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Govind Ramchandra Deo vs Smt. Ramabai Vasudeo Pandit And Ors. on 7 January, 1993

In tune with the above noted view of this Court, it was held by the Delhi High Court in Hem Chand Baid's case (supra) while constructing the provisions of Clause (h) of section 14(1) proviso, of the Delhi Rent Control Act which is similar to Clause (1) of section 13(1) of the Bombay Rent Act, that once a tenant loses protection of the Act by committing default contemplated by Clause (h) and the protection under the Act is not revived subsequently in any situation. Although coming into possession of another premises by a tenant was regarded as a default and although it was sought to be argued before us by Mr. Phadkar that an allotment of suitable residence may not be capable of being described as default, it is unnecessary to go into that question. Suffice it to say that the view taken by the Delhi High Court in the aforesaid decision was similar as was taken by this Court earlier
Bombay High Court Cites 9 - Cited by 2 - Full Document

Sh. Virender Bhasin vs Sh. Vinod Choudhary on 26 June, 2020

This view was taken for the first time by the Division Bench of Delhi High Court in Hem Chand Baid vs. Smt. Prem Wati Parekh, AIR 1980 Delhi 1, wherein it was observed that subsequent disposal of their residence would not efface the fact it had been once acquired and thus gave cause of action to the landlord for filing eviction petition. It cannot be open to the wrongful doer to himself put the aggrieved party out of Court by subsequently changing the situation unilaterally.
Delhi District Court Cites 18 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

In Re vs Shri V. P. Yadav on 8 December, 2021

Another proposition of law which should be borne in mind while deciding the present appeal is that once a default is committed by a tenant i.e. one builds, acquires or allotted a residence, he ceases to enjoy the protection of law permanently and at no point of time and under no circumstance, the protection of law is revived, for which, reference can be had to decision in Hem Chand RCT No.10/2020 Rakesh Jain vs. V. P. Yadav & Ors. Page 9 of 14 Baid vs. Premwati Parekh, 1979 (2) RCR 328, which proposition of law was upheld in the cited case relied upon by the Ld. ARC titled Ganpat Ram Sharma & Ors. vs. Smt. Gayatri Devi (supra).
Delhi District Court Cites 12 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Ganpat Ram vs Gayatri Devi on 28 August, 1980

(7) Under clauses (h) if once default is committed by the tenant he disentitles himself to protection under the Act. If once residence is allotted to him, he is not entitled to any protection (See : Hem Chand Bail Vs. Smt. Prem Wati Parekh, 1979 (2) T.C.R. 328 and Battoo Mal Vs. Rameshwar Nath, 1970 R.C.R. 532) under this clause when once any of the grounds is available to the landlord and the tenant either alienate the building after constructing it or surrenders the possession of the premises after acquiring the possession thereof or surrenders the residential premises alleted to him, he ceases to have protection under the Rent Control Art. in the present case there is unrebutted evidence that the quarter was allotted to him. There is further evidence that possession was delivered to him. It was not at all necessary to prove that after allotment possession was delivered to him. As soon as the allotment of residence is proved in favor of Ganpat Rain he disentitles himself to protection under the R.ent Act.
Delhi High Court Cites 13 - Cited by 2 - Full Document

Smt. Mohini Badhwar vs Raghunandan Saran Ashok Saran on 27 April, 1989

The Assistant Rent Controller, Delhi, and the Rent Control Tribunal concurrently held that the appellant was owner of house D-196, Defence Colony, New Delhi, that on 20 November, 1973 the previous tenant had vacated the premises and handed over vacant possession and that thereafter she had sold it to one Smt. Leela Wati 750 on 24 November, 1973. It was observed that during the period 20 November, 1973 to 24 November, 1973 it must be taken that she was in possession of alternative accommodation. It was also held concurrently that even though on the date the petition for eviction was filed, the house, D-196, Defence Colony, New Delhi, was no longer in the occupation of the appellant it was sufficient for the purpose of s. 14(1)(h) that some time prior to the filing of the eviction petition the appellant had obtained possession of the house. The High Court endorsed the view taken by it earlier in Hem Chand Baid v. Smt. Prem Wati Parekh., AIR 1980 Delhi 1 and in the view that the ground for ejectment had been made out when the eviction petition was filed it dismissed the appeal. In this appeal it is urged on behalf of the appellant that before the earlier tenant of tile appellant had vacated the house the appellant had already entered into an agree- ment to sell the house to another person, and that therefore in the presence of that obligation it was not possible to say that when the house was vacated the appellant was enti- tled to enter into and to continue in possession of the house. It is contended before us that before the original tenant vacated the house there was an oral agreement between the appellant and Smt. Leela Wati to sell the house to Smt. Leela Wati and that the agreement was only formalized in a written document on 24 November, 1973. It is urged that when the original tenant vacated the house on 20 November, 1973 the appellant was under a legal obligation to sell the house to Smt. Leela Wati, and that in the circumstances, the house cannot be said to constitute alternative accommodation for the purpose of s. 14(1)(h) of the Act. The Rent Control Tribunal has found against the existence of any such oral agreement. Upon that it would seem that it was only after obtaining possession on 20 November, 1973 from the original tenant, that is, four days later, that the appellant execut- ed an agreement for sale with Smt. Leela Wati. It is appar- ent that on 20 November, 1973 the appellant came into the house belonging to her and it was available to her for her occupation. The circumstances that she lost possession on the date when the eviction petition was filed does not protect the appellant against s. 14(1)(h) of the Act. In the result, the appeal fails .and is dismissed but there is no order as to costs.
Supreme Court of India Cites 3 - Cited by 16 - R S Pathak - Full Document
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