have entered into possession of the properties allotted, the defendant No. 1 was not seeking to obtain a decision upon the existence, effect or validity of an award. He is merely seeking to set up a plea that the property was divided by the consent of parties. Such a plea is not precluded by anything contained in the Arbitration Act.
Allahabad High Court Cites 14 - Cited by 3 - Full Document

Commissioner Of Income-Tax vs Ghanshyam Das Laxmi Narain on 26 November, 1973

Such a construction on the statement in the award is amply supported by the recitals of the partition deed. The recital in the first paragraph of the preamble was undoubtedly incorrect. The joint Hindu family had come to an end surely from the date of the award--January 1, 1961--if not from December 23, 1960, the date of the arbitration agreement. To be more accurate, the Supreme Court has said in Kashinathsa Yamosa Kabadi v. Narsingsa Bhaskarsa Kabadi, (1) A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1077 that the disruption of the family is from the date of the arbitration agreement. But here whether the date of the disruption of family is December 23, 1960, or January 1, 1961, is not material. What is to be emphasised is that on the day the deed of partition was executed, the parties to the deed could not say that on that day they were members of a joint Mitakshara trading family as recited in paragraph 1 of the preamble. But, apart from that inaccurate statement, the repeated recitals in the preamble and in the subsequent paragraphs which have been extracted above leave no room for doubt that the parties to the deed were giving effect to the partition of the properties by metes and bounds by means of the deed. There is no recital in the whole of the deed to show that the partition of the properties as mentioned in the award had been given effect to by the parties by their agreement on and from January 1, 1961, and to make it a pucca partition in the eye of law they were executing a formal registered deed of partition. Rather, the recitals clearly show that partition was being effected in accordance with the award by the deed. Recitals also show that the properties allotted by the deed will be the properties of the parties. As against such clear recitals in the various paragraphs of the preamble of the deed and the deed, the recital in paragraph 9 is of no avail. Parties could very well agree with respect to the rented houses that they would be entitled to realise the arrears of rent from 1st January, 1961, in respect of the properties allotted to them. But, then, in that very paragraph the right to such arrears of rent by parties other than the one to whom the property was allotted has been assigned by the deed by the use of the expression "hereby assigns". On a careful consideration of the matter, therefore, I have no doubt that on the written materials produced by the assessee in the shape of the award and the deed of partition it could not be held that partition by metes and bounds, as a matter of fact, had been effected on and from January 1, 1961; rather, the recitals indicate that the partition was being effected from February 2, 1962.
Patna High Court Cites 11 - Cited by 43 - Full Document

Kehar Dass vs Tarak Singh And Anr. on 22 February, 1977

10. The learned counsel for the appellant further pointed out that in Kashinathsa Yamasa Kabadi v. Narsingsa Bhaskarsa Kabadi, AIR 1961 SC 1077, no considered opinion was given on the question in dispute and it was observed that "where an award made in arbitration out of Court is accepted by the parties and it is acted upon voluntarily and a suit is thereafter sought to be filed by one of the parties ignoring the acts done in pursuance of the acceptance of the award, the defence that the suit is not maintainable is not founded on the plea that there is an award which bars the suit but that the parties have by mutual agreement settled the dispute, and that the agreement and the subsequent actings of the parties are binding. By setting up a defence in the present casa that there has been a division of the property and the parties have entered into possession of the properties allotted, defendant No. 1 is not seeking to obtain a decision upon the existence, effect or validity of an award. He is merely seeking to set up a plea that the property was divided by consent of parties Such a plea is in our judgment not precluded by anything contained in the Arbitration Act,"
Punjab-Haryana High Court Cites 21 - Cited by 1 - Full Document
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