In the case of Municipal Council, .Palai v. T.I. Joseph (supra) the question was whether provisions relating to construction of public halting places, etc. and levy of fees for the use of the sam contained in Travancore District Municipalites Act, 1941 which was a special statute was repugnant to Section 72 of the Travancore Cochin Motor Vehicles Act, 1950 which was a general statute and was enacted later in point of time. Upon consideration of the provisions of the said earlier enacted special legislature and the later enacted general law, the Supreme Court reached the conclusion that the provisions of Section 72 of the Travancore Cochin Motor Vehicles Act was not intended to replace the provisions of Travancore District Municipalities Act. The intention of the legislature appeared to be to allow both sets of provisions to co-exist because both were enabling ones. But the Supreme Court was also careful enough to add that although an implied repeal was not intended provisions of Section 72 of the Travancore Cochin Motor Vehicles Act represented the latest will of the legislature and will have overriding effect on the earlier provision in the sense that despite the fact that some action had been taken by Municipal Council by resorting to the earlier provision, the appropriate authority may nevertheless take action under Section 72
of the Travancore Cochin Motor Vehicles Act, the result of which would be to override the action taken by the Municipal Council under Section 287 of the District Municipalities Act. In the case before the Supreme Court it was noted that no action so far had been taken by the Government under Section 72 of the Motor Vehicles Act In the instant case before us, Section 20 of the Code was part of the general law of procedure enacted earlier in point of time. Section 80 inserted by Act 39 of 1961 in the Railways Act, was a subsequently enacted special provision relating to certain classes of suits and we have already indicated our reasons for holding that it should be inferred that the legislature thereby intended to make general provisions relating to territorial jurisdiction of courts inapplicable to su its for compensation against the Railways.
WP-2813-17 with WPL-2032-17 & WP 2684-17.sxw
It could thus be clearly seen that Their Lordships of the Apex Court
have clearly held that there can be no fixing of a rigid fee structure by
the Government. It has been held that the decision on the fees to be
charged must necessarily be left to the private educational institutions
that do not seek and which are not dependent upon any funds from
the Government. Each institute will be entitled to have its own fee
structure. The fee structure for each institute must be fixed keeping in
mind the infrastructure and facilities available, the investments made,
salaries paid to the teachers and staff, future plans for expansion
and/or betterment of the institution etc. However, Their Lordships
have held that there can be no profiteering and capitation fees cannot
be charged. It has been directed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that in
order to give effect to the judgment in T.M.A. Pai Case 1 the respective
State Government/concerned authority shall set up, in each State, a
committee headed by a retired High Court Judge who shall be
nominated by the Chief Justice of that State. The judgment also
provides as to who shall be other members of the Committee.
WP-2813-17 with WPL-2032-17 & WP 2684-17.sxw
It could thus be clearly seen that Their Lordships of the Apex Court
have clearly held that there can be no fixing of a rigid fee structure by
the Government. It has been held that the decision on the fees to be
charged must necessarily be left to the private educational institutions
that do not seek and which are not dependent upon any funds from
the Government. Each institute will be entitled to have its own fee
structure. The fee structure for each institute must be fixed keeping in
mind the infrastructure and facilities available, the investments made,
salaries paid to the teachers and staff, future plans for expansion
and/or betterment of the institution etc. However, Their Lordships
have held that there can be no profiteering and capitation fees cannot
be charged. It has been directed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that in
order to give effect to the judgment in T.M.A. Pai Case 1 the respective
State Government/concerned authority shall set up, in each State, a
committee headed by a retired High Court Judge who shall be
nominated by the Chief Justice of that State. The judgment also
provides as to who shall be other members of the Committee.
WP-2813-17 with WPL-2032-17 & WP 2684-17.sxw
It could thus be clearly seen that Their Lordships of the Apex Court
have clearly held that there can be no fixing of a rigid fee structure by
the Government. It has been held that the decision on the fees to be
charged must necessarily be left to the private educational institutions
that do not seek and which are not dependent upon any funds from
the Government. Each institute will be entitled to have its own fee
structure. The fee structure for each institute must be fixed keeping in
mind the infrastructure and facilities available, the investments made,
salaries paid to the teachers and staff, future plans for expansion
and/or betterment of the institution etc. However, Their Lordships
have held that there can be no profiteering and capitation fees cannot
be charged. It has been directed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that in
order to give effect to the judgment in T.M.A. Pai Case 1 the respective
State Government/concerned authority shall set up, in each State, a
committee headed by a retired High Court Judge who shall be
nominated by the Chief Justice of that State. The judgment also
provides as to who shall be other members of the Committee.
29] As observed by the Supreme Court in case of Municipal
Council, Palai Vs. T.J. Joseph (supra), the test applied for
determining repugnancy under Article 254 of the Constitution of
India, may be applied for solving the question of implied repeal.
[See, AIR 1963 SC 1561 (Municipal Council,
Palai vs. P.J.Joseph) and (1997) 1 SCC 450 (Cantonment Board, Mhow
[30]
WP-4021-2019 & connected WPs
vs. M.P.State Road Transport Corporation). Justice G.P.Singh in
Principles of Statutory Interpretation (12th Edition), page 681, opined as
under :-
In Municipal Council, Palai through the
Commissioner of Municipal Council, Palai v.
T.J.Joseph (AIR 1963 SC 1561), it has been stated that
what has to be seen is "1) Whether there is direct conflict
between the two provisions; 2) Whether the Legislature
intended to lay down an exhaustive code in respect of the
subject matter replacing the earlier law; 3) Whether two
laws occupy the same filed". While applying these tests,
-: 154 :-
the Court is in effect trying to find out the intention of the
Legislature by examining the scope and object of the two
enactments by a comparison of the provisions. That is
exactly what has been done by us in this case.