Surajdeo vs Board Of Revenue, U.P., Allahabad And ... on 25 August, 1981
In AIR 1957 All 820 Laraiti Devi v. Sia Ram it has been observed as below vide paragraph 8:--
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Laraiti Devi vs Sia Ram on 22 March, 1957
Munnu Lal S/O Hori Lal vs Addl. Commissioner, ... on 24 May, 2005
12. From the record it is clearly borne out that the order dated 7.5.2003 was passed ex parte, without impleaded Gram Panchayat or Land Management Committee. In these circumstances an application in order to protect interest of Village community was rightly moved to recall order dated 7.5.2003 by a member of the Gram Pradhan and the authority below rightly recalled that order. This Court in 1982 (8) A.L.R 23 Surajdeo v. Board of Revenue while relying upon various other decisions AIR 1957 ALL 820 Laraiti Devi v. Sita Ram, 1959 A.L.J. 818 Uttar Pradesh State v. Sheo Saran Agrawal, 1974 RD 298 Sukhdeo v. Jagdhari, 1976 A L.R. 216 Lalji Tandon v. Union of India and Ors., A.I.R. 1969 Mad.
Putto Lal vs His Highness Maharaja Dhiraj ... on 29 August, 1962
20. The Allahabad High Court has consistently taken the view that the word "lawful" in Order 23, Rule 3 does not mean binding or enforceable and refer to agreements which on their very terms or by their nature are not unlawful and that that word includes agreements which are merely voidable at the option of one of the parties thereto be cause they have been brought about by undue influence, coercion or fraud, and, therefore, the party alleging fraud or undue influence or coercion cannot be allowed to avoid the compromise admitted or proved to have been executed by it in proceedings started by an application under Order 23, Rule 3. See Qadri Jahan Begam v. Fazal Ahmed, AIR 1928 All 494, AIR 1935 All 137 (Supra) and Laraiti Devi v. Sita Ram, AIR 1957 All 820.
Manohar Lal And Anr. vs Surjan Singh And Anr. on 3 May, 1983
Indeed it was held in Mt. Shah Jahan Begam v. Ghulam Rabani, AIR 1935 All 738 that even an omission to record such satisfaction or agreement or compromise does not affect the merits of the case and is curable under Section 99, C.P.C. A Division Bench in Laraiti Devi v. Sia Ram, AIR 1957 All 820 has also observed that O. 23 R. 3 only required that agreement, compromise or satisfaction should be recorded, but it did not law down how it was to be recorded and where it was directed that compromise should form part of the decree, it was held to be sufficient compliance with R. 3.
Munnoottam Kuzhiyil Vayaloli Balan ... vs Thekkedath Sankara Kurup on 9 August, 2011
14. Reference can be made to Laraiti Devi Vs. Sia Ram
(AIR 1957 All 820 (paragraphs 9 and 10)) where, referring to
Rule 3 of Order XXIII of the Code, it is said that Rule 3 only said
that the compromise or adjustment should be ordered to be
recorded and that it does not lay down how it is to be recorded.
Where the order clearly provides that the compromise should
form part of the decree, it is certainly one of the ways in which
the compromise could be recorded.
Munnoottam Kuzhiyil Vayaloli Balan ... vs Thekkedath Sankara Kurup on 9 August, 2011
14. Reference can be made to Laraiti Devi Vs. Sia Ram
(AIR 1957 All 820 (paragraphs 9 and 10)) where, referring to
Rule 3 of Order XXIII of the Code, it is said that Rule 3 only said
that the compromise or adjustment should be ordered to be
recorded and that it does not lay down how it is to be recorded.
Where the order clearly provides that the compromise should
form part of the decree, it is certainly one of the ways in which
the compromise could be recorded.
Sm. Sumitra Devi Agarwalla vs Sm. Sulekha Kundu And Anr. on 24 February, 1976
9. It is clear from Order 23, Rule 3 that before the Court considers whether, or not an agreement is lawful, it must be satisfied that there has been an agreement between the parties. An agreement is brought into existence where one party makes an offer and another accepts the same. It is the consensus of minds of two persons in regard to certain matter. Of these two persons if one has not agreed to the term proposed by the other, there is no agreement between them. When the consent of one to the term is obtained by the other by some illegal means, namely, by fraud, coercion or undue influence, it is difficult to hold that the person whose consent has been so obtained has agreed to the term. In two decisions in Mst. Shujarat v. Moharnmad Raza, and Laraiti Devi v. Sia Ram, , the Allahabad High Court has laid down that the Court should be satisfied that the agreement pleaded by any party has in fact been reached. At the same time it has also been laid down that it is not open to a party to avoid the compromise admittedly entered into by it, in proceedings under Order 23, Rule 3 by alleging fraud and that, if the compromise was in fact arrived at, the additional question whether it was avoidable at the instance of one of the parties on grounds similar to fraud or misrepresentation is
foreign to the proceedings under Order 23, Rule 3 and cannot be considered in those proceedings. It is not easy to follow how a Court can come to a finding that the agreement has been reached between the parties without considering the allegation of fraud, coercion or undue influence made by one of them. Is it that the satisfaction of the Court is confined only to the proof of the signatures of the parties on the document containing the terms? Even in spite of the fact that the signature of a party or his consent to the agreement has been obtained by the other party by some illegal means, namely, by fraud, undue influence or coercion, would the Court be able to hold that there is an agreement? With respect, we are unable to understand the principle of law laid down in those two decisions. It has been already observed that if the consent of one party is obtained by fraud, undue influence or coercion, it cannot be said that he has agreed to the term to which his consent has been so obtained and consequently the Court has to come to the finding that there is no agreement. If it is required under Order 23, Rule 3 that the Court has to be satisfied as to whether an agreement has in fact been reached as held by the Allahabad High Court in the above two decisions, we are of the opinion that an enquiry by the Court for such satisfaction will include also an enquiry into the allegation of a party that his consent to the terms of the agreement has been procured by fraud, undue influence or coercion. It is true that fraud, undue influence or coercion makes a contract a avoidable one and not void. But as soon as a party complains about the practice upon him of fraud, undue influence or coercion by another party, he avoids the contract. If the party complains to Court that his signature to a document containing the terms has been obtained by the other party at the point of a revolver, would the Court refuse to make an enquiry into the same on the ground that the agreement is only avoidable and not void? With due respect, we are unable to subscribe to such a bold proposition and, in our opinion, to consider whether or not an agreement has been reached between the parties, the Court will of necessity embark upon an enquiry as to the allegation of a party that his consent to the "agreement or his signature on the document containing the terms, has been obtained by fraud, undue influence or coercion. It is true that the party complaining has his remedy by way of suit
He can obtain a declaration that the con-tract is vitiated by fraud, undue influence or coercion and, as such, is not binding upon him. In our opinion, to drive such a party to a separate suit will be against justice, equity and good conscience.
Wassan Singh And Ors. vs Lakha Singh And Anr. on 1 March, 2005
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