17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of Benga Behera and another vs. Braja Kishore Nanda and others (Supra), has held that the requirement of the proof of execution of a will is the same as in the case of certain other documents, for example Gift or Mortgage and at least one attesting witness has to be examined to prove execution and attestation of the will and it is to be proved that the executant had signed and/or given his thumb impression in presence of at least two attesting witnesses and the attesting witnesses had put their signatures in presence of the executant. It has further been held that existence of suspicious circumstances itself may be held to be sufficient to arrive at a conclusion that the execution of the will has not duly been proved.
20. Learned Counsel also cited the case of Benga Behera & Anr. v.
Braja Kishore Nanada & Ors., reported at (2007) 9 SCC 728. With great
respect, this case goes against the plaintiff. I will revert to this case later in
this judgment.
41. The Court granting letters of administration with a copy of
the will annexed or probate must satisfy itself not only about the
genuineness of the will but also satisfy itself that it is not fraught
with any suspicious circumstances." (Emphasis supplied)
Mr. Jai Prakash, the learned senior counsel for the respondents
submits that in view of Section 52 and 58 of the Registration Act, 1908,
the only duty cast upon the registering authority is to endorse the
admission or execution by the person who presented the document for
registration. The compliance with that provision leads to the legal
presumption that the document was registered and nothing else. If an
authority in performance of his statutory duty signs a document, he does
not become an attesting witness within the meaning of Section 3 of the
Transfer of Properties Act and Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act,
1925 as the word 'attest' is to bear witness to a fact. It is then submitted
that the essential condition of valid attestation are that two or more
witnesses have seen the executant signed the instrument and each of
11 M.A. No. 272 of 2009
them have signed the instrument in presence of the executants animo
attestandi and the same is the necessary ingredient of proving the
attestation. It is next submitted by Mr. Jai Prakash that in the case of
Benga Behera and Another vs. Braja Kishore Nanda and Others
(supra), it has also been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India that
the court granting Letters of Administration with a copy of the Will
annexed or probate must satisfy itself not only about the genuineness of
the Will but also satisfy itself that it is not fraught with any suspicious
circumstances and existence of suspicious circumstances itself may be
held to be sufficient to arrive at a conclusion that the execution of the
Will has not been duly made.
33. However, the learned counsel for the respondents/plaintiffs would cite a judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 2008 (1) LW 241 (Benga Behera & another v. Braja Kishore Nanda & others) in which the following passage he relied upon as follows:-
In 2007 vol.9 SCC 728 Benga Behera and Anr. v. Braja Kishore Nanda and Ors. , relied upon by Advocate Chavan, the Hon'ble Apex Court found that PW 9 had put his signature before testatrix had put thumb impression on the Will. He did not answer the requirement of attesting witnesses. It also found that he was not aware of any other person attesting the Will. It, therefore, held that 23 his evidence was insufficient to prove execution in writing. It is, therefore, obvious that as this person has placed his signature before hand and he was not aware about other persons attesting the Will, the view has been taken by the Hon'ble Apex Court.
43. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in a long line of
decisions has explained the essentials as regards the
attestation of a Will under section 63 (c) of the Indian
Succession Act, 1925 and proof of such attestation under
section 68 of the Evidence Act, 1872. Therefore, there cannot
be any quarrel about the propositions relied upon by the
learned counsel for the contesting respondents relying upon
the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ramesh Verma
v. Lagesh Saxena reported in (2017) 1 SCC page 257, or
Kashibai v. Parvathi reported in (1995) 6 SCC 213 or Benga
44
Behera and others v. Braja Kishore Nanda and others reported
in (2007) 9 SCC 728.
76. To "attest" is to bear witness to a fact - See Benga Behera v.
Braja Kishore Nanda.25 The word attestation is defined in Section 3
of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which provides that "attested"
in relation to an instrument, means and shall be deemed always to
have meant attested by two or more witnesses each of whom has seen
the executant sign or affix his mark to the instrument, or has seen
some other person sign the instrument in the presence and by the
direction of the executant, or has received from the executant a
personal acknowledgement of his signature of mark, or of the
signature of such other person, and each of whom has signed the
instrument in the presence of the executant; but it shall not be
necessary that more than one of such witnesses shall have been
present at the same time, and no particular form of attestation shall be
necessary. By attestation is meant the signing of a document to signify
that the attestor is a witness to the execution of the document; and by
Section 63(c) of the Act, an attesting witness is one who signs the
document in the presence of the executant after seeing the execution
24 (1998) 3 SCC 384
25 (2007) 9 SCC 728
Page No. 36/42
of the document or after receiving a personal acknowledgement from
the executant as regards the execution of the document. While making
attestation, there must be an animus attestandi, on the part of the
attesting witness, meaning thereby, he must intent to attest and
extrinsic evidence on this point is receivable.
While dealing with a case falling under clause (c) of Section 65 of the
Act, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Benga Behra v. Braja Kishore Nanda
2007 (3) RCR (Civil) 240, wherein the Will was sought to be proved by
way of secondary evidence, observed that it was obligatory on the part
of first respondent to establish the loss of original will beyond all
reasonable doubt. Since his testimony in this regard remained
uncorroborated, therefore, photocopy could not be admitted as
secondary evidence.