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Ravindra Jain vs Natraj Albums Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. on 16 October, 1996

(7) There is a near unanimity of opinion amongst different High Courts of the country as deducible from the available decided cases holding the provisions of Rule 3-A directory and not mandatory. Merely because a time barred appeal is not accompanied by an application for condensation of delay that by itself is no ground to dismiss the appeal. 7.1. For Bombay view see M.Das Gupta v. Prakash K. Shah, . 7.2.
Delhi High Court Cites 25 - Cited by 4 - R C Lahoti - Full Document

Bhagwan S/O Ganpatrao Godsay vs Kachrulal S/O Bastimal Samdariya on 23 January, 1987

In M. Das Gupta v. Prakash K. Shah, , it is held that despite the apparently peremptory language of Rule 3-A of Order 41 of the code the appeal preferred after the expiry of period of limitation cannot be dismissed summarily on ground that the application for condonation of delay does not accompany the memo of appeal. Here also Jahagirdar, J, hinted that in the matter of procedure the word "shall" should be liberally construed. Further there is a direct decision of Tated, J., in Shaikh lbrahim v. Teckchand Fakirchand Rathod and others, 1986 Mh.L.J. 903. The learned Judge took the view that the Appellate Court can grant interim relief till decision of the application for condonation of delay.
Bombay High Court Cites 13 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

State Of Karnataka vs Nagappa on 28 June, 1985

23. The view we have taken as to how an appellate Court can make operative subrule (1) of R. 3A, it has to be said, receives support from the decisions of High Courts of Kerala, Patna and Bombay (Mayadevi v. M. K. Krishna Bhattathiri, ; State of Bihar v. Rav Chandi Nath Sahay, ; and M. Das Gupta v. Prakash K. Shah, though the reasons given therefor, are not exactly the same as ours.
Karnataka High Court Cites 11 - Cited by 6 - N Venkatachala - Full Document

Smt. Umrao Bai And Ors. vs Sardarilal Khatri on 22 March, 1996

This Court finds that the counsel failed in his duty in filing the appeal without any application for condonation of delay. This appeal was allowed to be decided without going into the question of limitation. The learned counsel for the respondent, however, urged that Order XLI, Rule 3A is not mandatory. He cited the decision of Karnataka High Court in the case of State of Karnataka v. Nagappa, AIR 1986 Kant 199 and of Bombay High Court, in the case of M. Das Gupta v. Prakash Shah, AIR 1984 Bombay 390. He also urged that appellant had filed review application which was refused by the lower appellate Court. The application of condonation of delay was filed at that stage and delay was condoned. It is, therefore, necessary to repel the contention of learned counsel as unwarranted. The lower appellate Court had refused to review the judgment and decree passed by it. That does not mean that delay was condoned. The lower appellant Court did not decide the question of extension of limitation after setting aside its judgment and decree and did not give any opportunity to refute the allegations made in the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to the appellants. The Court below had given fanciful reasons for not reviewing its own judgment and decree and has gone to the extent of holding that delay was impliedly condoned. This is travesty of law. However, it is not necessary to go further than to say that since the review application was rejected, the question of condonation of delay did not arise. Nor does rejection of review application come in the way of deciding this appeal.
Madhya Pradesh High Court Cites 9 - Cited by 3 - Full Document

National General Mazdoor Union vs Nitin Casting Limited And Ors. on 11 July, 1990

5. While interpreting an analogous provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure, this Court in M. Das Gupta v. Prakash K. Shah 1984 Maharashtra Law Journal 694, has held that despite the fact that Rule 3-A of Order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure mentions that the appeal must be accompanied by an application making out the case for condonation of delay if the appeal is beyond the period of limitation, it does not preclude the appellant from presenting an application for condonation of delay when it is brought to his notice that the appeal has been filed beyond time. In particular, this Court held that despite the apparently peremptory language of Rule 3-A of Order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure, the appeal preferred after the period of expiry of limitation cannot be dismissed summarily on the ground that the application for condonation of delay does not accompany the memo of appeal. This is for the simple reason that at the time when the appeal is preferred, the appellant may not be aware that the appeal is beyond time or may be insisting that the appeal was within time.
Bombay High Court Cites 7 - Cited by 5 - Full Document
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